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ABSTRACT 
The Arab Socialist movement in Iraq is part of a 
larger Socialist movement which began to spread in Arab land 
a-fter word war II and to effect the structure and dynamics 
of Arab society in varying degrees of intensity. Broadly 
speaking, the Arab socialist movement in Iraq may not be 
different in theoretical framework from the other Arab 
socialist movements, But the impact and course of 
development of each movement varied from land to land. 
The Arab Socialist movement, often called the 
Ba'th or the arab Resurrection, emerged first in syria in 
response to Arab nationalist demands as seen from syrian 
perspectives, But after spreading to iraq in conditions 
different from Syria, its goal and directions appeared not 
altogether similar to those in syria or in other Arab lands. 
Though the Arab socialist movement in Iraq 
appeared almost a decade after it had arisen in Syria, some 
of the influence that affected its scope and direction may 
be traced back to the intellectual and political activities 
of pre-war years as well as to the events and new conditions 
which gave rise to social upheavels that swept the country 
after the World War-II. As a result, the Arab socialist 
movement in Iraq has acquired a local colouring and the 
country's principal political figures stamped it with their 
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own imprint and identi-fied it with their own local interests 
and traditions. 
Like the socialist movements in the other Arab 
lands, the Iraqi Arab socialist movement sought progress, 
social justice and prosperity which were not possible to 
achieve under the old Regime. It was hoped that in time that 
system would mature into a stable and truly parliamentary 
•form of government which would provide the legitimate bases 
•for political participation and opportunities for welfare 
and prosperity for all. Soon after independence, however, 
this system began to appear meaningless because the ruling 
elite betrayed authoritarian tendencies and had little or no 
respect for parliamentary process. After world war II, when 
a "new generation" began to grow and sought participation in 
the political system, they were denied the -freedom necessary 
-for political participation. Failure of the ruling 
obligarchy to accommodate itself to the new social 
conditions prompted the new generation to resist the 
monopoly of power, by force if necessary. When the young 
civilian leaders were unable to achieve power, the young 
officers felt compelled to overthrow the old regime, for 
these officers shared the same ideas and aspirations as 
their civilian contemporaries. They sought to achieve by the 
armed forces of the state what civilian leaders could not do 
by strikes and street demonstrations. 
The early ideological structure o-f the Ba'th 
mounted a diverse ideological trends lie between extreme 
left and extreme right, Pan-Arabism and Regionalism, while 
the Ba'th rejects the military coups -for achieving power, it 
came to power in Iraq and Syria only through its military 
organisation and through its alliance with other nationalist 
groups. But, instead o-f recognizing right of sharing power 
to other groups, it exercised absolute dictatorship. 
As regards the religious policy of the Ba'th one 
may say that the question of religion has occupied an 
important place in the ideology of the Ba'th. The early 
literature shows lenient stance on the religious issues on 
different occassions. 
In the later phase of the Ba'th which was 
demarcated by Saddam's rise to power and his growing 
influence in the party in the late seventies, one finds that 
the Iraqi leadership sought a balance between religion, Pan-
Arabism and patriotism. The promotion of patriotism was a 
necessary measure to consolidate Iraqi society which is 
ethinically a heterogeneous society. Revival of Iraq's 
ancient history provided the main source for patriotism 
(wataniyya). 
But the military achieved only a political 
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revolution which rid the country of the ruling obligarchy; 
The social revolution which reformers had dreamed of had yet 
to be achieved. The new generation was divided on what sort 
of "Social revolution" it should seek and what method it 
should pursue to achieve it. Some disappointed with the 
military, urged the revival of traditional symbols and 
values, because the social changes achieved by military 
methods did not measure up to expectations, others preached 
radical ideologies which sought basic changes in social 
conditions. Yet in Iraq-indeed in several other Arab 
countries only the Arab socialist party(the Ba'th) seems to 
exite young Arabs more than other radical groups because it 
sought to hamonize the Arab with modern social and economic 
doctrines considered necessary to modernise Arab society. 
Perhaps a more important instrument to enlist 
popular participation would be a National Assembly in which 
various shades of opinion could be represented. The 
temporary constitution has indeed provide for such an 
Assembly but the relevant articles of the constitution 
(Article 46-55) have not yet been implemented. Leaders of 
various groups and national organizations prepared to 
cooperate within the framework of the regime seem to be 
awaiting the opportunity to express their views through an 
elected organ but plans for holding of elections have not 
been laid down. 
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The Ba'th leaders have shown a great entrtusiasm in 
emphasising "reconstruction" by planning and economic 
development than in the granting of freedom and political 
participation on the ground that no real progress and 
stability in the country can be achieved before poverty and 
other forms of deprivation were wiped out. Ba'th socialism, 
it, is held is designed to improve social and economic 
conditions as a prerequisite to other ultimate objectives-
democracy, freedom and Arab unity". 
The 1991 war and its aftermath brought to the 
surface an emotional unity wihdathal (unity of situation) 
among the Arabs. The sympathy expressed by many Arabs for 
Saddam and for his invasion and occupation of Kuwait, 
indicates that many Arabs do not take for granted the 
boundaries between Arab states because they do not consider 
the divisions of the Arabs world to be permanent. 
In the Arab public eye some border are less 
popular than others. The borders that insulate the Gulf 
royal families and their fortunes are very unpopular and the 
elimination of the Gulf political orders and elites is 
desirable in the eyes of many Arabs. 
Arab nationalism now consist of two major ideas; 
first the notion that the Arabs share common sentiments and 
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cultural and linguistic heritage and for some, a religious 
heritage. Second the idea that some o-f the borders between 
Arabs state arm not only artificial but also undesirable. 
There are various arguments that Arabs promote regarding the 
e-f-ficacy o-f Arab nationalism, for Faysal Darray the well-
known Palestinian writer the crisis in Arab contemporary 
history do not underscore the divisions between the Arab 
people, rather they underline the schism between "the 
people" and " the regimes". The repercussions of the Gulf 
War, according to Darraj, sharpened the divisions between 
the people and the regimes but not among the Arab people 
themselves. 
In a society where kinship, communal, tribal and 
other primordial loyalties prevail, the Ba'th has attached 
considerable value to the mystique of being an Arab. the 
self-assertion of his Arab identity would awaken the 
nationalist consciousness that lay dormant and trigger off 
automatic processes for self realization as an Arab 
nationalist. It is clear that Ba'thists are not prepared to 
distinguish between the individual being a national of the 
state and a nationalist. 
However, the over-emphasis on people rather 
than territory, and nationality rather than citizenship, 
makes Ba'thist doctrine repressive as its strives for the 
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assimilation of heterogeneous communities so that everyone 
conforms to its militant nationalist requirements. It is a 
recipe for the establishment of authoritarian rule under the 
control of a totalitarian party. 
It is in this background that the present 
study is devided into five chapters. The First Chapter 
begins with a brief discription of the origins of Arab 
nationalism, showing how the idea of Arabs as a separate 
ethno-1inguistic entity gradually took shape in the Arab 
provinces of the Ottomon Empire in the latter part of the 
19th century with the effective devision of the West Asia 
between Britian and France after 1920. Arab nationalism 
subsequently developed in two different but essentially 
inter-related directions. First it took the form of a 
movement of national liberation, seeking independence from 
foreign rule or foreign influence. Secondly a number of 
writers, put forward ideas of pan-Arabism, the notion that 
the Arabs form a single entity stretching from Morocco to 
Iraq, which has been divided artificially by colonial 
imperialism and (since 1948) Zionism. 
The Second Chapter highlights the growth and 
developments of the Ba'th movement in Ir-aq, as was 
elaborated by the Syrian Christian writer Michael Aflaq in 
the mid 1940s and 1950s. Aflaq and his associates gained 
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considerable in-fluence in Syrian politics until 1958, when 
the, Syrian Ba'th, -founded -formally in 1944, agreed to 
dissolve itself as the price demanded by Nasser for the 
creation of the union of Syria and Egypt, known as the 
united Arab Republic. The failure of the union in 1961 
percipitated a major and permanent split in the Ba'th, which 
has been in some sense institutionalised ever since by the 
existence of two separate Ba'th party in Syria and Iraq. 
The Third Chapter, ^Political Development in 
the Republican Iraq', begins highliting the February 1963 
coup de'tat which brought the Ba'th party to power in an 
orgy of bloodshed until their overthrow in November 1963 by 
a military nationalist coup. It further examines the 
successor governments that ruled Iraq until the Ba'th 
regained power by a coup in July 1968 and Ba'th rule since 
then. This chapter also attempts to cover the Ba'th Party 
activity in early 1970 to gain wider support by having a 
national allieance with some of the opposition parties, the 
Algiers Treaty with Shah of Iran in 1975; increasingly 
terroistic one party rule culminating from 1978 in violent 
repression of all opposition, life and history of Saddam 
Hussain and seizure of presidency in 1979 by eliminating all 
his opponents rivals in the Ba'th Party. This Chapter also 
traces the involvement of the army in politics, the role of 
political parties and Ideologies in the army; and the post-
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1968 Ba'thisation o-f the army aimed at creating al-Jaish al-
'Aqaidi (the ideological army). 
The Fourth Chapter - "Ba'th Party and the 
Kurdish Question', provides a detailed history of the Kurds 
since the 19th. century, including the Kurdish politics 
be-fore the 1958 Revolution in Iraq and after. This study 
also includes the significance of the 1970 manifesto and 
Algiers agreement of 1975. The discussion however in its 
ultimate analysis highlights the underlying conflict between 
a central government, anxious to solidify its authority and 
to preserve Iraq's territorial integrity and an entrenched 
Kurdish leadership whose desire for Autonomy was exploited 
by foreign intrests, which sought to promote the 
instanbility, if not the destruction — of the Ba'th regime 
in Baghdad. 
The last Chapter Republican Iraq at the cross 
roads demonstrates the causes and effects of the two Gulf 
Wars 8/. subsequently its over all impact on the politics of 
the region. 
BA'TH PARTY IN IRAQ SINCE 1951 
SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF 
Bettor of $}|iIO!e(op}|p 
IN 
POLITICAL SCIENCE 
nu I 
JAMIL AHMED KHAN 
DR. MOHAMMAD GULREZ 
READER (C W A S ) 
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY 
ALIGARH (INDIA) 
1996 
r a--'-
T4960 
^0i'^WK 
!^*>^;^^i •«# ^^j j ,^ . VJ-^. 
^ 1 AUG 1998 
L 
^ ^ -
M ^£i,M. 
i% * * » » ; • 
(E® M i iAlRiENai 
CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that Mr. Jamil Ahmed Khan has worked 
on his Ph.D. Thesis entitled, 'Bath Party in Iraq Since 
1951' under my Supervision. This is his own original 
contribution and suitable for the submission for the 
award of the degree of Ph.D. in Political Science. 
Dr. Mohammad Gulrez 
Supervisor 
C O N T E N T S 
Page No, 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS i - li 
PREFACE ill - X 
CHAPTER - 1 ROOTS OF ARAB NATIONALISM 1 - 3 0 
CHAPTER - 2 ORIGIN OF THE BA'TH PARTY 31 - 73 
CHAPTER - 3 POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
REPUBLICAN IRAQ 
74 - 109 
CHAPTER - 4 BA'TH AND THE KURDISH QUESTION 110 - 129 
CHAPTER - 5 REPUBLICAN IRAQ AT THE CROSS ROADS 130 - 163 
CONCLUSION 164 - 171 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
APPENDIX - A 
- B 
- C 
THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION OF THE 
IRAQI REPUBLIC 
DECISIONS OF THE SIXTH NATIONAL 
CONVENTION OF THE ARAB BA'TH 
SOCIALIST PARTY, 1963 
CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB BA'TH 
SOCIALIST PARTY 
172 
186 
18B 
216 
217 - 236 
237 - 256 
A C K N 0 M L E D 6 E M E N T 8 
In pursuance o-f this study I have received 
generous help -from many o-f teachers and -friends whom I wish 
to acknowledge from the core o-f my heart. 
Firstly I owe my sincere gratitudes to 
Dr. Mohd. Gulrez, Reader, Centre o-f West Asian Studies my 
supervisor without whose unceasing kindness and cooperation 
this work would not have been possible. I was greatly 
enspired by the Prof. Sahn Mohd, Chairman o-f the Political 
Science Department, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, who 
extended -full sympathy and encouragement and made available 
seminar facilities to complete this work. 
My thanks are also due to Prof. Akhtar 
Majeed, Director, Centre of West Asian Studies and Professor 
liahmudul Haque, for their valuable suggestions and 
encouragement. I am also thankful to the Director, Centre of 
West Asian Studies, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh for 
providing me Project Assistance grant for the completion of 
this work. 
I also wish to thanks the staff members of 
the Centre of West Asian Studies Library, Maulana Azad 
Library, J.N.U. Library and Political Science seminar for 
their kind cooperation. 
Cii] 
I wish to thanks my -friends without giving 
name who helped me in various ways. 
Th shortcomings and inaccuracies which remain 
and for the view points, I do ofcourse take the 
responsibi1ity. 
Finally I am thank'ful to Mr. Azimur Rehtnan 
•for excellently typing this work. 
( JAMIL AHMAD KHAN ) 
Ciii3 
PREFACE 
The modern state of Iraq has no historical 
antecedents for its present territorial dimensions. The 
heterogeneity of its society has preclude the development of 
a sense of political community among its diverse 
constituents. Hardly any community in a conglomeration of 
minorities—ethnic, religious,sectarian and denominational — 
wanted the state in the form it was created. Muslims, 
Sunnis and Shi'is, Arabs, Kurds and Turcomans, Christians 
and Jews entertained divergent political ends. Their new 
state was artificial as the lines drawn to demarcate its 
international frontiers. It was born out of the ruin of the 
Ottoman Empire, rejected and opposed by the people whose 
life and livelihood were to be determined and regulated by 
its laws and procedures. As such it failed to provide the 
general basis for the rule of law; nor could it serve as a 
single focus of loyalty or allegiance for the different 
communities. Thus, a salient feature of Iraqi politics has 
remained inherent instability and a marked propensity toward 
coersion in the settlement of political disputes, due mainly 
to its failure to develop an institutional frame work under 
which political difference could be accomodated and 
resolved. 
Milton Esman in his book Ethnicity, pluralism 
and the state in the Middle East addresses that ethnic 
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politics is a phenomenon that prevades the Third World. 
Since many o-f the states in Asia and A-frica are the product 
o-f their colonial past, their national frontiers are no more 
than the re-flection o-f the European imperial interests, 
conquest and domination. The same pattern obtains in the 
Middle East, only in a more pronounced -fashion. Under the 
post-colonial arrangement the territorial state, as the new 
political authority, has claimed exclusive control over the 
territory it occupies and the allegiance of all communities 
and people residing therein. It becomes the task of the new 
authority to engage in nation-building practices to subsume 
the diverse and divergent primordial loyalties of the 
various minorities encouraging their assimilation into the 
dominant ethnic community in order to fuse a union between 
nation and state. But unfortunately the majority of the 
territorial states in the world have failed to secure such 
an achievement. The inheritors of the colonial states have 
shown little inclination to revise the boundaries to make 
them more compatible with demographic reality. 
The state has had to establish its exclusive 
control through force and coercion rather than popular 
consent. Its instrument has been the Iraqi army, which has 
continued to be the repository of political power in the 
land. the imposition of its will did not resolve the 
prevailing hostility which the various communities harboured 
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toward the state and to each other. The tribesmen, who had 
little enthusiasm for a centralised administration, have 
been crushed and paci-fied. the Kurds, promised a state of 
their own in the immediate a-ftermath o-f the First World War, 
have been bludgeoned but not completely cowed. the Muslim 
Arab Shi'is, who resented and opposed sunni political 
domination -following their enfranchisement from the 
disabilities imposed by the Ottomons, have witnessed the 
destruction of their tribal structure which afforded power 
and protection, the deportation, exile and execution of 
their religious leadership, while their more westernised and 
secular groups have remained alienated, resentful and 
ignored. The Turcomans, who awaited liberation at the hands 
of Mustafa Kamal Ataturk, caught between recalcitrant Kurds 
and a domineering Arab government in Baghdad, have been 
intimidated into submission. 
Moreover, the elaborately devised means for 
national integration proved drastically inadequate. Iraq 
has been governed by different regimes, monarchical and 
republican, professing variants of the same ideology. Pan-
Arabism transformed into a radical doctrine of Arab 
nationalism under the Ba'th has ill served the integrative 
processes sought in nation-building. It has been a 
disruptive factor as it tends to draw a distinction between 
Arabs and non-Arabs as well as Muslims and non-Muslims. 
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However, in the provision o-f historical perspectives for the 
right to nationhood, Arab nationalist ideologies both Muslim 
and Christian, rely on the Islamic legacy which closely 
associated with Orthodox Islam. 
The golory o-f the Arab past owes a great deal 
to it, the unity of Arabia was achieved through the spread 
of Islam, and nationalist aspirations have been inspired by 
it. None the less the non-Sunni Muslims, particularly the 
Shi'is, do not share the view of history. For them, as for 
other religious groupings, the invocation of religious 
symbols and the constant reference to Sunni traditions has 
raised doubts about the validity of the nationalist 
ideology. 
It is rather paradoxical that the 
popularisation of nationalist claims on religious grounds 
has rendered the nationalist doctrine more divisive. It is 
this dichotomy which Ayatollah Khomeini sought to exploit in 
his campaign against Iraq under the Ba'th and conversely 
Saddam in the promotion of an Islamic concept of the state. 
It has become a common perception for states engaged in 
conflict to view the heterogeneity of society as an 
instrument of policy utilised for the purpose of obtaining 
territorial or other concessions at times of domestic 
upheavals. 
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The contribution of the Ba'th to this 
ideology has accentuated the inherent contradictions rather 
than resolved them. In a society where kinship, communal, 
tribal and other primordial loyalties prevail, the Ba'th has 
attached considerable value to the mystique of being an 
Arab. the self-assertion of his Arab identity would awaken 
the nationalist consciousness that lay dormant and trigger 
off automatic processes for self realization as an Arab 
nationalist. It is clear that Ba'thists are not prepared to 
distinguish between the individual being a national of the 
state and a nationalist. 
However, the ovei—emphasis on people rather 
than territory, and nationality rather than citizenship, 
makes Ba'thist doctrine repressive as its strives for the 
assimilation of heterogeneous communities so that everyone 
conforms to its militant nationalist requirements. It is a 
recipe for the establishment of authoritarian rule under the 
control of a totalitarian party. 
It is in this background that the present 
study is devided into five chapters. The First Chapter 
begins with a brief discription of the origins of Arab 
nationalism, showing how the idea of Arabs as a separate 
ethno-1inguistic entity gradually took shape in the Arab 
provinces of the Ottomon Empire in the latter part of the 
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19th century with the effective devision of the West Asia 
between Britian and France after 1920. Arab nationalism 
subsequently developed in two different but essentially 
inter-related directions. First it took the form of a 
movement of national liberation, seeking independence from 
foreign rule or foreign influence. Secondly a number of 
writers, put forward ideas of pan-Arabism, the notion that 
the Arabs form a single entity stretching from Morocco to 
Iraq, which has been divided artificially by colonial 
imperialism and (since 1948) Zionism. 
The Second Chapter highlights the growth and 
developments of the Ba'th movement in Iraq, as was 
elaborated by the Syrian Christian writer Michael Aflaq in 
the mid 1940s and 1950s. Aflaq and his associates gained 
considerable influence in Syrian politics until 1958, when 
the Syrian Ba'th, founded formally in 1944, agreed to 
dissolve itself as the price demanded by Nasser for the 
creation of the union of Syria and Egypt, known as the 
united Arab Republic. The failure of the union in 1961 
percipitated a major and permanent split in the Ba'th, which 
has been in some sense institutionalized ever since by the 
exijstence of two separate Ba'th in Syria and Iraq. 
Chapter Third, Political Development in the 
Republican Iraq, begins with the February 1963 coup de'tat 
which brought the Ba'th party to power in an orgy of 
bloodshed until their overthrow in November 1963 by a 
military nationalist coup. It further examines the 
successor governments that ruled Iraq until the Ba'th 
regained power by a coup in July 1968 and Ba'th rule since 
then. This chapter also attempts to cover the Ba'th Party 
activity in early 1970 to gain wider support by having a 
national allieance with some of the opposition parties, 
inside the count in the Algiers Treaty with Shah of Iran in 
1975; increasingly terroistic one party rule culminating 
from 1978 in violent repression of all opposition, life and 
history of Saddam Hussain and seizure of presidency in 1979 
by eliminating all his opponents rivals in the Ba'th Party. 
This Chapter alfeo traces the involvement of the army in 
politics, the role of political parties and ideologies in 
the army; and the past-1968 Ba'thisation of the army aimed 
at creating al~Jaish al-''Aqaidi <the ideological army). 
The Fourth Chapter Ba'th Party and the 
Kurdish Question provides a detailed history of the Kurds 
since the 19th. century, including the Kurdish politics 
before the 1958 Revolution in Iraq and after. This study 
also includes the significance of the 1970 manifesto and 
Algiers agreement of 1975. The discussion however in its 
ultimate analysis highlights the underlying conflict between 
a central government, anxious to'solidify its authority and 
to preserve Iraq's territorial integrity and an entrenched 
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Kurdish leadership whose desire for Autonomy was exploited 
by -foreign intrests, which sought to promote the 
instanbi 1 ity, ii not the destruction — o-f the Ba'th regime 
in Baghdad. 
The last Chapter Republican Iraq at the cross 
roads demonstrates the causes and effects of the two Gulf 
Wars S< subsequently its over all impact on the politics of 
the region. 
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ROOTS OF ARAB NftTIONALISM 
The body o-f ideas of oneness and unity from 
which Arab nationalism later emerged, developed only 
gradually during the second half of the 19th century. The 
earliest notion of the Arabs as a separate ethno-1inguistic 
entity was essentially secular, and derives initially from 
the writings of Syrian and Lebanese intellectuals who were 
themselves inspired by European nationalism, liberalism and 
constitutionalism. Many, though not all, were either 
Christians or had been educated in the schools and colleges 
founded in Greater Syria during and after the 1830s and 
1840s. A little later Muslim writers like Abd-al-Rahman al-
Kawakibi and Rashid Rida, under the inspiration of European 
liberalism and the ideals of Islamic reform put forward 
principally by Mohammad Abduh, sought to identify the Arabs 
more colsely with Islam, asserting that only the Arabs could 
purge the Islamic polity of the corruption into which it had 
fallen during the centuries of Ottomon control. Naturally, 
both these notions were a direct challenge to the ^Official' 
ideology of the Ottomon Empire as the universal Islamic 
State (dawla) ruled over by the Ottomon Sultan-Caliph. In 
this state, religion rather than language or ethnicity was 
the primary focus and indeed the only means of identity. 
Further in the course of his long reign Abd al-Hamid 
attempted to encourage the association between Pan-Islamism 
and Ottomonism . 
1. CARDRI (Committee Against Repression and Democratic 
Rights in Iraq) Saddam's Iraq Revolution or Reaction. 
Zed Book London, 1986, p. 90. 
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The aims o-f Arab nationalism w«re nmvmr 
•formulated in a set o-f principles at the time Arabs grsw 
aware of themselves as a group separate -from others in the 
Ottoman Empire. Be-fore World War-I, while the Arab id«« o-f 
nationalism was mingled with the idea o-f Islamic unity, Arab 
nationalism scarcely aimed beyond the rehabilitation of Arab 
race in multinational empire. The aim of Arab nationalism 
was merely to restore the Arabs to their lost role in Islam 
to which they felt entitled. Even the early Arab Christian 
thinkers, who advocated complete separation from the Ottoman 
union, were ready to compromise their extreme nationalist 
views to Islamic unity so as to maintain solidarity with 
2 
their Muslim compatriots . 
Muslim liberal thinkers who advocated the 
idea of nationalism did neither demand that Arab lands be 
detached from the Ottoman Empire nor indeed that religion be 
separated from the state. ^Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (1849-
1903) , the most radical thinker who attacked Ottoman rule, 
called for the restoration of the Caliphate from Turkish to 
Arab hands, but not for a break in Ottoman unity . He 
2. Kadduri, Majid., Political Trends in the Arab World, 
John Hopkins Press, London, (1970), p. 19. 
3. Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi belonged to a family of 
Aleppo, of Kurdish origin. He had an old-fashioned 
Arabic and Turkish Education in his native city, and 
then worked there as official and journalist untill he 
Fell foul of the Turkish authorities and found it best 
to move to Cairo in 1898. 
4. Al-Kawakibi's argument that the Turks usurped the 
Caliphate from the Arabs was based on the doctrine that 
one of the qualification of the Caliph must be his 
descent from the Arab tribe of Quraysh, according to 
authoritative legal texts. 
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failed, however, to define his frequent references to the 
Arab nation in clear nationalist terms, and his idea of 
nationalism represented but a transition from the ecumenical 
to the national stage. 
Al-kawakibi was, in truth, a revolutionary in 
spirit and inclination and that he often used to say; "if I 
had an army, I would have over thrown the government of 
Abdul Hamid in twenty-four hours". This estimate is 
confirmed by the ^Characteristics of Tyranny'. In this book 
al-kawakibi attacks political and religious tyranny and its 
nefarious effects on science, morality and progress. "True 
Islam", he argues, "is incompatible with tyranny, and it 
must lead to the just state in which individual lives 
happily, at one with his nation, completely free, yet 
completely owned by it". It is only a just political order, 
he says, that makes possible science, morality and progress. 
In this book Taba'i al-Istibdad (the characteristics of 
tyranny) which was and still remains very popular al-
kawakibi gave currency to a secular view of politics which 
holds that the only just government is government according 
to the will of the people, that any other government is 
tyrannical and can be removed by the governed . He held the 
tyrannical nature of the Ottoman state responsible for the 
stagnation of Islam and declared the Ottoman Empire unfit to 
protect the faith. Thus, the regeneration of Islam could 
only be undertaken by the Arabs of the Arabian peninsula 
5. Halm, Sylvia 6. (ed.)., Arab NationalIsmi An Anthology, 
Los Angeles and London, University of California Press, 
(1962), p. 26. 
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Bince only they were -free of racial, religious and sectarian 
bias. 
The ideas that he expressed in his other 
book, Umma al-qura, were even more revolutionary. This book 
attempts to explain the stagnation o-f Islam and to provide a 
remedy for it. The Muslim, he says, "are now a dead people 
with no corporate being or feelings. Their stagnation is 
the result of the tyranny, of the decline of the Islamic 
culture, and of the absence of racial and linguistic bonds 
among Muslims, and partly for this reason the Ottoman Empire 
is not fit to preserve Islam. The Muslim Kingdom is made up 
of different countries professing different religions and 
divided into numerous sects, and their ministers are drawn 
from different nationalities. Thus the Ottoman Empire 
cannot effect the regeneration of Islam. Regeneration 
should be the work of the Arabs who would supply a Caliph, 
residing in Mecca, and acting as the spiritual head of an 
Islamic union. Al-Kawakibi also provides a list of twenty-
six different reasons to prove the superiority of the Arabs 
and why the Caliphate should devolve upon them . 
There were no half measures in his attitude, 
he saw the Arabs as better Muslims than the Turks. As such 
they deserved to have their position of primacy in Islam 
acknowledged and recognized by other Muslims. Here lies the 
most glaring contradiction that has plagued Arab nationalism 
as an ideology of the Arabs. For the question that has 
6. Ibid., p. 27. 
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remained unanswered is! 'which Arabs?' It was obvious, 
since the call was made on religious grounds, that Kawakibi, 
being a Sunni Muslim and a Syrian, meant that it was the 
primacy o-f the Sunni Muslims which out to be acknowledged. 
This fact in the evolution o-f Arab nationalism has been 
completely overlooked. Moreover, subsequent works on Arab 
nationalism especially, strangely as it may seem, by 
Christian ideologues o-f Arab nationalism have come to 
subscribe to this view . 
Al-Kawakibi, then, may be considered as the 
•first intellectual precursor o-f modern secular Pan-Arabism. 
He was the -first to declare himsel-f, without ambiguity, as 
the champion of the Arabs against the Turks. 
The intellectual milieu of Istanbul in which 
many an Arab nationalist grew up was dominated by young 
Ottoman secular thought and most of the leaders who opposed 
Sultan *Abd al-Hamid's Pan-Islamic tried to keep the 
nationalist movement immune from Islamic influences. Most 
Arab nationalists were not prepared to accept the young 
Ottoman view of Islam, because Islam was regarded as a 
product of the Arabs cultural heritage from which they did 
not want to depart; indeed, most of them, including 
Christian thinkers, took pride in Islam because it laid 
special emphasis on the Arabic character of the Qur'an and 
on the Arabic language . 
7. Kelidar, Abbas, "The Rise of Arab Nationalism", Davis 
Uri, Andrew Mack, Nirayuval-Davis (ed.>; Israel and the 
Palestinians, Ithaca Press, London, (1975), pp. 86-87. 
8. Khadduri, Majid, 1970, op, cit, p. 179. 
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It is this significant cultural element which 
prompted Arab thinkers to regard Islam as a component o-f 
Arab nationalism. To the Arabs, Islam came into being in 
Arabia, the cradle of the Arab race, and Muhammad was an 
Arab Prophet and a national hero. The Qur'an was not only 
revealed in Arabic language but all believers, Arabs as well 
as non-Arabs, had it as their obligation to recite it in 
Arabic. The Arabs were the first believers of Islam and 
they struggled to spread it and establish the Islamic 
Empire. It was the Arabic language and Arab cultural 
heritage which superseded the racial bond and made possible 
the Arabization of people who adopted the Arab tongue and 
identified themselves as Arabs, especially the people of the 
o 
Fertile Crescent . 
It was the Arabic language and culture which 
inspired Arab thinkers, Muslims and Christian alike, to 
develop Arab national consciousness and call for an Arab 
identity separate from Ottoman identity in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As a product of 
the Arab heritage, Islam has been looked upon as a spiritual 
force and a set of moral values necessary for life. But if 
Islam is seen as a component of nationalism, it no longer 
remains the exclusive loyalty in the traditional sense . 
Perhaps the representative thinker whose 
primary loyalty was to Islam but who accepted nationalism as 
9. Ibid., p. 180. 
10. Ibid., p. 181. 
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a basis -for the Islamic state was the rBiormer Rashid Rida 
(1865-1935). Rashid Rida le-ft his native land Syria and 
came to Cairo in 1897 where he published the review Al-Manar 
(The Beacon) until his death in 1935^ . 
If, on the one hand, Mohammad Abduh (1849-
1905) makes no concession to nationalism or patriotism as a 
•factor in achieving unity, Rashid Rida represents yet a 
second trend. While opposing Ottoman rule, he rejected any 
tendency towards establishing separate Arab states based on 
non-Islamic solidarity in the Islamic World. But the Arabs, 
•for him, had a special place within the Islamic nations. 
"The Other Muslims", he held, "were pupils of the Arabs". 
This opposition to Ottoman rule was counterbalanced in Egypt 
by a strong pro-Ottoman movement with comparatively less 
interest in rel igion*-*-. 
Infused with the Arab nationalism Rashid Rida 
often showed more concern about Arab problems than those of 
other Islamic countries. In the true traditional Arab view 
of Islam, Rida spoke of the founder of Islam as an Arab 
Prophet, the Qura'an as revealed scripture in the Arab 
tongue, and the Arabs as the carriers of the message of 
Islam beyond the frontiers of Arabia^ . Giving reply to a 
question set by an Indonesian correspondent regarding ^what 
11. Hourani, Albert., Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 
1798-1939,Oxford University Press,London,(1962), p. 227 
12. Bezirgan, Najm, A. "Islam and Arab Nationalism", Curtis, 
Michael (ed.), Religion and Politics in the Middle East, 
West View Press, Boulder, Colorado (1981), p. 44. 
13. Khadduri, Majid, 1970, op, cit, p. 181. 
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is the attitude of Islam towards nationalism', Rida 
maintained that "As for the modern idea of nationalism, it 
is nothing but union of the inhabitants of a homeland who 
may be different in religion, who cooperate in the defence 
of their common homeland and in preserving its independence 
or in winning it back, when it is lost, and in increasing 
its prosperity. Such an idea does not manifest itself in 
Indonesia as it does in Egypt. Islam considers that it is 
the duty of Muslims to defend those of other religions who 
came under their rule and to treat them on a basis of 
equality, according to the just rulings of the Sharia'. As 
far the kind of nationalism that should adorn the Muslim 
youth, it is that he should set a good example to the 
inhabitants of his homeland irrespective of their religion 
and sects, and that he should cooperate with them in every 
legitimate action to further the independence of the 
homeland and to raise it up in learning, virtue, strength, 
and wealth, according to the rules of Islamic law which lays 
down that rights and duties devolve on the nearest relatives 
and then on those nearest to them. Further Muslim youth 
must not forget, while serving his homeland and his people, 
that Islam has honoured him and exalted his position by 
making him a brother to hundreds of millions of Muslims in 
the world; he is a member of a body bigger than his people, 
his own personal homeland is only a part of his religious 
homeland, and he must therefore seek to make the progress of 
14 
the part a means toward the progress of the whole"*^. 
14. Rida, Rashid, "Islam and the National Idea" Haim, Sylvia 
G <ed.) Arab Nationalism; An Anthology, Lon Angeles and 
London, 1962, p. 76. 
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The distinction between what he wrote and the 
action he was prepared to take is reinforced by his 
political record during his early years in Egypt. He came 
to Egypt as a radical, discontented with the situation of 
the Ottoman Empire and anxious for reform. And there 
significantly enough, he joined the party of the young 
Turks. It was after the young Turk Revolution, and indeed 
after the Balkan Wars, that Rashid Rida joined others in 
forming the decentralization party, when the Young Turks 
showed themselves bent upon a centralising policy 
detrimental both to the Arabs and to the Empire . 
According to Rida, "the Europeans are active 
and successful because they have abandoned their other 
worldly religion and replaced it by the principle of 
nationality, but Muslims can find such a principle of unity 
and loyalty in their religion itself. For the second 
distinguishing sign of Islam is that it has created a single 
community; not simply a Church, a body of men linked by 
faith and worship yet separated by their natural 
characteristics, but a community in every sense . 
Perhaps the most forceful expression of this 
blend of Islam and nationalism by Muslim thinkers is to be 
found in the writings of Abdul Rahman al-Bazzaz. Abdul 
Rahman al-Bazzaz, educated in law at the University of 
London in the late thirties, imbued with humanistic 
15. Ibid., pp. 24-25. 
16. Hourani Alber; op; cit, p. 229. 
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conception o-f classical western liberalism returned to his 
home in Baghdad in 1939. In his distinguished careBr -first 
as a teacher and scholar and later as a diplomat and 
statesman, al-Bazzaz remained -faith+ul to his -fundamental 
conception o-f Arab nationalism in terms of a humanistic 
perspective o-f individual emancipation within the -framework 
o-f evolutionary social progress . 
Much of al-Baz2az's early writings are 
concerned with defining the relation between Islam and Arab 
nationalism. In Min Roh al-Islam (From the spirit of Islam) 
published in Baghdad in 1959, he advanced the thesis that 
"there is no real opposition between Islam and Arab 
nationalism: the Arab nation is the core of the Islamic 
community; most of Muslims are also Arabs; the Qur'an is in 
Arabic and embodies the traditional morality of the Arabs 
the Prophet was an Arab; Islam is the medium through which 
18 
the Arabs made their contribution to history" . 
This conception of the essential unity of 
Arab nationalism and Islam runs through al-Bazzaz's early 
formulation of the four basis of Arab nationalism; language, 
history, literature and customs and character. Arab 
nationalism for al-Bazzaz, like Zuraiq and other liberals, 
1 9 
is inextricably fused with Islam*^. 
17. Ismail, Tariq, Y., The Arab Left, Syracuse University 
Press, America, (1976), p. 6. 
18. Hourani Albert; op, cit, p. 309. 
19. Ismail, Tariq, Y., op, cit, p. 7. 
According to Bazzaz contradiction between 
Islam and Arab nationalism which is still present in the 
mind of many people is, in the first place, due to 
m isunderstanding, misrepresentation and misinterpretation, 
20 
involving both Islam and Arab nationalism . This, he 
maintained, sprang from a western conception of Islam and of 
nationalism, and that so many Arab had accepted it showed 
21 
the intellectual domination of the West over them . 
The misunderstanding of Islam, maintained by 
Bazzaz is due to the wrong significance attributed to the 
world Veligion'. He says, "We are influenced here as a 
result of the intellectual imperialism under which a group 
of us still labour by the western concepts which restricts 
religion within narrow limits not extending beyond worship, 
ritual, and the spiritual beliefs, which govern a man in his 
behaviour, in relation to his God and to his brotherman, in 
his capacity of an individual independent of society. Islam 
does not admit this narrow view of religion, but opposes it 
and the purpose it serves to the utmost. Many people still 
believe that Islam is similar to Christianity or Budhism, 
and consists in devotional beliefs and exercises, ethical 
rules and no more. But, in fact, Islam, in its precise 
sense, is a social order, a philosophy of life, a system of 
economic principles, a rule of government, in addition to 
22 
its being a religious creed in the narrow Western sense" . 
20. Bazzaz, Abd al-Rahman, "Islam and Arab Nationalism" 
Haim, Sylvia G. (ed.) Arab Nationalism; An Anthology, 
Los Angeles and London, (1962), p. 173. 
21. Hourani Albert; op, cit, p. 308. 
22. Haim, Sylvia 6., op, cit, p. 173. 
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He -further argues that there is absolutely no 
contradiction between Arabism and Islam. The two converge 
on many points, yet Islam can not be included as a 
"necessary" element in the -formation of Arab nationalism. 
What is interesting in his view is that; 
"If we equate religion and nationalism, 
we would exclude one-tenth of the 
Egyptian population, and one-fifth of 
Syria and about one-half of the 
population of Lebanon from Arab 
nationalism. We would also exclude a 
sizeable proportion of the Iraqis, 
Palestinians, Jordanians, and Sudanese, 
as wel1 as a great number of Arabs who 
have immigrated to America, Africa and 
other continents. But, on the other hand, 
when we lose these millions (of Arabs), 
the theory (that Islam is an essential 
element) would have us consider.... every 
Muslim in Asia.... brothers in the 
national sense, which means that the sons 
of the same nationality will have the 
same political destiny and one ultimate 
national interest, and requires the 
establishment of a social and political 
solidarity and association among them.... 
can the advocate of an Islamic 
nationalism imagine the consequences of 
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thinking and .... the responsibilities 
and obligations, which are beyond our 
power and resources '?"23 
Abdul Rahman al-Baszaz revived the old 
arguments when he asserted that nationalism and Islam went 
hand in hand in many respects. In the course of doing so he 
was to expose the nature o-F Arab nationalism as a divisive 
and elitist movement and so to provide an a-f-f irmation of the 
nationalist belief in the necessity for the preeminent 
position of the Sunni Community in Islam. To him 
nationalism had to take on the activist nature of Islam 
since nationalism was an assertion by the Arabs of the 
resumption of the mission of Mohammad. Thus the Prophet 
becomes the founder of the Arab nation, and Islam is the 
product of the Arab national genius. This kind of analysis 
leaves out the non-Muslim Arab, the Christian and the Jew, 
the non-Arab Muslim, the Kurd and Berber, and the heterodox 
Muslim, Shi'ite, Druse, Alawi and Ismaili. But Bazzaz 
claims to provide a solution for this dilemma too. "These 
groups become true Arabs when they recognize Muhammad as the 
hero of Arab nationalism and venerate Islam as the religion 
that entitled the Arab nation to assert its place in the 
world. This seems to be an open invitation not only to the 
non-Sunni Muslims but to the Christians, and the Jews to 
acknowledge that the Muslim Sunni Arab has the right 
ordained in orthodoxy to enjoy a position of primacy and 
presumably-rule all non-Sunni communities . 
23. Curtis, Michael, op, cit, p. 48. 
24. Davis Uri,Andrew Mack,Nirayural-Davis,op,cit, pp. 90-91. 
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Strangely as it may seem a number of 
Christian ideologues o-f Arab nationalism have accepted 
Bazzaz's thesis and condoned his pretensions. Indeed 
Qustantin Zuraiq, whom Bazzaz cites as a model Christian 
nationalist thinker, in contrast to the early Christian 
advocates of nationalism (who advocated the separation of 
religion and state), has also emphasized the compatibility 
between Islam and nationalism and called on his fellow 
Christians to accord Islam a special venenation . 
Like Zuraiq and other liberal nationalists, 
al-Bazzaz's primary concern was with individual freedom and 
dignity. The role of the State, then, is to secure 
individual freedom while protecting social justice as he 
wrote in ''This is Our Nationalism', "a happy mean between 
the absolute individualism that gave rise to capitalism and 
Marxist inspired communism Our Arab nationalism 
strives for social justice in every sense of the term, while 
at the same time it seeks to reinforce the basis of social 
solidarity between the individuals of the entire community 
in order to prevent exploitation and class domination" . 
In the early twenties the assertion of 
secular ideas alarmed religious circles, and nationalist 
leaders, who needed the support of religious groups in the 
struggle for independence, sought to conciliate religious 
leaders by paying lip service to Islam. Moreover, the 
25. Ibid. 
26. Ismail, Tariq, Yj op, cit, p. 8. 
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growing interest in Arabic and Islamic studies both in 
native and foreign educational institutions, created an 
awareness of the overlapping elements of culture and 
religion and of the importance of Islam to Arab 
27 
national ism . 
At the outset this trend disturbed Christian 
Arab thinkers who feared that the association of religion 
with nationalism might arouse religious fanaticism and 
restore the social exclusiveness of Ottoman days. 
Meanwhile, secular thinkers regarded the trend as a step 
backward, construed to please religious and conservative 
quarters rather than to serve the cause of modernism and 
progress. Very soon, however, it was realized that the 
religious and ethical values of Islam were so ingrained in 
Arab society that they could not be ignored as a basic 
ingredient of nationalism. It was at this stage that 
Christian thinkers, like Qustantin Zuraiq and Edmond 
Rabbath, began to explain the inescapable association of 
28 
religion and nationalism . In his first volume of essay on 
National Consciousness (al-Wa'y al-qawmi>, which appeared in 
late 1939, Zuraiq has discussed these ideas at length. 
In dealing with the fundamental issue of the 
relationship between Islam and Arab nationalism, Zuraiq 
argued, "that a basic problem of Arab society is that we 
have no convictions; having no convictions, we cannot 
27. Khadduri, Majid, op, cit, p. 183. 
28. Ibid., p. 184. 
subordinate our individual desires and passions to an 
organisation rooted in a principle; therefore, we can not 
act successfully as a group. Nationalism is the conviction 
we need; that is to say, a sense of collective 
responsibility, a feeling of belonging to a nation, but one 
of a special sort, a nation which draws its inspiration from 
a religion. For the Arabs this religion can only be 
Islam"^^. 
However, he draws a sharp distinction between 
"the religious spirit" (al-ruh al-diniyya) and "sectarian 
fanaticism" (al-asabiyy al-lai'fiyya). The assumptions 
underlying this distinction appear to be two-fold: first 
that all religions contain the same core of truth, 
accessible alike to all men; and secondly, that the moral 
principles of religion are those which are necessary to 
build a stable and prosperous society. In this sense, then, 
"sectarian fanaticism" consists of the dogmatic assumption 
by adherents of a particular religion that their particular 
religion has a special claim to moral validity, while 
"religious spirit" means participation of the individual in 
the moral truth inherent in all great religions . 
Nationalism, therefore, spiritual movement as 
it is, must converged toward religion and draw from it 
strength, life, sublimity and excellence. Such is Arab 
nationalism in its true character: it does not in any way 
29. Hourani, Albert; op, cit, p. 309. 
30. Ismail, Tariq Y; op, cit, p. 4. 
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oppose or negate any religion, but it accepts all religions 
in order to draw -from their sources the cups o-f purity and 
liberation, o-f strength and immortality. If nationalism 
does contradict anything, it is not the religious spirit but 
the destructive fanaticism, which makes the communal tie 
stronger than the national tie and refuses to dissolve 
itself in the all-consuming crucible of the nation; for it 
is the fanaticism which often exploits innocent religious 
feeling for its own Partisan ambitions and inclinations. 
Thus fanaticism is the chronic disease of the land, and its 
authors are the enemies of Arab nationalism and destroyers 
of its unity. True religion, however, which aims to develop 
the forces of the spirit, springs from the same sources as 
nationalism, and they both go in the same direction, towards 
the same end. It is, therefore, incumbent on the Arab 
nationalists to go back to the sources of their religion in 
order to draw from them spiritual excellence and strength of 
soul, and to seek inspiration, among other things, from the 
history of all their Prophets so as to enrich their souls 
with the strength and the purity which overflow from these 
religions . 
It was at that time the Arab intellectual and 
political activists realise that the cultural and political 
aspirations of ^the Arabs' would be better served by the 
separation of the Arab provinces from rest of the Ottomon 
Empire or by the creation of an Arab State under an Arab 
31. Zuraiq, Qustantin, "Arab Nationalism and Religion" Haim, 
Sylvia G., (ed.) Arab Nationalism; An Anthology, Log 
Angeles and London (1962), pp. 168-69. 
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King . As a result of a number o-f Arab Bocieties and 
political parties were formed by enlightened and educated 
young Arabs to defend the Arab cause and to protect the Arab 
rights (there were several of these but two came to dominate 
the movement. These two were the young Arab society 
(commonly known as al-Fatat) and convenant Society (commonly 
known as al-Ahd) . 
On the eve of the first World War, therefore, 
there was a strong tide of opposition to Ottoman rule, 
although a more general changeover to Arabism only took 
place when the Ottoman Empire was finally defeated in 1918. 
Apart from the Arab Revolt there was no generalized anti-
Turkish rising by Arabs in the course of the First World 
War, those Syrians who might have wished to lead one were 
34 
either hanged in Beirut in 1916 or forced into exile . 
The period following the First World War, 
which on the one hand coincided with Socialist revolution in 
Soviet Union, and on the other with the direct involvement 
of Western imperialism in West Asia, also witnessed the rise 
of the first nationalist movement in the Arab world. Having 
been betrayed by the French and British in their promises of 
independence, the Arab masses, especially in levant and 
32. Sluglett, Marion Farouk t< Peter Sluglett; Iraq Since 
1958, From Revolution to Dictatorship, K.P.I, London 
1987, p. 6-7. 
33. Dawn C Ernest; From Ottomonism to Arabism: Eassay on the 
Origins of Arab Nationalism, IIlions Press, London, 
1V73, p. 150. 
34. CARDRI, op, cit, p. 90. 
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Palestine rose in a tremendous movement for national 
1iberation^ . 
The experience of the ex-Ottoman provinces in 
the next two dcades was not uniform, which goes some way to 
explain the different forms which nationalism came to assume 
in Iraq and Syria. In Iraq, the British continued the direct 
rule which they had been extending over the area since 1914 
untill 1920, while in Syria an Arab government, admittedly 
financed and supported by Britain was actually running the 
country. However, in July 1920 the French defeated the Arab 
government by force of arms and introduced a system of 
direct rule. In Iraq, in response to the national uprising 
known as the Revolution of 1920, the British introduced a 
system of indirect rule, under which Arab ministers and 
provincial governors backed by British advisers managed the 
national affairs. However, those who held office under the 
monarchy, men like Nuri al-Said, Jafar al-Askari and Ali 
Jawdat al-Ayyubi, would have regarded themselves as 
nationalists in the sense that they had indeed fought to 
liberate the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire from the 
Ottoman, and were participating in the government of an Arab 
country . 
From the end of the World Wai—I to the early 
thirties, the Arab nationalist demanding independence and 
Arab unity. It is not surprising, therefore, that Arab 
35. Berindranath, Dewan: Iraq the Land of Arab Resurgence, 
India, 1979, p. 16. 
36. CARDRI, op, cit, p. 91. 
C203 
attention was devoted mainly to obtaining political 
independence -from European control and not to -far reaching 
discussion on social re-form or the adoption of particular 
political systems. 
As Arab intellectuals had not created a 
clearly defined concept of Arabism before the war, it was 
natural that they confronted in the changed circumstances 
and divided ideologically as they were politically . 
The search to overocme these devisions led to 
a variety of proposals, none of which were fully realized, 
but all of which have contributed to the formation of Arab 
nationalism. The externally imposed political borders 
encouraged localism, especially in Syria, where the French 
administration divided the region into four separate states 
(Syria, Breater Lebanon, The <3abal Druze and the State of 
the Alwites) based on ethnic or Sectarian concentrations. 
Representative and advocate of this regional trend in Arab 
nationalism was Antun Sa'adah (1904-1949), a Lebanese 
Christian, who founded the Syrian Social Nationalist Party 
in Beirut in 1930's. 
Although Sa'dah sought to overcome the 
divisions within Greater Syria, he belonged to the regional 
current of nationalism for his out-spoken belief that "Syria 
was a distinct and complete entity which should not be part 
of a larger Arab nation". He saw in Syria's identification 
with Arab nationalism as a surrender of its unique qualities 
37. Khadduri, Majid; 1970, op, cit, pp. 18-19. 
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and, in becoming part of a larger country that was lems 
advanced or progressive than Syria, the acceptance o-f an 
38 
inferior Status . 
Further complicating was the disinterested 
stance adopted by the majority of the Egyptian 
intellectuals. In the period between World Wars, Egypt was 
engaged in its own struggle for independence from Great 
Britain, and the foundation of Egyptian nationhood did not 
emphasise primarily Arab symbols. At the same time they did 
not identify themselves with Arabism,- the idea of unity was 
projected by Syrian or Iraqi Politicians"'^. 
The third major expression of Arab political 
and cultural identity was formulated by those who rejected 
regionalism and Islamic sentiments in favour of secular Pan-
Arab nationalism. Their writings have kept alive the idea 
of a unified Arab nation bound by ties of Arab culture. 
This doctrine received its clearest exposition from the 
Turkish ideologue and educator Sati' al-Husri (1880-1968). 
Husri pleaded for a secular type of Arab nationalism which 
was completely divorced from religion. His arguments were 
based partly on the nature of Islam, which stressed 
universal rather than national values; partly on the 
historical experiences of the Arabs among whom nationalism 
emerged as a reaction against Islamic unity; and partly 
38. Cleveland, Will aim L. "Scources of Arab Nationalism": An 
Overview, in Curtis Michael (ed.>, "Religion and 
Politics in the Middle East", Westview Press, Boulder, 
Colorado, 1981, p. 61. 
39. Ibid. 
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because o-f the existence o-f the Christian Arabs in Arab 
lands, whose bonds o-f unity with other Arabs were language 
and history^". 
Arab nationalism certainly meant something 
di-fferent to Christian than to Muslims. Some West Asian 
Christians see nationalism as a secular movement. Arab 
nationalism does not mean Arab unity or Pan-Arabism to most 
Christians. They accept the Islamic background as part of a 
civilisation in which they have participated since 
immemorial times, speaking the same language, living as 
41 
separate millets in the same framework of laws . 
Scholar Wilfred Cartwell Smith on the other 
hand cautions that, "some writers have been too hasty in 
assuming or concluding that a Western-type nationalism in 
this positive sense could be or has been adopted fairly 
easily or effectively into the Islamic world... it was the 
Islamic impetus that carried the Arabs from their obscure 
home into historic greatness, in conquest and creativity. 
Islam gave the Arabs earthly greatness; and vice versa, it 
was the Arabs who gave Islam its earthly success... The 
synthesis is close: an identification, at times unconscious, 
of Islam and Arabism. On the one hand, an Arab need not be 
pious or spiritually concerned in order to be proud of 
Islam's, historic achievements. Indeed, he need not even be 
a Muslim; Christian Arabs have taken a share in that pride". 
40. Khadduri, Majid, 1970, op, cit, p. 204. 
41. Tutsch, Hans E., Facets of Arab Bationalism, Wayne State 
University Press, Detroit, (1965), p. 67. 
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In -fact Christians have played an enormous role in the 
initial stages oi the birth o-f Arab nationalism and some 
Christians, like Michael Aflaq, are still recognized as the 
42 
leader of nationalist movement . 
For example the -fundamental ideological 
principles o-f the Aflaq's Ba'th Party are more advanced and 
more elaborate than those of the other nationalist parties 
in the Arab countries, but it is curious that while the 
party's constitution stresses the historical continuity of 
the Arab nation, it makes no mention of Islam. This does 
not mean that the party's intellectual leaders are less 
concerned with the question of religion than were the 
forerunners of the Arab nationalist movements. In fact, 
there is a great deal of similarity between the concept of 
Michael Aflaq on this topic and earlier views of al-Husri 
and others. For Aflaq, "Islam is the beginning of Arabism". 
He sees a spiritual affinity between the two; a view which 
is also held by an independent Christian nationalist, 
Qustantin Zuraiq. But Aflaq is an ideologue par excellence, 
who is mainly concerned with establishing historical 
foundations for Arab nationalism in order to further the 
43 
interest of his party ^. 
In its politically meaningful phase. 
42. Ibid., p. 50. 
43. Op., cit. , Curtis, Michael, p. 50. 
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Socialism developed in the Arab world almost entirely after 
World War-I and, especially, World War-II. Its birth was 
preceded and conditioned by the rise o-f nationalism and 
statehood, usually after monarchy or foreign rule were 
toppled by political revolutions. The beginnings of 
Socialism may be traced to the nineteenth century, when all 
AA 
nationalist thinkers and movements had social purposes . 
The development of socialist ideas cannot be 
explained simply in terms of the Arabs' wish to improve 
their lot after independence. It is evident that Arab 
Socialism had adherents as early as the late nineteenth 
century. At that time major Arabic magazines and news 
papers were engaged in heated debate about Socialism. Dr. 
Yakoub Sarrouf, owner and publisher of the influencial 
magazine al-Muqtataf (Selections), was an ardent advocate of 
Laissez-faire theory and arch-enemy of socialism in Egypt. 
Another influential opponent of the socialism was the 
magazine al-Hilal (The Crescent), which branded socialism 
"immoral" and claimed it would kill private initiative^^. 
The fact that the two major Egyptian 
magazines of the time declared themselves anti-socialist but 
suggested that socialism had a tumber of powerful adherents. 
Indeed, socialism had gained the support of influential men, 
one of whom was Dr. Shibli Shumayy it who may be regarded as 
44. Karpat, Kemal H; Political and Social Thought in the 
Contemporary Middle East, Praeger, New York, 1982, p. 
;< X :<. 
45. Abujaber, Kamel S; The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party 
History, Ideology and Organization, Syracuse University 
Press, 1966, p. 2. 
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the -first Arab Socialist . Shumayyi 1 was a socialist 
Darwinist who believed socialism is the inevitable result o-f 
progress. According to Shumayyil "It [Socialism] does not 
Csimplyl teach the distribution of wealth .... but justice 
in the distribution of profits between labour and capital". 
He def^ined socialism as the re-form of= society through the 
47 
re-form of each individual within it . 
As early as the -first decade o+ the present 
century members of the Egyptian intelligentsia (e.g. Shibli 
Shermayyil, Sal ma Musa and Ismail Mazhar) discussed aspects 
of socialism in its European and particularly British Fabian 
and French continental sense and tradition. They considered 
it in the context of scientific rationalism, social re-form 
and state wel-f are doctrines. A socialist party o-f 
Alexandria workers was formed in 1920 by Mahmud Husni al-
Arabi, followed by a communist party in Alexandria two years 
later. Several Communist parties also appeared in the 
4B 
Fertile crescent and levant . 
Socialism in the Arab world is an 
extention of nationalism. It aims to consolidate the power 
o-f the modern state through an internal reorganisation of 
the productive forces and reassignment of roles and 
46. Shibli Shumayyil (1860-1917), a Syrian Christian and a 
doctor, an early graduate o-f the medical School o-f the 
Syrian Protestant College. Studied medicine in Paris 
be-fore settling in Egypt, where he practicied his Craft 
and become a frequent contributor to the Muqtataf and 
other periodicals of the type. 
47. Abujaber, Kamel. S. op, cit, p. 3. 
48. "Ishtirakiyya" in Encylopaedia of Islam (New Editions), 
Vol.4, P.J. Vatikiotis, p. 125. 
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responsibilities, with the idea o-f creating a participant 
society. It proposes to create social consciousness, 
responsibility, and dedication to ideas above individual 
40 
interests and loyalties . 
Another major Arab intellectual o-f the 
socialist school was Nicola Haddad. As a political activist 
he defended socialism in magazines, newspapers, and books 
and even published his own magazine in-fluenced by the 
writings o-f Eugene Debs, the American Socialist, he 
established an Arab writers association in New York in 1910 
and brought out the magazine al-Jami'ah (the universal) on a 
regular basis. In 1920 he wrote a book de-fining his ideas 
on Socialism, al-Ishtirakiyyah (Cairo: Dar al Hilal). 
Haddad believed in democratic Socialism for he was convinced 
that economic democracy cannot be achieved without political 
50 
democracy . 
Socialism in the Arab world has two facets. 
It may appear as a rejection of the Western economic System 
(capitalism), of excesses of individual economic power and 
of class differentiation. Socialism may also appear as an 
egalitarian movement to eradicate differences of wealth and 
position and thus pave the way for the social integration 
necessary for the survival of the modern state . 
49. Karpat, Kemal, H. op,cit,p.XXXI. 
50. Abujaber, Kamel, S; op, cit, p. 3. 
51. Karpat, Kemal H, op, cit, p. x!t;<i, see also Said Abdel 
Moghny 'Arab Socialism', London, Bland ford Press, 1972. 
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As early as 1908 upon his return to Egypt 
•from studying in France, Dr. Muhammad Jamal al-Din organised 
the Blessed Socialist Party (al-Hizb al~Ishtiraki al-
Mubarak), which emphasize agrarian reforms but neglected 
nationlism. Despite some support from urban areas, this 
movement soon disintegrated. Further in 1920 Musa and a few 
other intellectuals organised the Socialist Party in the 
Arab world: the Egyptian Socialist Party (al-Hizb al-Misri 
al-Ishtiraki). This party continued its activities until 
52 
1930, when it too disintegrated . 
At first Egypt was the centre of Arab 
socialist ideas and movements, but they were taking root in 
other parts of the Arab world as well . In Iraq in 1931 a 
group of Western-educated liberals formed what was later to 
54 
be known as the Ahali Group 
Socialism is also a kind of modern moral 
system. It draws much of its ethical- moral strength from 
the Islam and the West. The Islamic ideas of charity, 
social justice and responsibility, mutual assistance and 
52. Abujaber K.amel S. op, cit, pp. 4-5, See also Gordon H. 
Torry and John. F.Dervin, "Arab Socialism", Journal of 
International Affairs XIX January, 1965, p. 47. 
53. Khadduri, Majid; Independent Iraq (London, Oxfor 
University Press, 1960, pp. 69-70. See also Sami, A. 
Hanna, "Socialism and the Ahali Movement in Iraq" The 
Middle East Journal, xxii summer, 1968. 
54. First, the Ahali (Populist) movement made its appearance 
in the early thirties, first as an intellectual movement 
and then as a political party called the National 
Democratic Party. It was the first successful effort by 
a small group of thinkers and political leaders to break 
new ground in an essentially traditional Islamic Society 
for Socialist teachings. 
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communal solidarity, reinterpreted in the light of 
contemporary needs, provide powerful basis -for socialist 
action. Even some conservative in the Muslim Brotherhood, 
such as Mustafa al-Siba'i, used the teaching of Islam to 
develop an Islamic brand of socialism. Other social-minded 
Muslim scholars, such as Mahmud Shaltut, the former head of 
al-Azhar, relied on Islamic idea to justify the social and 
economic policies of his government 
Gerbran MaJdalany lists two main currents of 
Arab socialism today. The first and more important is that 
of the Ba'th Socialist Party, whose aims to join the entire 
region of the Arab world, which it considers united by 
culture and aspiration. The second current is represented 
by certain parties who base their action on the present 
political possibilities without regard or commitment to 
ideology. The Progressive Socialist Party in Lebanon 
represents this tendency. In Iraq this tendency was 
represented by three political parties that came into 
existence in 1946; the National Democratic Party (al-Hizb 
al-Watani al-Demoqrati), the National Unity Party (Hizb al-
wihdah al-wataniyyah), and the People's Party (Hizb al-
Sha'b). These three socialist parties were very close and 
in fact agreed on most points in their programs. These 
parties called for social services, public education, 
agrarian reform, equality regardless of race or religion and 
S5. Karpat, Kemal H, op, cit, p. ;;;;xii. See also Islamic 
Socialism by Sami, A. Hanna and George H. Gardner in 
"Arab Socialism, A Documentry Survey", Leiden, EJ Brill, 
London, pp. 64-78. 
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above all strengthening o-f democratic regimes in the 
region 
Thus one may divide socialism in the Arab 
world -first according to the country and second according to 
its ideological characteristics. Egypt advocated Nasserite 
or Arab socialism, Syria, Ba'th Socialism, Algeria, Algerian 
Socialism, various groups in Lebanon promote progressive 
socialism; while Islamic and Marxist Socialism are •found 
among all groups throughout the Arab world. Only Islamic 
and Marxist Socialism have international goals or look 
beyond their own national boundaries 
A-fter the Second World War, attention 
concentrated on what was called Arab Socialism (al-
ishtirakiyya al-arabiyya) the main exponent o-f which was the 
Arab Ba'th Party, -founded by Michael A-flaq and Salah al-Din 
al-Bitar in 1941-3, which later on in 1953 merged with Akram 
Hurani's Arab Socialist Party to be known as Arab Ba'th 
Socialist Party. In the periods 1955 to 1961 and 1961 to 
1967, Arab Socialism broadly devided in two major groupings 
i.e. the President Abd al-Nasir's version o-f socialism o-f 
Egypt and in among the various Ba'th Party Organizations and 
regimes in the Fertile Crescent Countries, particularly in 
58 
Syria and Iraq . 
56. Abujaber Kamel S, op, cit, p. 7. 
57. Karpat, Kemal, H. op, cit, p. xxxiii, See also Khadduri, 
Majid, op, cit, pp. 150-75. 
58. Encyclopaedia o-f Islam, op, cit, p. 125. 
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As an ideological movement, the Ba'th Party 
epitomises the agonies and hopes o-f a large number o-f Arabs 
who are intent on achieving change and modernisation. Ba'th 
history is characterized by the o-f ten -frustrated hopes o-f 
modern Arabs to bring about unity, socialism and liberty . 
59. Abujaber, Kamel S, op, cit, p. 10, 
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ORIGIN OF THE BA^TH PARTY 
The idea of nationalism had begun amongst 
Christian intellectuals be-fore it did among Muslims. The 
Christians had been more strongly exposed to Western 
cultural in-fluence and they had read Arab history through 
the lenses of modern western scholarship . The impact of 
the Ba'th ideology on political thought of the Arab world is 
enormous and Michael Aflaq deserves much credit for the 
compelling way in which he placed his beliefs before the 
citizenry and attracted many to his cause . 
0 
The Ba'th's founders were theorists with a 
vision and were able to put forth their ideas on social 
revolution and Arab nationalism more cogently and longer 
than any of their rivals. Thus in Syria, the Ba'th has 
grown from a purely Syrian Party into a regional inter-Arab 
movements with adherents in every Arab country and branches 
in most . 
There is much controversy among Ba'thists as 
to whether Zaki al-Arsuzi or Michael Aflaq and Salah al-Din 
1. Nuseibh, Hazem Zaki; The Idea of Arab Nationalism, 
Ithaca Corbel 1 University Press, 1956, p. 53. 
2. Devlin John F. The Ba'th Party, A History from its 
Origin to 1966, Stenford University, California, 1976, 
p. 23. 
3. Torrey, Gordon H, "The Ba'th - Ideology and Practice, 
"The Middle East Journal, Vol.23 (Autumn 1969), p.445. 
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al Bitar were the real founders of the Ba'th . 
In a more immediate sense the Ba'th Party can 
be considered as a successor to the league of National 
Action (^Usbat al-*Amal al-Qawmi) which was organized in 
1932 to spearhead the struggle against the French and 
remained politically active until 1940. The league provided 
a relatively cohesive organizational framework, which the 
nationalist movement lacked at the time. Decline of the 
league came with the death of its first Secretary, ^Abd al-
Razaaq al-Dandashi, and the expulsion of its second 
Secretary Sabri al-*Asali because of his agreement to serve 
in parliament before the termination of the Mandate. After 
the withdrawl of Zaki al-Arsuzi from active membership in 
1939, league was gravely weakened and shortly after its 
activities were suspended because of the out break of World 
War II . A number of events in the late i930s and early 
1940s provided the stimulus for the formation of the Ba'th 
Party. Probably most important was the crushing defeat of 
4. Zaki al-Arsuzi was originally the head of the Arab 
resistance in the Sanjaq of Alexandretta, where he 
captured the admiration of the Syrian nationalist youth 
and became a veritable national symbol to them. After 
the loss of Sanjaq, he moved to Damascus, but remained 
politically active. The victorious radical Ba'thists 
of the 23 Feb., 1966 coup have acknowledged al-Arsuzi 
instead of Michael Aflaq as the ^Spiritual father' of 
the Ba'th. 
5. Kalyani, Nabil M, "The Rise of the Syrian Ba'th, 1940-
1958: Political Success, party failure, "International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol.3 (1972), p.3. 
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France by the Nazis in 1940 and the consequent weakening o-f 
its power in its overseas dominions especially in Syria and 
Lebanon. The dangers of pro-Nazi control of these areas led 
the British and the Free French to invade both Syria and 
Lebanon in June 1941. The Free French representative, 
Delegate General Catroux, promised in a statement issued the 
day the invasion began that the Lebanese and Syrians would 
"be from henceforth sovereign and independent peoples". 
Five years of political turmoil and civil strife ending with 
French shelling of Damascus, were to pass before his promise 
was completely redeemed. However, it served to open up 
political possibilities in Syria . 
The event that paved the way for the Ba'th 
Party entry into Iraq was the formation of the Rashid Ali 
Baylani Government in the Spring of 1941. Iraq had become 
formally independent in 1932, but retained close ties to 
Britain, especially in defence and security affairs. By 
treaty, Britain retained the right to maintain certain 
forces in Iraq. However the relations between the two got 
severed when London tried to introduce larger forces in Iraq 
on the pretext of the Germans' military threat against the 
will of the nationalist government of Saylani in Iraq. Soon 
after fighting broke out when the Iraqis tried to capture 
the British Base at Habbaniyah. Military developments in 
Iraq caught the attention of young Arab nationalists in 
6. Devlin, John F; op.cit, p.3. 
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Syria, and several Syrians, acting in accordance with the 
principles O'f Arab unity, went to Iraq to o-f-fer their 
services to the Gaylani regime. When British -forces crushed 
the Gaylani movement all were interned by the French 
authorities . 
Be-fore examining the Ba'thist ideology more 
speci-fically, it is use-ful to try to place the Ba'th in the 
context o-f other ^national ist' political parties and 
groupings o-f the 1940s. In Syria the older generation o-f 
nationalists, who had no experience -for collaboration with 
the colonial power as their counterparts in Iraq, were 
organised into two main groupings, Hizb al-Sha'b and al-
Kutla al-wataniyya. Both these bodies opposed the mandate 
as constituted, and had been instrumental in conducting the 
abortive negotiations with the French, which had begun in 
1936. In general, both the groupings believed in the notion 
"^ Syria for the Syrians'.and were fiercely opposed the 
acceding of Alaxendaretta to Turkey, and sought an 
8 
independent united Syrian State . 
For the Syrian nationalists the war years 
were trying, filled with soul-searching and sporadic 
7. Ibid, p.4. 
8. CARDRI (Committee Against Repression and Democratic 
Rights in Iraq) Saddam's Iraq Revolution or Reaction, 
Zed Book Ltd., London, 1986, pp. 92-93. 
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attempts to escape -from political emptiness. In 1939 an 
Arab nationalist party was apparently -founded by al-Arsuzi 
and a handful of followers, but it lasted for only a few 
months. At the end of November 1940 al-Arsuzi, with only 
five of his disciples, organized another party, al-Ba'th al-
Arabi (the Arab Resurrection). Sami al-jundi, a founding 
member of that demunitive group, records how he and al-
Arsuzi incidentally learned of the existence of another, 
very similar, party which called itself al-Ihya al-Arabi and 
alternatively al-Ba'th al-Arabi. Its leaders were Michael 
Aflaq and Sal ah al-Din al-Bitar, and all the members of the 
two Ba'ths, with one or two exceptions, were their students 
at the Tajhiz Demashq high school. Al-Arsuzi Ba'th 
eventually disbanded, and its members joined al-Ihya al-
Arabi , which became a vocal protagonists of Arab unity and 
o 
socialism in the country^. 
Michael Aflaq was born in 1910 into a Greek 
Orthodox Christian family in the Maydane quarter, a centre 
of nationalist agitation, of Damascus. His father a middle 
class merchant was twice imprisioned for his nationalist 
activities, first by the Ottomons and then by the French 
mandate authorities. Aflaq received his secondary education 
in Damascus and participated in the Syrian uprising against 
the French. In 1928 he won a scholarship to the Sorbone 
9. Kalyani, Nabil M; IJME's, op, cit, p.4 
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where he completed licentiate of History in 1932. While in 
Paris he acquired a thorough knowledge oi the cultural and 
philosophic issues of the day. Influenced through the 
intensive study of the works of Anatole France, Andre Gide, 
Nietzche, Marx, Dostoeivski, Tolstoi and Bergson, Aflaq 
formed a union of Arab students in France which set as its 
goal the independence and unification of the Arab world . 
The rich intellectual background of Paris had made 
significant impact on Aflaq's mind. He was lured by 
communists to attend some of their meetings but did not 
become member of the communist party, he seems to have been 
fascinated by Marx and may have become in theory, if not in 
practice, a Marxist above all, he was most impressed by 
communist discipline and tenacity, which taught him at first 
hand the practical methods of a highly organized political 
party . 
Before going to France I was simply a 
nationalist <*Aflaq said later), I had been greatly 
influenced by my father who have taken an active part in the 
struggle against the French and had been imprisioned several 
times. Nationalism was our local reality, but Bitar and I 
10. F.M.A. Card. Arab World file: Cyprus, No.1129, Nov.29, 
1978. 
11. Khadduri, Majid: Arab Contemporaries: The role of 
Personalities in Politics, John Hopkins, University 
Press, London, 1973, p. 214. 
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discovered socialism in French. On our return we were eager 
12 
to pass on these ideas to a new generation . 
On his return to Damascus in 1932 he started 
teaching at the (Al-Tajhiz) government secondary school. He 
objected to the methods o-f instruction and examination and 
when a-fter many warnings the Minister o-f Education fined him 
a -fifteen days salary deduction he resigned from the school 
along with his colleague Bitar. At the same time he made 
contact with the Syrian nationalist leaders to begin to work 
more particularly with the National Bloc, consists of fire-
brand Syrian nationalists for the liberation of Syria from 
the French mandate. From 1933 to 1936 he was attracted by 
communists, hoping to get their support to the cause of Arab 
nationalism. During this period he even wrote for the 
communist magazine al-Talia'h (The vanguard) . The message 
Aflaq preached was fundamentally Arabism that the Arabs as 
one people - the Ummah' Arabiyyah - had a distinct existence 
and a special role in the Arab world. For him and his 
followers this belief was a self evident truth, as it was 
also for a growing number of politically conscious Arabs who 
12. Michael Aflaq to author, Beirut, 3 Jan. 1961; quoted in 
Seale, Patrick. The Struggle for Syria: A Study of 
Post War Arab Politics 1945-58, I.B. Tauris and Co. 
Ltd., London, 1965, p. 148. 
13. Abujaber, Kamel S; The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party; 
History, Ideology and Organization, Syracuse University 
Press, Syracuse, 1966, p. 12. 
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did not associate themselves with the Ba'th Party or who did 
not accept all o-f its other doctrines. In A-flaq's view, 
devotion to and love -for one's homeland were articles o-f 
•faith which needed no reasoned explanation. Writing in 
1940, he asserted; 
The nati onal i sm -for which we cal 1 is 
the same sentiment that binds the individual 
to his -family, because the -fatherland is only 
a large household and the nation a large 
14 
family . 
Here lies the cruK o-f A-flaq's political philosophy! he was 
an Arab nationalist with a Western education and Western 
European attitudes. For a time he was torn between the 
doctrines o-f Marxist materialism and romantic nationalism. 
This romantic nationalism touches a chord close to nearly 
all Arab hearts harking back to the days of glory and 
Islamic Arab Empire which stretched from Morocco to the 
Indian Ocean. But Aflaq being of Christian Origin, has been 
compelled to establish his nationalism on a secular basis, 
despite the fact that Arab nationalism is often equated with 
the Arab Muslims . 
14. Devlin, John F; op; cit, p.24 
15. Torry Gordon H; MEJ, op; cit, p. 449. 
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From 1943 onwards, A-flaq, Bitar and their 
supporters used the term Ba'th (resurrection) in place of 
the earlier more common use o-f ihya (revi tal ization) ^  . The 
•first mention o-f Harkat al-Ba'th al-Arabi (The Arab 
Ressurection Movement) appears in a statement issued by 
A-flaq and Bitar in support o-f Shukri Quwatli in June 1943 '^. 
In essence his basic political principles may be summarized 
as -follows: 
1. Emphasis on the dynamic nationalist ideas which 
represents the aspirations o-f the Arab people. 
2. Emphasis on protecting the integrity and unity o-f 
Arab culture -from the -fragmenting in-fluences o-f 
Western culture. 
3. Rejection of religious factionalism and localism. 
4. Condemnation of communism which represent an 
artificial materialistic progress. 
16. Aflaq wrote that the party was named the "Arab 
Resurrection party not only because it was the first 
party to believe ideologically and practically in Arab 
unity, and to place its organization on a universal 
Arab foundation but also because it believed that any 
view-point or remedy of the vital difficulties of the 
Arabs, either in parts or in toto, which does not 
emanate from the axiom ''The Unity of the Arab people' 
is an enormous outlook and injurious cure". 
17. Devlin John F; op; cit, p. 11. 
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5. Emphasis on the freedom and unity of the Arab 
World*^. 
By this time Arab students in Syria as well 
as in other countries had become highly politicized, and 
started showing readiness to listen to those revolutionary 
ideological groups who approached them to enlist their 
support in organizing strikes and street demonstrations. 
Aflaq wielded strong influence on several thousands young 
Arabs. In the last analysis, his political strength had 
depended on them as the vehicle of his political ideas . 
At this point, the followers began to 
consider the Ba'th a political party rather than a movement. 
In August 1944, Aflaq signed a propaganda bulletin on behalf 
of the Arab Ba'th Burea (Maktab al-Ba'th al-Arabi). And 
finally the Ba'th movement (Harkat) was replaced in the name 
of Arab Ba'th Party (Hizb al-Ba'th al-Arabi) when they 
applied for a license to function as a legal political party 
in July 10, 1945 and assumed to himself along with Salah al-
Din, Bitar and Midhat Bitar the membership of the central 
executive body. Although the three were applying for a 
license to function as a party in Syria, the application 
pointed out that the Ba'th party was intrested in all parts 
of the Arab nation and addressed its appeal to all Arabs. 
18. Ismail, Tariq Y; The Arab Left, Syracuse University 
Press, America, 1976, pp. 20-21. 
19. Khadduri, Majid; 1973, op,cit, p. 219. 
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The request -for a license was not granted. The party 
renewed its application for a license in May 1946, after the 
French had left Syria"^^. 
Legal or not, the Ba'th was in full swing as 
a political party by the end of 1945. In December of that 
year, a general meeting of the party membership was held in 
Damascus. It issued a statement ranging over a broad array 
of Arab problems, the Palestine question, relation with 
England and France, and conditions in virtually all Arab 
countries. Hence, after the departure of the French, the 
party moved to obtain its own press outlet, and the first 
issue of its daily news paper, al-Ba'th, appeared on July 3, 
1946. The paper was issued under the party slogan "One Arab 
Nation, One Immortal Mission". Its checkered career 
reflected the fortunes of the party to a considerable 
extent. It was suspended for the greater part of 1948 and 
1949^^. 
After Syrian independence, the party assumed 
the role of opposition to the government. In a speech by 
Aflaq to party members in November 1946, he commented on the 
newly formed government, saying "The truth is that this 
20. Devlin; John F; op; cit; p. 12. 
21. Ibid. 
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regime is inflicted with a disease; it is not faith-ful to 
its constitutional principles" . 
Throughout 1946, the Ba'th party continued 
its campaign to hasten the French withdrawl, to Syrianise 
the administration and the army, and to spread its triple 
slogan o-f independence, Unity and Socialism for the entire 
Arab world. During this period, it acted pretty much as 
would any conventional political party in an Arab State"^"*. 
For the party itself however, size was becoming a problem. 
By 1947, the party had branches in Syria's half-dozen major 
cities and members in many of the larger provincial towns, 
and the party leaders realized the time had come to put the 
organization on a more formal basis. 
The founding congress of the party began on 
April 4, 1947 at the Luna Park Coffee House in Damascus open 
to any party members who were able to come, the congress was 
attended mostly by Syrians, naturally but Jordan, Lebanon 
and Iraq were represented by students studying in Syria. 
The 247 people who attended were mostly students, teachers, 
government employees, and private professional people. 
Jalal al-Sayyid was elected Chairman of the congress. 
Michael Aflaq gave the opening address and Salah Bitar a 
22. Abujaber; K.amel S, op; cit, p. 25. 
23. Devlin; John F; op; cit, p. 13. 
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•t«t«ments o-f policy. The congress approved the 
constitution o-f the party, which was read, discusiied, and 
24 
accepted article by article . The Congress ended by 
electing Michael Aflaq as amid or doyen - later Secretary 
General o-f the party and choosing an executive body 
consisting o-f Salah al-Din Bitar, Jalal al-Sayyid, and Mahib 
al-Ohanim. With this Congress, the Ba'th Party completed 
its transition from a movement to an organised political 
party. Ba'thist themselves reier to the three-day April 
1947 congress as the founding date of their party. 
That is how the Ba'thists reject the Western 
theory of nation state being a political entity and instead 
of emphasize the moral, spiritual, and dynamic qualities 
which people possess through their heritage, dreams and 
aspirations to qualify them for being called a nation. An 
authoritative translation of the Arab Ba'thist position 
explaining their view-point on Nationalism and Arab regions, 
invariably appears in all their publications as a sort of 
preface. It would be revealing to go through it. It says 
"the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party regards all Arabs as being 
part of one nation both in cultural and spiritual sense. 
The different countries in which they live, make up 
24. Ibid. 
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politically and economically united Fatherland**^. 
The Arab has been de-fined as early as the 
•first congress o-f the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party in 1947. 
The constitution o-f the party adopted, laid down "an Arab is 
any one whose language is Arabic, who lives on Arab land or 
aspires to live their and who is convinced of his belonging 
to the Arab nation""^^. 
The definition of the ^Arab' in itself makes 
it clear that the Ba'thist faith in the nationalist idea is 
not a fanatical concept as has been propagated by many a 
philosopher of Europe. The very first resolution of the 
party in 1947, emphasized the point that Arab nationalism 
was an integral factor of world humanism and was to develop 
in harmony with humanistic principles. It made it 
abundantly clear that Arab desires for unity, liberation and 
collaboration among the Arab is in the context of the good 
of the humanity as a whole, and aims towards the creation of 
a free harmonious and peaceful world progressing 
27 
continuously . 
25. In the party's documents, the Arab Fatherland means all 
the Arab countries. Each of these is a *Qutr' which, 
literally translated, means country; in the Ba'th 
context, it should be read as province or region. The 
adjective ^Qutri' (provincial or regional) is used when 
referred to an individual country. 
26. See Appendix-C, Constitution of the Arab Ba'th 
Socialist Party, Article 3 and 22. 
27. Berindranath, Dewan; Iraq the Land of Arab Resurgence, 
India, 1979, p. 12. 
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The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party had declared, 
"the concept o-f nationalism that we propose is marked above 
all by a spirit o-f brotherhood. It proceeds from the same 
•feelings that tie its -family members to its home, -for we 
consider that a homeland is one vast heart and that a nation 
28 is one large -family 
Jo Aflaq Arab nationalism is -formulated as an 
ideology which would achieve its goals in two stages, each 
stage embodied in a movement intimately connected with the 
other. The -first is the emancipation o-f Arab lands -from 
imperialism, the second the unification o-f Arab homeland. 
The -first cannot completely disappear until the second one 
is realized. There seems to be nothing new in this 
-formulation, -for Arab thinkers have been calling -for 
independence and unity long before the Ba'th came into 
e;<istence. But the Ba'th Party was perhaps the first 
ideological group to put forth Arab unity as a primary 
demand to call for revolutionary approach to achieve it. 
The Ba'th call for unity came indeed at a time when the 
Arabs were in greater need for it, that is, when it became 
evident that the Arabs were unable to stand up to Israil as 
a result of disunity. The Ba'th expressed this point in its 
well-known slogan of "Common Arab Destiny", which was an apt 
cry against bickering Arab leaders who revealed their 
28. Ibid, p. 13. 
C46D 
negativism, traditionalism, and vested intrests 
A-flaq outlined Pan-Arab ideology through 
defining three objectives for his party: The National 
unity, Freedom and Socialism. The three ends were believed 
to be fastened together in an organic relationship. They 
were •*'.divisible whole, non can be realized at the expense 
of the others. This find expression in the following words: 
"In order to reach this level, the level of 
National unity, our party defined its three ends, 
It's belief in Arab unity, Freedom and Socialism. 
(Arab nationalism) People understand that none of 
these aims can be brought about without the 
achievement of the other two. We believe that 
there will be no unity without freedom and no 
freedom without socialism and no socialism without 
freedom and Arab unity". 
"These aims must move side by side because if one 
preceeds the other two ends, we go astray from the 
road and enter the road of tyranny. The unity 
might be frightful unless it has spirit of freedom 
and the freedom might be frightful unless it 
contains socialism. Our nationalism is not a 
racial nationalism as long as the freedom is a 
29. Khadduri, Majid, Political Trends in the Arab World, 
John Hopkins, London, 1970, pp. 195-96. 
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base and a pillar -for it, thers'fore it is linked 
with the human consciousness which is existing 
nowhere but in the chest of the liberal man". 
"The -freedom is nothing but a word i-f equity is 
not achieved between individuals. Therefore 
socialism is a fundamental factor in the real 
freedom and at the same time, the real freedom is 
a perfect and right way to achieve socialism, thus 
we find the three ends are always there in one 
motto: Unity, Freedom and Socialism: . 
The struggle for unity is not conceived 
simply in straight forward Pan-Arab terms as the elimination 
of divisive political boundaries, it is seen as a 
regenerative process leading to reform of Arab character and 
society. This can only come about when Arabs free 
themselves from all regional, religious, and communal 
loyalties, liberate themselves from all 'ambivalence' and 
submit to the external values of mankind. Unity, therefore, 
is not merely a clear cut political objective, it is search 
for the ''treasure of hidden vitality', the moral and 
spiritual founts of nationalism . 
The arguments given by Dr. Munif al-Razsaz 
30. Unanimous book, op, cit, p. 352. 
31. Ismail, Tariq Y; op, cit, p. 32. 
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are more systematic, in the sense that they convey essence. 
According to him, unity means not just unification o-f 
existing states but the trans-formation of society itself: 
"This unity is horizantal in the sense that it 
aims to bind the present parts into one economic, 
political and military unit. And it is vertical 
in the sense that it tends to fight familism, 
tribalism, racism and sectarianism and to unite 
people in the way of liquidation of colonialism 
firstly and secondly to build up a free dignified 
life"^2. 
A cardinal point that dominated the 
literature of the party and occupied the minds and hearts of 
party adherence was the question of unity. Writing in 1962, 
Michael Aflaq noted that "the aim of the Arab unity is the 
strongest and deepest motivation, for the existence of the 
Arab Ba'th Socialist Party as a popular revolutionary and 
progressive movement". In the constitution of the Ba'th, 
innumerable references were made to the need and 
plausibility of unifying Arab countries. The existing 
divisions and frontiers were shunned as fabrications of 
colonial powers with no substantive reality to them. Unity 
32. Munif al-Razsaz, al-Qawmiyya taruha Wa MuhtaWah 
<Nationalism: its from and essence), In Dirasat Fi al-
Qawmiyya, Beirut, Dar al-Tali'a, 1960, p. 62. 
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was considered an existing reality that merely needs to be 
embodied in formal institutions. A primary object o-f the 
party was to break down and eradicate the barriers 
separating the Arabs 
Ba'th constitution spoke not only on 
political and economic unity but also on the cultural unity. 
The -first and second fundamental principles o-f the 
constitution read: 
1. The Arab -fatherland constitutes an indivisible 
political and economic unity. No Arab country can 
be alive independent of the other. 
2. The Arab nation constitutes a cultural unity. Any 
differences existing among its sons are accidental 
and unimportant. They will disappear with the 
34 
awakening of Arab consciousness . 
For more than two decades, this Ba'th notion 
of Arab unity remained almost unaltered. The experience 
gained by the 1958 Egyptian - Syrian union and its 
dissolution in 1961, however, enriched and transformed the 
theoretical formulation of this notion. In 1963, in the 
Sixth National Conference of the Ba'th, for instance, the 
33. Seale, Patrick; op, cit, p. 154. 
34. See Appendix-C Constitution of the Arab Ba'th Socialist 
Party. 
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CoH'ference criticized the high level abstraction in the 
concept o-f unity and the party's over-emphasis of unity to 
the neglect o-f socialism. The place o-f unity in the 
literature of Ba'th in Sixties was minimized while Socialism 
received more importance than others. The conference also 
directed the Ba'th provincial leadership in Iraq and Syria 
to unify the two countries. The directive, however, was not 
realized due to the external disagreements and conflicts 
within the party. The assumption to power of Hafiz-al-Assad 
in Syria in 1970 witnessed the last Ba'thist attempt at 
unity. Following negotiations between Egypt, Syria and 
Libya, a union of Arab Republic was declared in 1971, but 
this too could not be materialized . 
The party also strongly believes that 
sovereigntty belongs to the people which alone is the source 
of all authority and leadership, that the value of the state 
is measured by the support it received from the masses, and 
that its sanctity is contingent upon the freedom they would 
enjoy in the choice of their government. It is, moreover, 
committed to create objective conditions conducive to the 
exercise of full rights by the citizens in the individual 
capacity as well as in national life. These includes 
establishment of a constitutional representative system 
35. For detail see Appendix-B, Decisions of the Sixth 
National Convention of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, 
1963. 
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requiring the executive to be responsible to the 
legislative, independence o-f the judiciary, and a single 
code of laws -for all citizens in harmony with the spirit of 
the present age^°. 
Central to Aflag's thinking is the quest for 
freedom, conceived not merely as emancipation from political 
tyranny and oppressive poverty, but the liberation of the 
Arab people, unified in mind and spirit, joined together in 
social brotherhood. Freedom, should therefore, emanate from 
the very soul of the Arab and be cherished as an indivisible 
part of his cultural heritage. Here again th--. path to 
freedom is that of struggle strewn with sacrifice. Since 
such a generic conception of freedom could not be achieved 
or even promoted without state action, especially in the 
education of the massess, the political machinery of the 
state had to be freed from the grip of the privileged 
classes, considered to be custodian of the feudal past, and 
intrisical1y opposed to the idea of the Inqilab . 
As far as freedom was concerned, the 
construction of the Ba'th tapped the question of freedom in 
the following article: 
36. Agwani M.S. "Ba'thist Revolution in Iraq: The 
Ideological Bases", Engineer Asghar Ali (ed); Islam and 
Revolution, Ajanta Publication, Delhi, 1984, p. 42. 
37. Kalyani, Nabil, M; IJMES, op, cit, P.6. 
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"The party ai the Arab Ba'th therefore believes 
that: Freedom of speech, -freedom of aeeembly, 
freedom of belief, as well as artistic freedom are 
sacred, no authority can diminish them" . 
The article dealt with the freedom of 
individuals but ideologically, the Ba'thist ideologists 
speaks more on freedom of nation which directs its affairs 
and freedom from external control as well as from indigenous 
arbitrary rule. Freedom is eleborated by al-Razzaz in these 
words: 
"Arab nationalism believes in freedom. The 
freedom outside through establishing a free 
relations with the people of the world without any 
disintegration of Arabian Authority (al-Sayadah 
al-arabiyya) and the freedom inside by 
establishing a perfect democracy that represents 
the will of the people and gives them the 
responsibility and it realize that its struggle 
against imperialism contains this essence because 
one of the faces of colonialism is the liquidation 
39 
of freedom and destoration of people's will"^ . 
38. See Appendix-C, Constitution of the Arab Ba'th 
Socialist Party. 
39. Munif al-Razzaz, op, cit, p. 62. 
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Perhaps Aflaq, more than any other writer, 
sees the ill© 0+ Arab society as a result of weakness in the 
Arab "self". Thus he demands an end to the evasion of 
responsibility. He deems necessary a regeneration of those 
noble values within each individual that once made the Arab 
nation strong. 
Aflaq is very franV; in his approach to the 
problem of personal freedom. At one point he is merciless 
in his treatment of those who do not accept the tutelage of 
the vanguard during the ^^Inqilab' period. In effect, he 
wants to force them to be free. He says, "our mercilessness 
has for its objective to restore them to their true selves 
which they ignore, to their hidden will which they have not 
yet clearly discerned and which is with us even though their 
40 
swords are against us" 
The Ba'th constitution calls for a 
"Parliamentary constitutional Regime" (Art. 14). 
Emphasising their democratic spirit, the constitution also 
insists on a decentralized government (Art.16). 
Decentralization is required to curb the power of the 
bureacracy and secure more popular participation in 
government. Munif al-Razzaz, writing in 1952, elaborated on 
this article in the following words: 
"It is not possible for this sense of community 
40. Abu Jaber, Kamel B; op, cit, pp. 125-26. 
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(among the individuals in a society) to be 
completely achieved except through a popular 
democratic system, by democratic meaning a -freely 
elected parliamentary system with the government 
directly responsible to the representatives of the 
people, by popular meaning one built on the will 
o-f the majority o-f the Ummah where in each person 
enjoys freedom of thought and opinion in the 
41 
widest application ". 
The sixth national congress of the party 
acknowledged that in the past the party did act in a way 
suggesting that it accepted bourgeois liberal democracy as 
"a permanent and adequate framework for struggle and 
political action". And this was the main reason for its 
failure to formulate a new theoretical basis for a clearly 
defined concept of freedom and democracy consistent with a 
socialist framework. The starting point of the quest for a 
new theoretical basis derived from the objective conditions 
of Arab life was a critical evaluation of the bourgeois 
concepts of freedom and parliamentary democracy . 
It was in this context that the congress Vlth 
of the party commended the alternative model of popular 
41. Devlin, John F, op, cit, pp.15-18. 
42. Engineer Asghar Ali, op, cit, pp. 55-58. 
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democracy. This was considered to be the most suitable 
system o-f government during the period o-f change-over •from a 
feudal capitalist order to a socialist order. The theory o-f 
popular democracy, which the Ba'thist government o-f Iraq has 
translated into reality, rests on a series o-f interrelated 
43 
postulates . 
Regarding socialism, though it was placed in 
third position but it had become a pre—fix word and a part 
of the party's name "Socialist Arab Ba'th Party". Socialism 
occupies a greater scope in the constitution and literatures 
of the party and only one among the three objectives which 
could partially be implemented in Syria and Iraq after the 
capture of power. Thus, it is more interesting to examine 
socialism of Ba'th on both theoretical and practical levels. 
On the theoretical level, socialism like 
other values of Ba'th was subjected to spiritualization for 
gaining an independent identity as an 'Arab Socialism'. But 
what exactly Arab Socialism meant ? Aflaq gives the 
following answer: 
"If I am asked about the definition of Socialism, 
I will not find it neither in the treaties of Marx 
nor in Lenin's book but I shall reply that it is 
the religion of life and victory of life against 
43. For detail see Appendix-B, decision of the Sixth 
National Convention of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, 
1963. 
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death^^", 
Socialism is also intimately bound up with 
other elements o-f the party doctrine. In -fact, Aflaq in an 
early writing (1946) went so -fSir at one point as to equate 
it with nationalism. He says, "The Arab nationalists are 
the socialists, hence there is neither incompatibility nor 
45 
contrition nor war between nationalists and socialist ". 
The concept o-f Arab socialism actually 
existed for many centuries be-fore modern Arab nationalism 
came upon the scene. Its roots were planted long be-fore 
Marx. They lie deep in the soil o-f Islam and in the 
MI. 
cultural heritage o-f the Arabs . 
The ^ dea o-f socialism has long been the 
subject of discussion in the Arab world, but Arab 
nationalists showed no great interest in it mainly because 
the overriding principle of Arab union was uppermost in 
their minds. Young Arabs who exhibited concern about social 
problems tended to become socialists or communists, and paid 
little or no attention to Arab union. Such was the trend of 
thought among young men before World War II. It was the 
44. Aflaq, Michael, Fi Sabil al-Ba^th (In the Way to 
Ba'th), Beirut, Dar al-Tali'a, p. 22. 
45. Devlin, John F, op, cit, p. 32. 
46. Said Abdel Moghny, Arab Socialism, London Blandford 
Press, (1972), p. 24. 
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Ba'th thinkers who (nade the -first attempt to reconcile the 
two divergent view points and demonstrated that Arab union 
can not be achieved or possible endure unless it is based on 
socialism 
In the pre - 1947 writings o-f Michael Aflaq, 
socialism signifies an ardent commitment to social justice 
unsupported by any serious comprehension o-f the socio-
economic realities o-f Arab li-fe or o-f the ways and means to 
achieve the socialist goal. "My concern is not", wrote 
A-flaq in 1936, "that people should be equal in the 
distribution o-f -food but that every individual should be 
allowed to realize his gi-fts and potential. We are not 
concerned about alleviating misery (we are concerned about) 
48 
increasing the wealth of life ". 
Speaking on Militant Arab Nationalism as 
cited in "^selection from a collection of article and 
speeches by the founder of the Ba'th Party, Fi Sabil al-
Ba'th (for the Resurrection, Beirut, 1959), Aflaq further 
explains his positions: 
"When we say that we are in need of an Arab 
Socialism, all we mean is that attention should be given to 
47. Khadduri, Majid; Republican Iraq, Oxford University 
Press, London (1969), p. 247. 
48. Engineer Asghar Ali, op, cit, p. 59. 
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the special circumstances that pertain to us as Arabs in 
this phase o-f our history. We all agree as to the principle 
of socialism, but not as to the manner in which it should be 
applied or to the place it should occupy in our national 
life. We cannot accept the view of Western Socialism that 
nationalism is merely a transient phase in the process of 
economic evolution. On the contrary, socialism must be 
suited to our national and to our political struggle and not 
become an instrument of conspiracy against our fatherland, 
or a means of external divisions and strife, or a screen for 
antinationalist maneuvers. 
We want socialism to serve our nationalist 
cause, to increase our intellectual daring and to strengthen 
our call for individual freedom and the fruitfulness and 
richness of our spirit-not to kill our new freedom in its 
cradle 
What would become of Arab thought if it 
were overcome by an artificial philosophy such as communist 
socialism..... with all that is false and destorted in this 
philosophy ? If we adopt (communist) socialism as our 
philosophy of life.... then we shall destroy the future of 
49 
Arab thought and its freedom with our own hands ". 
49. Sharabi, Hisham; Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab 
World. The Middle East and North Africa, London, 
(1966), p. 111. 
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Michael Aflaq had written earlier that 
communism was a product of abstract eighteenth century 
philosophy and that its practice in Russia seems to be the 
product o-f Russian spiritualism and scientific European 
thought. To him, communism had no resemblance to any Arab 
intellectual traditions or to the past and present life of 
the Arabs. The insistence of Ba'th on differentiating its 
socialism from Marxist scientific socialism has led to the 
coining of the term "Arab socialism", not as a derivative of 
Marxism but as an opposing and contradictory ideology. 
Besides, both Aflaq and Bitar believed that Marxism greatly 
exaggerated the importance of class struggle, ignoring the 
vital historical role of nationalism . 
Aflaq advocates the independency of Arab 
socialism in these words: 
"Socialism is for all people, it is an 
independent socialism which does not follow specific school 
and it is not an instrument for fanaticism and dispute but 
it benefits from all theories and experiences of the 
nations. It tends to be in harmony with the spirit of the 
nation, its conditions and deeds. This is Arab 
50. Ismail Tariq Y op, cit, p. 44. See also Aflaq Michael; 
The Socialist Idology of the Ba'th; in Karpat Kemal H 
(ed); Political and Social Thought in Contemporary 
Middle East, America, (1982), pp. 140-145. 
National ism 
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Also, -for the sake o-f legitimacy, socialism 
was described as an "Islamic Socialism". This was expressed 
by Jalal al-Sayyid a senior Ba'thist leader. 
"The Ba'th Socialism is actually an Arab 
Socialism but it is possible to say that Ba'th Socialism is 
an Islamic or more speci-f ical 1 y it is a ^Hanbalite' version 
because the Hanbalite Jurists went away than the Ba'th Party 
52 
in this regard" . 
But Sal ah al-Din Baytar unambigously 
disclosed the nature of Arab Socialism: 
"Be-fore everything else, I would like to 
remove a confusion that surrounds this slogan (Socialism). 
The phrase "Arab Socialism" may reveal that we are inventing 
a new kind of socialism and here I want to affirm that 
socialism in our view is one. It is the scientific 
social ism" . 
51. Aflaq Michael, Ma'alim al-Qawmiyya al-Taqadumiyya 
(Characteristics of the progressive nationalism); in 
Derasat Fi al-Qawmiyya,Beirut,Dar al-Tali'a 1960,p.29. 
52. Jalal al-Sayyid, op, cit, p. 207. 
53. Abd al-Azi2 al-Badri, Hukm al-Islam Fi al-Ishtirakiyya 
(The Judgement of Islam on Socialism), Beirut, al-
Maktaba al-Elmiyya, 1965, p. 133. 
C61] 
As regards the constitution, it reads: 
"The Party of the Arab Ba'th is a Socialist 
Party. It believes that socialism is a necessity which 
emanates -from the depth of Arab nationalism itself. 
Socialism constitutes, in fact, the ideal social order which 
will allow the Arab people to realise its possibilities and 
to enable its genius to flourish which will ensure for the 
constant national progress in its material and moral output. 
It makes possible a trustful brotherhood among its 
membersS^. 
The Ba'th constitution is a litte more 
specific in that it incorporated a series of propositions 
prescribing national ownership of major natural resources 
and public utilities, ceiling on agricultural holdings, 
worker's participation in management and share in profits 
and equitable distribution of wealth. But the over all 
pattern it envisaged was one of moderate socialism complete 
with class cooperation and protection of the rights of 
private property and of inheritance . 
The constitution does specify the economic 
plan of the party. Article 26 described the Ba'th as a 
54. See Appendix-C the Constitution of the Arab Ba'th 
Socialist Party. 
55. Ibid. 
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socialist party claiming that all the economic resources o-f 
the Arab nation should be owned by Arabs themselves. 
Article 27 declared that this economic wealth had been 
distributed unjustly; hence, it should be redistributed 
equally among the people. It -followed in Article 28 that 
the exploitation O'f man by man was condemned, -for all 
citizens are equal. The state's manipulation o-f the means 
of production was also approved by virtue o-f Article 29. 
The aforementioned article clearly stated that the state 
should run co-operations of public interests natural 
resources, factors of production, and the means of 
transportation . 
Aflaq wrote in 1950 " Socialism in the 
Arab Ba'th is limited to economic organization that aims to 
reconsider the distribution of wealth in the Arab fatherland 
and to layout economic basis which would guarantee equality 
and economic justice among the citizens ". Again in 
1955, after explaining that socialism could be defined as a 
doctrine or a system, with specific origins, Aflaq wrote 
that " all of these were reducible to the simple statement 
that socialism is the sharing of the resources of the 
country by its citizens . 
Changes in Ba'thist attitudes regarding 
socialism began to appear in the mid 1950s. Jamal Attasi, 
57. Devlin, John F, op, cit, p. 34. 
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writing in 1956, repeated the party's oft-stated differences 
between communism and Ba'thisim, but noted that Ba'thists 
could learn a good deal from the manner in which socialism 
had been put into practice in the socialist countries. 
Attasi said in a companion article for example, " Socialism 
cannot realize its goals unless it starts from the (fact of) 
division, differences and conflict among society's 
structures and classes". 
Munif al-Razsaz an early member of the party 
in Jordan was equally forthright in his article entitled 
"why socialism now? it takes a very different approach to 
socialism than Aflaq did. 
To him, "Socialism is a way of life, not just 
an economic order. It extends to all aspects of life 
economic, politics, training, education, social life, 
health, moral, literature science, history and others, both 
great and small". Disgressing from the established practice 
of placing nationalism above every thing else, he sought to 
demonstrate that socialism, freedom and unity were 
interrelated and independent" . 
It was in this context that the party's Sixth 
58. Ibid, pp. 36-37. 
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National Congress in 1963 reviewed the Ba'th'e outlook on 
socialism -focussing on its positive as well as negative 
aspects. While nothing that in the early stage the Ba'th's 
concept of socialism was not clear and well de-fined, it 
maintained that this deficiency was partly compensated by 
the party's revolutionary stand point in struggle which 
indeed saved it from being submerged in bourgeois 
X 59 
reformism . 
In the new formulation socialism aims at the 
establishment of a new social order in which objective, 
econimic, social, intellectual and political conditions are 
established that free the individual from all forms of 
exploitation, subjugation, and stagnation and allow him to 
become a completely free human being. This new conception 
of socialism which the Sixth National Conference had 
approved however was soon attacked by both rightist and 
leftist elements within the Ba'th. The former discredited 
it as being extremist and the latter condemned it as being 
selective and not sufficiently radical ^. 
The Arab nationalist doctrine dictated by 
Michael Aflaq had at its heart a call for a revitalization 
59. For detail see Appendix-B, Decisions of the Sixth 
National convention of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, 
1963. 
60. Ismail Tariq Y, op, cit, p. 45. 
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O'f Arab society. This was the essence o-f the sacred mission 
of the party and was what Aflaq intended to convey when he 
used the word Inqilab. Thus in a talk given to a party 
branch in February 1950, he said: 
"Revolution then, before being a political 
and social program, is that prime propelling power, that 
powerful psychic current that mandatory struggle, without 
which the re-awakening of the nation is not to be 
understood". 
Thus, to Aflaq ^Inqilab' means changing 
people rather than the system. Once the people, or enough 
of them had undergone an interior transformation, 
"liberating the intellect.... and releasing the source of 
faith in the soul". Change in the system would follow 
automatically . This interpretation of Mnqilab' as 
transformation came to have considerable influence in the 
Ba'th Party in the forties and early fifties. As article 6 
of the Ba'th constitution states, "The Party of the Arab 
Ba'th is revolutionary. It believes that its main 
objectives for the realisation of the renaissance of Arab 
nationalism or for the establishment of socialism can not be 
achieved except by means of revolution and struggle. To 
61. Aflaq Michel; "Nationalism and Revolution" in Haim 
Sylvia G (ed); Arab Nationalism: An Anthology, 
University of California Press, Los Angles and London, 
1962, p. 245. 
62. Devlin John F, op, cit, pp. 26-27. 
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rely on slow evolution and to be satis-fied with a partial 
and superficial reforms is to threaten these aims and to 
conduce to their failure and their loss" . 
Aflaq laid down three essential conditions 
for the Inqilab. 
1. Awareness of the historical and contemporary 
realities which called for drastic transformation 
2. a feeling of responsibility rooted in a strong 
moral base and 
3. a genuine belief in the feasibility, at the 
existing stage of Arab history, of the proposed. 
Inqilab. 
These conditions were to be fulfilled by al-
Talia (the vanguard) who constitutes the membership of the 
Ba'th. The struggle which designated as the practical 
expression of the Inqilab, wrote Aflaq, creates its own 
crusaders. The Inqilab becomes a living thing in their 
souls, minds and manners or it become life itself. Once 
achieved, the Inqilab would presumably usher in the Ba'thist 
trinity - unity, freedom, and socialism. Conversely, the 
trinity are indispensable ingredients for the success of the 
63. See Appendix-C, Constitution of the Arab Ba'th 
Socialist Party. 
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Inqilab, since the ideal o-f unity, freedom and socialism are 
considered -fundamental and inseparable objective o-f equal 
importance 
The concept o-f secularism in the Arab World 
emerged as a result o-f the impact of the West on the Arab 
intellectuals. Serious attempts were made by the Arab 
intellectuals to philosophise the concept o-f secularism in 
nationalistic terms -for the prupose o-f legitimacy in the 
Arab World^^. 
The Ba'th party, indeed, worked out -for 
decades to de-fine Arab secularism or more specifically, the 
relationship between State and Religion. In order to 
provide a detailed description for the ideological 
development of the Ba'thist secularism, it is necessary to 
analyse the problem on constitutional, ideological and 
practical level . 
On constitutional grounds, the manifesto of 
the Ba'th which was drafted by Michael Aflaq in 1947 and the 
64. Kalyani, Nabil M. IJMES, op, cit, p. 5. 
65. David Robert writes: The West displayed the Successful 
and secular nation - State to the visitors including 
the Arab nationalist. The intelledctual influences 
which swayed them, Hegel, Mar;;, Stalin, Rosenberg and 
Hitler in Europe and Antun Sa'adeh at home, all had one 
common denominator, the exaltation of the State in one 
form or another. 
66. Roberts David; The Ba'th and the Creation of Modern 
Syria, Croom Helm, London, 1987, p. 18. 
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Interim Constitution o-f the Iraqi State promulgated in 1968 
are better specimens -for study since this may still be 
regarded as the primary power o-f Ba'thist programme in Iraq. 
The Ba'th Constitution tries to project the 
ideal vision o-f the party to the Arab people, which Is 
epitomised in the dictum that "Arab nation constitutes a 
cultural unity and that the Arab land belongs to Arabs who 
alone have the right to administer its a-f-fairs". Such 
secular tendencies and nationalistic colour dominated the 
-forty eight articles o-f the constitution. The -first 
•fundamental principle reads: 
"The Arabs •form one nation. This nation has the 
natural right to live in a single state and to be 
-free to direct its own destiny". 
The Ba'th .there-fore believes that: 
(1). The Arab -fatherland constitutes an indivisible 
political and economic unity. No Arab country can 
live apart •from the others. 
The Arab nation constitutes a cultural unity. Any 
di-f-f erences existing among its sons are accidental 
and unimportant. They will all disappear with the 
awakening o-f the Arab consciousness. 
The Arab fatherland belongs to the Arabs. They 
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alone have the right to administer its a-f-fair«, to 
dispose o^^ its wealth, and to direct its 
desti nies' . 
In the Ba'th ideology, Arab nationalism is 
the essence o-f the Ba'th theory. It is "an eternal and 
living reality", "the will o-f the Arabs", "sacred -feeling" 
and "the only tie in the Arab State". 
"The party o-f the Arab Ba'th is a national 
party. It believes that nationalism is a living and eternal 
reality. It believes that -feeling o-f national awakening 
which intimately unites the individual to his nation is a 
sacred feeling. This -feeling has within itsel-f a potential 
o-f creative power; it binds itsel-f to sacrifice, it seeks 
the exercise of responsibilities, and it directs the 
individual personality in a concrete and active manner. 
The national idea to which the party appeals 
is the will of the Arab people to free themselves and to 
unite. It demands that the opportunity be given to it to 
realize in history its Arab personality, and to collaborate 
with all the nations in all the fields which will ensure the 
march of humanity toward welfare and progress". 
67. See Appendix-C, Constitution of the Arab Ba'th 
Socialist Party. 
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Further the Constitution reads: 
"The national tie is the only tie that may 
exist in the Arab State. It ensure harmony among all the 
citinens by melting them in the crucible o-f a single nation 
and counteracts all religious, communal, tribal, racial, or 
regional factions' . 
This concept o-f secular nationalism is 
reinforced by Article 18 which prescribes "a single code of 
laws" in harmony with "the spirit of the present age" and 
"the past experience of the Arab nation". 
Thus it is clear that the Ba'th replaces 
Islam by nationalism to be the only tie that binds Arabs in 
a State and a weapon to counter all religious factions. 
The Ba'th's preferfence for secularism is 
also reflected in its cultural and educational policy 
Article 41(a) states that "the party endeavours to develop a 
common culture for the Arab homeland - a culture that will 
be Arab, free, progressive, comprehensive, deep and humanist 
in its aims". And Article 43 declares that the party's 
educational policy aims at creating "a new Arab generation 
believing in the unity and immortal mission of its nation, 
taking to scientific thinking, freed from the bonds of 
superstition and reactionary traditions.... and serving the 
68. Ibid. 
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cause o-f human progress 
But as Ba'th captured power in Iraq in 1968, 
a clear departure -from the above -fundamentals came to be 
seen in the interim constitution o-f Iraqi State which 
supposed to be based on the principles o-f the Ba'th. 
The Ba'thist regime seems unable to neglect 
the religious -factor since religion is a deep rooted 
phenomenon in the Iraqi society. 
The Arabic text o-f the interim constitution 
speeks in terms o-f religion on si;-; occassions. The -first 
and fourth articles o-f the -first part of the constitution 
de-fine the Arab heritage and the spirit o-f Islam as a source 
o-f democracy and popularity. Also they consider Islam as 
the religion and -fundamental base o-f the Iraqi State: 
Article - I: 
"The Iraqi republic is a democratic republic 
state. The Arab heritage and the spirit o-f Islam 
constitute the source o-f its democracy and 
popularity". 
Article - 4: 
"Islam is the religion o-f the State and the 
fundamental base for its constitution and the 
69. Ibid. 
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Arabic language is the of-ficial language" 
Here, the purpose behind declaring Islam as a 
base o-f Iraqi constitution is nothing but to give rise to a 
sort o-f ambiguity which tends to win over the majority in 
Iraq. Such ambiguity also surfaced in Article 8,17 and 30 
o-f the second part and Article 57 o-f the third part o-f the 
constitution: 
Arcicle-8: 
"Inheritance is a recognized right regulated by 
the Islamic law""^^. 
Article-30: 
"The State shall maintain the -freedom o-f religious 
and the right o-f religious ceremonies provided 
that this -freedom shall neither contradict the law 
72 
nor violate the morality" . 
Article-57: 
"I swear by the Almighty Bod to be a -faithful to 
my religion, country and nation and to preserve 
the republican regime and abide by its 
constitution and care for the people's interests 
70. See Appendix-A, Interim Constitution of the Iraqi 
Republic. 
71. Ibid. 
72. Ibid. 
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with -full attention and to protect the 
independence o-f the country and the integrity of 
the lands''^ ''. 
The above articles shows that the ideal 
principles o-f Ba'th could not be transferred into the 
interim constitution. The State's Constitution was made to 
correspond to Iraq society and theoretically, the 
constitution is more applicable and realistic as compared 
with the Ba'th constitution o-f 1947. 
'3. Ibid, 
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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE REPUBLICAN IRAQ 
As an ideology, the Ba'th began to spread in 
Iraq long before the party came into existence. The 
political parties that made their appearence after the World 
Wai—II failed in Ba'thist eyes to meet the country's needs 
and aspirations except the Istiqlal Party, the embodiment of 
the neo Pan-Arab movement, as it was a little bit different 
from other parties. Later even, the Istiqlal leaders 
appeared complacent and ready to compromise with the ruling 
obligarchg which was considered reactionary and corrupt and 
therefore unworthy of survival. It was therefore natural 
that a more dynamic nationalist organization should become 
the center of attraction to young nationalists . 
Ba'thist teaching began to enter into Iraq in 
a steady though in an unorganised way, first by Syrian 
students and teachers who went either to study or teach in 
Iraq, and then by Iraqi students who went to study in Syria 
and Lebanon. The earliest missionaries were a few young men 
from Alexandretta who, after their homeland had been annexed 
by Turkey in 1939, went to Iraq to study or settle their in 
2 
a possible new home . 
1. Khadduri, Majid; Socialist Iraq: Middle East Institute, 
Washington D.C., 1978, p. 8. 
2. Ibid. 
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Among the Syrians, Faiz Ismail and Wasfi al-
Ghanim were Alawis -from Alexandretta, who came to Iraq in 
the second hal-f o-f the 40s. In Baghdad University they 
succeeded in organising some Iraqi students under the 
Ba'thist ideology. Other prominent Syrian Ba'thist 
ideologue at that time was Zaki al-Arsuzi, who in Iraq 
participated actively in spreading Ba'thist teaching in 
Baghdad. Prominent among the non Syrian political activist 
was Abu al-Qasim Mohammed Karu a Tunisian national, who 
actively participated in preaching Ba'thism in Baghdad 
University. A number o-f Iraqies, who had came in contact 
with Michael A-flaq in Damascus and Lebanon like Abd al-
Rahman al-Damin and Abd al-Khaliq al-Khudayri, started 
preaching the ideas o^^ the Ba'th, after their returning 
home . 
During the -first three year, the Ba'thism in 
Iraq was merely an intellectual circle o-f students. In 
1950, the Syrian command over Iraqi Ba'th was transferred to 
Iraqi members when Fayi'z Ismail returned back to Syria. 
Abd al-Rahman al-Damin took the charge o-f the organization. 
Subsequently in 1951, Fu'ad al-Rikabi took the charge of the 
Ba'th Organization and successfully organized it for eight 
3. Ibid, See also Hanna, Batatu, The Old Social Classes and 
the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq; Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1978, pp. 741-42. 
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year . It was under him that the Ba'th rose in number -from 
50 members in 1951 to more than 100 members in the middle o-f 
1952. According to al~Rikabi the total number o-f the 
Ba'thists reached upto 1500 in 1958. The -first decade of 
Ba'thist movement in Iraq was signi-f i cantl y marked with the 
increase o-f Shi'i members. This was due to the influence 
exercised by al-Rikabi in the Shi'i provinces including his 
native place Nasiriyyah . 
The party had grown su-f-f icientl y by the fall 
of 1952 for its participation in the riots of that period 
against the government's policies. The party issued its 
first handbill over the signature, Arab University Youth in 
Iraq, at this time . 
By 1954 the party was strong enough in Iraq 
to issue statements and distribute them in the streets. It 
opposed the Nuri al-Said policies in Iraq on the national 
and International level. When the Iraqi government signed 
the Iraqi-Turkish agreement in 1955, later to be known as 
4. Fau'd Rikabi, who succeeded Qadduri as Secretary 
General, was born in Nasiriyya, a towvo in Southern Iraq, 
in 1931 and joined the Ba'th Party while still in 
college. He became a member of the National Command 
when he attended the party's second congress in Damascus 
in 1954 and served in that capacity for the next five 
year. 
5. Hanna, Batatu, op,cit, p. 741. 
6. Devlin, John F; The Ba'th Party, A History from its 
origin to 1966, Stenford University California, 1976, p. 
106. 
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Baghdad Pact, the party went into a frenzy oi activity 
against the government. In a statement distributed in the 
streets of Baghdad in January, 1955, the Ba'th called on the 
Iraqi people to overthrow the Said government. The greatest 
boost to the party's popularity in Iraq came, however, after 
the Sues Canal crisis. By this time the party had become a 
major "street ^ower" in Baghdad and was distributing its 
literature throughout Iraq*^ . 
Despite the extreme repressive measures taken 
against the Ba'th by the Qasim regime, the party grew 
stronger in Iraq. With its strong machine, it was able to 
dominate a number of trade unions and the influential Iraqi 
students organization. It was also able to publish four 
official underground news papers: viz Wa'yz al-'ummal 
(Workers Consciousness), Al-Ishtiraki (The Socialist), Al-
Ittihady al-Watani li al-Talabah (The National Union for 
o 
Students), Hi sab al-Jamahir (Mass Judgement) respectively". 
The inter group rivalry in the Syrian Ba'th 
and the emergence of a new trend within the Ba'th 
particularly affected the structure of Iraqi Ba'th during 
the U.A.R. period. 
7. Abujaber, Kamel S;. The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, 
History, Ideology and OrgAnj^£i%ifig^^isS.YreiCuse University 
Press, 1966, pp. 52-53. >®>V **^ ^^  
8. Ibid, p. 55. hf-y—/,^^ * 
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Fu'ad al-Rikabi who was a member o-f National 
Command di-f-fered with A-f 1 aq and al-Hurani -for their 
opposition to Jamal Abd al-Nasir's policies. He along with 
other National Command members adopted a unionist trend that 
led to their expulsion -from the party in 1959. The group 
•formed their own Ba'th Party in Lebanon in 1961 while the 
Iraqi Ba'th re-organized itself under the leadership o-f Al i 
Salih al-Sa'di. 
In 1962, the Iraqi Ba'th entered a broad 
alliance with the nationalist o-fficers in the armed -forces 
and together prepared the way to the first coup in February 
1963. Subsequently through which -for the -first time it 
9 
•formed its own government in Iraq . 
A-fter the -fall o-f the Monarchy, the military 
leaders who carried out the Revolution of 1958 began to fall 
under the influence of competing parties and groups and each 
tried to influence the revolutionary process along one 
ideological line or another. Rivalry between the two top 
leaders - *Abd al-Karim Qasim and ^Abd al-Salim ""Arif - led 
to the devision of civilian leaders into two camps, the 
Nationalists <essentially Ba'th and other Pan-Arab elements) 
and Communists, supported by left wing groups. Moderate 
9. CARDRI (Committee Against Repression and Democratic 
Rights in Iraq) Saddam's Iraq Revolution or Reaction ? 
Zed Book Ltd., London, 1986, p. 99. 
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leaders who might have played a constructive rolm failed to 
reconcile the two camps and the gap between them bscame ever 
wider. Since the Nationalists supported ^Arif, who 
championed the cause oi Arab unity, Dasim sought the support 
of Communists who, though in -favour of Arab unity in 
principle, was against unity with the united Arab 
Republic . 
The Ba'th captured power -from Col. Abd al-
Karim Qasim after having alliance with its military officers 
and other nationalist factions in Feb. 18, 1963. The 
alliance was aimed to bring Ba'thist to power. Through this 
alliance the right for participation of other nationalist 
groups was legally denied by the government. Although Abd 
al-Salam Arif a pro-Nasserite military Colonel was elevated 
to the post of presidency of the republic but the real power 
was in the hand of the Ba'thist who dominated the cabinet 
and the National Council . 
In the cabinet the Ba'thists occupied a 
majority or, to be specific, twelve out of the twenty-one 
seats including all the key ministers. Three other seats 
were filled by prominent members of the old Free Officers 
10. Khadduri, Majid; 1978, op,cit, p. 13. 
11. Haddad, George M; Revolutionary and Military Rule in the 
Middle East: The Arab States, Vol. 2, California 
University of California, 1971, pp. 131-37. 
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movement - sta-ff Brigadier Naji Taleb, an independent 
nationalist, Brigadier . Faud Ari'f, a Kurd, and Sta-f-f 
Brigadier Mahmud Sheet Khattab, who sympathized with the 
Moslem Brotherhood. 0-f the remaining port-folios, one went 
to a member of the landowning Kurdish -family of the 
Barzeingi Sayyeds, two to ex-affiliates of the defunct, 
right oriented independent party and three to specialists of 
12 
distinctly conservative temparement . 
It was clear that the Ba'th party, with its 
roots in Syria, was dedicated to the principles of Arab 
unity and Socialism. The new Iraqi leaders who were now in 
power were seeking reapproachment with the united Arab 
Republic in order to strengthen their hold on the basis of 
Arab unity before they introduced socialist measures. 
President Nasser responded on February 21, when he addressed 
a large gathering in Cairo that Egypt and Iraq were "one 
nation having one aim" and that "the U.A.R. people whole 
heartedly with the Iraqi people" . 
The differences between the Ba'th-dominated 
government in Syria and the Ba'th - Arif government in Iraq 
12. Batatu, Hanna; The Old Social Classes and the 
Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, Princeton University 
Press, New Jersey, 1978, pp. 1006-7. 
13. Kimball, Lorenzo, K; The Changing Pattern of Political 
Power in Iraq, 1958-71, Robert Speller ?< Sons Pub., New 
York, 1972, p. 109. 
cen 
vis-a-vis the issue of unity came to surface at this time. 
Aref, a non-Bathist, wanted cooperation among the Arab 
governments along the lines of the European Economic 
Community (Common Market), to be followed by a political and 
legal union. The Syrian Ba'th government, on the other 
hand, was advocating immediate union between the 
"revolutionary governments" of Syria, Iraq, the U.A.R., 
Algeria and Yemen. The new Ba'th plan called for a federal 
14 
union with collective leadership 
Consequently, negotiations for a federation 
between Iraq, Syria and Egypt were initiated in order to 
form a new united Arab Republic. Meetings were held in 
Cairo, Baghdad and Damascus during February and March. Out 
of these and other consultations came an agreement, signed 
at Cairo on April 17, 1963, for the federation of these 
States^^. 
A referendum was to be held in five months to 
elect a President of the Federation, a transitional Council 
and Cabinet were provided for, with provision for an 
eventual legislative Assembly and Senate, Regional 
Parliaments and a federal government which would control 
foreign affairs, defense and national security, finance 
14. Abujaber, Kamel S, op, cit, p. 69. 
15. Kimball Lorenzo K. op, cit, p. 109. 
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economic planning, justice, •ducation and communications. 
However, the Syrian and Iraqi Ba'thists clashed with Nassei— 
on certain policy issues. Three major issues dominated the 
conflict: 
1. equality versus inequality o-f the three parties, 
2. collective versus personal leadership, and 
3. the monopoly o-f the Syrian Ba'thists across a 
broader -front which include Pro-Nasserit-=»s. 
Interpretation o-f the agreements -following its 
conclusion began to vary between Cairo and the other 
two capitals with the consequence that the 
provisions of the agreement were never 
implemented . 
The outcome was to derive the Iraqi Ba'thists 
into closer cooperation with their Syrian counterparts. On 
September 2, 1963, the two countries announced their 
agreement to establish closer cooperation with a view to 
achieve the ultimate objectives of unity, Freedom and 
Socialism . 
The Sixth National Congress of the Ba'th 
Party, meeting in Damascus on 5-23 October, 1963, passed a 
resolution approving the principle of full federal union 
between Iraq and Syria but the Syrian Government made no 
16. Ibid. See also Batatu Hanna, op, cit, pp. 1014-1016. 
17. Ibid. 
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more to establish political union between the two countries, 
since such a union would be construed as an alliance against 
Egypt^^. 
However in this newly -formed Government, the 
Ba'th leaders were devided into three groups. The right 
wing group consisted of Talib Shabib, Hazim Jawad, Minister 
of State, Hardan al-Tikriti, commander of the air forces, 
Tahir Yahya, Chief of the General Staff and Abd al-Sattar 
Abd al-Latif, Minister of Communications respectively. This 
group advocated cooperation with other national elements, 
especially in the army, whom they thought it might 
eventually become members of the party and strengthen its 
position in the country. They therefore pressed for the 
postponement of the implementation of radical principles, 
especially Socialism, until the time had came when the 
country was ready for it. The Left-wing group on the other-
hand consisted essentially of leaders like Ali Salih al-
Sadi, Deputy Premier and Minister of Interior (later 
Minister of Guidance), Muhsin al-Shaykh Radi, Hamdi Abd al-
Majid, Hani al-Fukayki, and Abu Talib al-Hashmi. This group 
insisted on the implementation of basic principles, 
especially socialism, on the ground that socialism would 
secure the support of the masses and of the new generation. 
18. Khadduri, Majid; ^Republican Iraq' A Study in Iraqi 
Politics since the Revolution of 1958, Oxford University 
Press, 1969, p. 207. 
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Between these two extremes there was a centre group, 
composed of Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, Prime Minister and Salih 
Mahdi Ammash, Minister of Defence. The centre tried to 
reconcile the two extreme groups hoping that solidarity 
might be maintained if both were induced to cooperate on 
certain matters acceptable to them but Bakr and Ammash did 
not carry enough weight to be able to prevent the party from 
19 
breaking asunder . 
Shortly after the coup, the regime found 
itself challenged by its partners, the Nasserites, the 
Communists, and the Radical Ba'thists. Therefore it launched 
campaign against all, starting with the communists then 
Nasserites and lastly with the hard liners of the Ba'th. 
During their course of confrontation, the Ba'th survived 
four plots; The first was carried out by the Nasserites and 
subsequently on May 25, eleven Nasserites Officerfs were 
executed by firing squad. The second was held by the 
Communists on July 3, 1963 in which 35 Communists were 
condemned to death. The third attempt was designed by 
several retired senior officers and politicians of the old 
regime. The plotter received sentences of one to three 
years in jail. On November, 13, 1963, the fourth attempt 
was carried out by the radical group of the Ba'th headed by 
^Ali Salih al-Sa'di, the deputy premium and interior 
19. Ibid. 
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minister. The attempt followed by a decision of the 
Regional Command to expel 1 Ali Salih al-Sa'di from the 
command and his deportation to spain along with four of his 
Of) 
supporters^ . The Commander of the National Quards <the 
Ba'th militia) Mandher al-Mahdawi had led the air attack 
against the ministry of defence and the presidential place 
but the coup was crushed, resulting in killing of hundreds 
of Ba'thists. An emergency National Congress of the Ba'th 
was held in Baghdad in the evening of 13, November, 1963, to 
settle the crisis and it was decided that a new regional 
command should be formed in which al-Sa'di and his followers 
should rejoined it to further strengthen its Organizational 
base . 
The Ba'th Party in Iraq with this support of 
Abdus Salam Arif was the first ideological party to dominate 
the government and monopolize power in any Arab country. 
Its domination, however, was entirely dependent on the power 
of the military, and it ended when the military withdrew its 
support. The Ba'th ruler in Iraq as well as in Syria were 
never able to restore representative democratic government 
and could never- face the electorate in any kind of 
parliamentary elections. Their regime was troubled by Pro-
Nasserist and Communist attempts to overthrow the Ba'thists, 
20. Four Supporters were, Hamdi Abd al-Majid Muslim al-
Shaykh Rodi, Hani al-Fukaykl and Abu Talib al-Hashimi. 
21. Haddad George M., op, cit, pp. 131-37. 
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and by disputes and disagreements between the Ba'th rulers 
themselves which, in addition to their serious blunders, led 
after nine months to the end o-f their rule. 
Thus, the crisis continued to set the stage 
•for the coup of 18 November, 1963 and the fall of the Ba'th. 
In fact, the conflict that brought about the end of the 
Ba'th rule, was between the Iraqi regular army and the 
National Guards of the Ba'th^'^. 
The military coup of 18 November, 1963 was 
carried out by Abd-al-Rehman Arif with the cooperation of 
the Ba'thist Commander of air force. The rebels had a full 
control of power after they succeeded in eliminating the 
national guardsmen of the Ba'th. Abd al-Rahman Arif was 
chosen as the new statesman of Iraq. The coup of 18 
November, 1963, was a serious setback in the history of the 
Ba'th in Iraq-^ .^ 
An honest assessment of the achievements of 
the party after nine months of rule in Iraq leaves the 
impression that it acted as a reformist party more than a 
revolutionary one. For inspite of its radical new concept 
of mass organization, which constitutes the only serious 
22. Ibid, see also Devlin, John F, op, cit, pp. 259-72. 
23. Ibid. 
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basis o-f any popular revolutionary movement, and inspite of 
its clear views on the shape o-f new socialist society, 
incompetence, lack of experience and ri-fts among its leaders 
le-ft little scope for serious radical changes'' . 
In July 1968, the Ba'th returned to power in 
yet another coup. The coup of July 17, 1968 wai the eighth 
among the attempted millatary coups - after the revolution 
of July 14, 1958 and sixteenth since Iraq became independent 
in 1932. It was carried out by the cooperation of the 
retired Ba'thist Officer - politician, Ahmad Hasan Bakr, 
with two younger independent Officers in the active service, 
Lt. Col. Ibrahim Da'ud, Commander of the Presidential Guard, 
and Abdul Rassaaq Nayef, deputy chief of military 
intelligence and liaison man between President Aref and the 
army. Two weeks later, on July 30, it was followed by 
another coup in which the Ba'thists ousted the two young 
25 
officers who brought them to power . But the root cause 
lies in the fact that the regime had neighter been 
sufficiently consolidated under the Premiership of Yahiya 
nor attained legitimacy by popular consent. Both in the 
army and the outside official circles, their existed certain 
groups that were determined to effect a change by force if 
24. Majdalani, Gebran; "The Ba'th Experience in Iraq". 
Middle East Forum, Vol. 41, No.2, Late Autumn 1965), pp, 
41-47. 
25. Haddad, Seorge li, op, cit, p. 157 
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their demandB to participate the political process were not 
heeded. Since the regime was not prepared to tolerate the 
opposition its tenure of o-f-fice ultimately depended on the 
loyalty o-f the army . 
The major military units on which the 'Ari-f 
regime depended were the Republican Guard, the Baghdad 
Garrison and Military intelligence. The -first was headed by 
Colonel ^Abd al-Rahman Ibrahim al-Da'ud, the second, under 
the command of colonel Hammad Shihab, the third under the 
control of colonel 'Abd al-Raszaq al-Nay'ef. And these 
officers, especially Naif and Da'ud, who had already become 
conscious of their power, had their own ambitions and plans 
for the future. They seems to have tacitly come to the 
conclusion that if ''Arif were overthrown, they would be the 
successors on whose shoulders the mantle of the 'Arif regime 
should fall. Keenly feeling that they were in need of a 
front that would disguise their personal ambition, they 
agreed to cooperate with Ba'th party because it was thought 
it might provide legitimacy for their rule. With a poor 
record under the first 'Arif regime, they felt the Ba'th 
27 
party would be the ideal tool in their hands . 
On the morning of July 16th., 1968, the 
26. Khadduri, Majid, 1978, op, cit, p. 21. 
27. Ibid, p. 22. 
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Regional leadership was meeting in the house of Regional 
Party Secretary General Comrade Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr to 
review and settle the -final assignments. Unexpectedly, a 
messenger -from Abdul Razzaq al-Nayi-f arrived with an o-f-fer 
from him to participate in the proposed operation. It was 
revealed that Ibrahim al-Da'ud had in -fact in-formed Al-Nayi-f 
of the coming event and proposed that he will take part with 
an understanding that he would become the Prime Minister of 
the new regime. The Party leadership, had to act quickly in 
28 
view of this dangerous development . Accordingly Lt. Col. 
Abdul raszaq Nayif, thirty-four years old, thus became Prime 
Minister and Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, assumed the charge of 
Presidentship in place of Abdus Salam, Asif, Ibrahim Da'ud 
,thirty-nine years old, was given the defence portfolio and 
became Lieutenant General and Deputy Commander of the Armed 
Forces. Among the Ba'th military leaders who had been 
retired under the preceding regime. Lieut. Gen. Hardan 
Takriti became army chief of staff and Maj. Gen. Saleh Mahdi 
Ammash, Minister of Interior. The cabinet included four 
Kurdish ministers, two of whom were regarded as adherents of 
29 
the Khurdish leader Mustafa al-Barzani"". 
No sooner did the Government begin to 
28. Revolutionary Iraq 1968-1973, The Political Report 
adopted by the Eighth Regional Congress of the Arab 
Ba'th Socialist Party - Iraq - p. 39. 
29. Haddad, George, M, op, cit, pp. 158-59. 
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•function than a conflict between the Ba'th and Nayif - Oa'ud 
group ensued, both inside and outside of-ficial circles. 
Premier Nayif made several statements to the press 
unfavourable to socialism which were unacceptable to Ba'th 
leaders. President Bakr, on the other hand, pointed out 
that the new regime was in favour of an Arab nationalist 
contrary to socialist policy to which his party was 
committed and would expect its representatives in the 
Government to carry out. No less significant was the 
conflict on foreign affairs. The Nayif - Da'ud group was 
inclined to cooperate with Western powers and paid lip 
service to Arab unity while the Ba'th leaders were opposed 
to cooperation with Nasir and demanded a neutralist foreign 
policy. As a result, an atmosphere of suspicion surrounded 
the relationships between the Ba'th and the Nayif-Da'ud 
30 
group and a struggle for power between them ensued . 
The Ba'th leaders were not happy with the 
attitudes and policies of the young officers who brought 
them back to power. They now used the same unscrupulous 
maneuvers that the Ba'thist had employed elsewhere in order 
to oust Nayif and Da'ud because they stood in the way of 
complete Ba'th control in Iraq." In Syria, the Ba'thists had 
succeded in July 1963 in ousting General Zaid Hariri who 
30. Kadduri, Majid, 1978, op, cit, pp. 25-27. 
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executed the coup o-f March 8, 1963 that brought them to 
power and in purging out the non~Ba'thist elements that 
took, part in the coup. The Iraqi Ba'thist did not wait -four 
months or even four weeks to remove these who made the coup 
against Are-f. On July 30, 1968, two weeks after the coup, 
Col. Nayi-F and General Da'ud were dismissed from their posts 
and sent to exile by their Ba'thist partners. The tvjelve-
day-old cabinet was dismissed. Col. Nayif was arrested at 
noon in his residence in Baghdad and was later sent to 
Morocco, while the minister of defence, General Da'ud was 
purged out while he was performing a duty of his office 
outside the country. It was blood-less Revolution. Some 
have called it the White Revolution^ . 
In September, the new Ba'thist regime headed 
by Bakr issued its first provisional constitution, which 
declared Islam to be the religion of the State, ^Socialism' 
as the foundation of the economy, and RCC (and by extension, 
its Chairman) as the supreme legislative and executive 
authority, to which the cabinet and the (projected) National 
Assembly were to be subordinate. The third of these 
provisions, stressing the supremacy of the RCC, is evidently 
the one that has been most assiduously respected since 1968. 
The RCC is accountable to no one, except to the Ba'th Party; 
even this degree of accountability is no more than formal. 
31. Haddad, George M, op, cit, p. 160. 
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As far as the two other institutions are concernedi the 
Cabinet has never e;:er ci <=^-,d more than technocratic 
authority, and the National Assembly, which eventually came 
into being in 1980, has deliberative rather than legislative 
power . 
In the second temporary constitution of 16 
July 1970 nationalist and socialist principles (derived 
essentially from Ba'thist teachings) were more strongly 
emphasized than in the 21 September 1968 first temporary 
constitution. Thus in the second constitution, Society as 
envisioned to be ultimately composed of equal . and 
responsible individuals, presumably to classless society 
maintained by social solidarity. The function of the State 
was to help establish this society structured on the 
findings of science and achieved through a revolutionary 
process. The State undertook to achieve these objectives by 
continuous planning and regulating the social and economic 
system. The country's natural resources and the instruments 
of production were declared to be owned collectively by the 
nation - the State undertakes to exploit them for the 
benefit of the people as a whole. Private .ownership, 
however, was named recognised and private sectors allowed to 
J. 3 3 operate . 
32. Sluglett Marion Farouk and Peter Sluglett; Iraq Since 
1958, From Revolution to Dictatorship, K.P.I. London and 
New York, 1987, p. 118. 
33. Khadduri, Majid, 1978, op, cit, p. 34. 
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When the Ba'th came to power in 1968 a 
section within the party -felt that it was necessary to make 
some sorts of accomodation with its -former enemies after 
giving up its total political isolation. Furthermore it 
needed to produce positive economic policies on the lines of 
newly framed constitution of 1968 which would be both 
popular and effective. Thus in 1969 and 1970 the Ba'th 
began to make official overtures to the Communist Party and 
Kurdistan Democratic Party alongwith other ^Progressive 
forces', calling upon them to participate with it in the 
'national struggle' against Imperialism and Zionism, and in 
the construction of an Independent Iraq and a free and 
prosperous Arab nation'. Thus the Ba'th Party alternately 
cajoled and pressurized the Communists and the Kurds to join 
them in a National Front early in 1972. This coalition, 
which came into being in 1973, enabled them to broaden their 
power base very substantially. For their part, the KDF and 
Communists were permitted a certain degree of political 
freedom, and in particular were allowed to publish their own 
newspaper and magazines. At the same time, the Ba'th began 
to make overtures to the Socialist Countries, which bore 
fruit in the Iraq-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1972. 
Naturally the Friendship Treaty was another important reason 
for the Communists joining the National Front . But by the 
34. CARDRI Saddam's Iraq, op, cit, pp. 100-1. See also 
P.M.A. Card, Arab World File, Progressive National and 
Nationalist Front, Iraq - 1104/1, 20 January 1982. 
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end o-f 1978, there developed a steady deterioration in the 
relation between the Ba'th and its main partner the 
Communist Party. It ended with the Communist decision to 
take up arms against the regime. They joined the Kurds who 
35 
too broke alliances with regime and waged an open war . 
In their pursuit o-f popularity, the Ba'thist 
rulers also adopted a bold line on the question o-f Palestine 
and the conflict in the West Asia in January 1969, they 
rejected the U.N. Security Council Resolution o-f November 
22, 1967, in July 1970 they denounced the proposal o-f 
American Secretary of State William P. Rogers -for a 
cease-fire at least three months and for peace negotiations 
through special U.N. envoy 6unnar. V. Jarring; in September 
1970 they openly pledged to commit their troops in Jordan on 
the side of the Palestinian Resistance in the event of a 
show down with King Husain's army. But the boldness was 
more in their words than in their deeds. Their failure to 
live up to their pledge to the Fedayeen not only cost them 
dearly in prestige, but also produced a serious rift between 
them and a section of the Ba'th Pan-Arab command led by 
Michael Aflaq. More than that, it heightend the infighting 
between the military and civilian wings of the Party . 
35. Sluglett, Marion Farouk, op, cit, pp. 158-170. 
36. Batatu Hanna, op, cit, pp. 1096-97. 
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However, the decline in the prestige of 
Ba'thi regime that ensured from its weakness in the Jordan 
showdown was more than compensated by the popular approval 
to nationalizing the Iraq Petroleum Company. Before it came 
to power in 1968, the Ba'th party had called for 
nationalization of the oil industry, epitomized in the 
slogan "Arab Oil for the Arabs". Once in the saddle, the 
Ba'th began to appreciate the difficulties involved in 
nationalization and decided to proceed step by step toward 
the ultimate goal of nationalization. On June 1, 1972 the 
R.C.C. passed a resolution to nationalize the IPC operations 
and a degree 69 was issued to compensate the company for its 
assets as redefined under law 80 (1961). A national company 
called the Iraq Company for Oil Operations was established 
to operate the fields taken over from the IPC which would be 
responsible for the rights and assets transferred to it in 
accordance with degree 69 . 
Similarly, Ba'thism, although not directly 
identified with Sunni Islam, also has definite aspirations 
towards Arab Unity, an ideal for which the majority of Iraqi 
Shi'i have never expressed much positive enthusiasm. Thus, 
while not wishing to suggest that all politically articulate 
Shi'is were attracted to communism, it is safe to say that 
37. Khadduri, Majid, op, cit; 1979, pp. 123-129. See also 
Berindranath Dewan, Iraq the Land of Arab Resurgence, 
PAI Pvt. Ltd., Delhi, 1979, pp. 111-129. 
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•few of them were positively attracted either to Arab 
nationalism or to Ba'thism. The only major exception to 
this was the group around the Faud al-Rikabi, the Shi'i 
•founder o-F the Ba'th Party in Iraq in 1952. As he recruited 
primarily among his -friends and relatives, many o-f the -first 
Iraqi Ba'thists were Shi'is. However, it must be emphasised 
that they were al-Rikabi's family and associates before 
anything else, so that when he left the Ba'th in 1959 almost 
all of them left with him . Furthermore, when control of 
the Ba'th passed into the hands of the Tikriti after 1968, 
there were no Shi'i at all in the higher echelons of the 
party, a state of affairs that did not change until the 
appointment of four Shi'i to RCC in September 1977'^^. 
Although Shi'is did join the Ba'th Party 
after it had established itself in power, and a number rose 
to important positions in the course of time, it can safely 
be asserted that the majority of the Shi'i population 
remained indifferent to Ba'thism. After the success of 
Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979, a considerable Shi'i 
40 
challenge to the regime came into existence . 
38. Sluglett, Marion Farouk, op, cit, p. 194. 
39. Naim Haddad and Hasan 'Ali al-Amiri Joined the Regional 
Command in 1974. Muhdi 'Abd al-Husain al-Mashadi and 
Adnan Hamdani became members of the RCC in September 
1977; Haddad and al-Amiri became RCC member at the same 
ti me. 
40. Sluglett, Marion Farouk, op, cit, p. 195. See also 
Bengio Opra; "Shi'ism and Politics in Ba'thi Iraq", 
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1, January 1985, 
Frank CASS ?•< CO Ltd. London, pp. 3-13. 
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Apart -from the issue oi Arab Uinity, which 
was particularly prominent in the -first -few years after 
1968, the overall ideological framework of the party in Iraq 
has essentially remained within the original mystical notion 
of the Arab nation, the Arab homeland, al-watan al-^arabi, 
and the Arab masses al~jamahir - who wage a fierce and bold 
struggle against the Imperialist and Zionist enemy and its 
local reactionary hirelings. Thus the political strategy of 
the party aims, in a scientific and practical way, at 
developing Arab trends and tendencies towards the higher 
national aspirations of the Arab nation in its present stage 
41 
of historical development . Hence the advancement and 
development of this nation possibly on all fronts became 
prominent during the Saddam Ba'thist regime starting from 
the time when he assumed the post of Vice-President of this 
republic. But at the same time he may be charged of creating 
factionalism and Bathization and Tikritization of all the 
institutions of the state including the army of Iraq. Thus 
it is desirable to look into the life of Saddam Hussain who 
is not only responsible for a considerable progress on 
economic and social spheres but is also beign charged for 
waging a war with Iran in 1979, which claimed to have taken 
more than 2,00,000 lifes on the Iraqi side. 
Saddam Hussain was born in Tikrit on April 
41. CARDRI Saddam's Iraq; op, cit, pp. 102-105. 
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28, 1937 in a poor peasant -family . Saddam Husain was 
nearly eight years old when Michael A-flaq's Arab Ba'th 
movement was evolving into a party in Damascus. He had not 
yet had any -formal education, as his relatives wanted him to 
became a -farmer like the rest o-f the -family. But a cousin 
on his mother's side Adnan Khairallah helped and encouraged 
him to join the school. A-fter completing his first year at 
school, he moved to Baghdad with his maternal uncle 
Khairallah Tal-fah, who looked a-fter him because his father 
43 
had died be-fore he was born ^. 
From the time when he was still in Tikrit, a 
number of significant events seem to have had an indelible 
impact on his future car-BBr. Khayr-Allah Talfah, who was 
then an officer in the army, participated in the ill-fated 
Rashid Ali uprising and took part in the military operations 
against Britain in 1941. After the fall of the Rashid Ali, 
Talfah was expelled from service. His detention, along with 
other officers grieved all member of his family. the impact 
of the Rashid Ali affair, was one of the principal reason 
that prompted him to participate in nationalist activities 
which have as their goal the elimination of foreign 
influence not only from his country but also from all Arab 
42. F.M.A. Card, Arab World File: Iraq No, 1903/1, 16 Nov. 
1983. 
43. Matar Faud: Saddam Husain, The Man, The Cause and the 
Future, Third World Centre, London, 1981, p. 31. 
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The Second important event in Saddam's li-fe 
was his decision to continue his studies in Baghdad. After 
he -finished primary education in Tikrit, and while he was 
still in the second year in high school, he began to -follow 
student activities'in Baghdad and aspired to be in the midst 
o-f those events. He le-ft Tikrit in the fall of 1955 and 
entered the secondary school of al-Karkh. While still in 
school, he became involved in the activities of the Ba'th 
Party and participated in the abortive coup of 1956. That 
event was then considered as a significant land mark in 
nationalist activities and the Ba'th Party played an 
important role in enlisting students to take part in it. In 
the following year, Saddam became a member of the Ba'th 
Party^'^. 
The third important event was Saddam's 
participation in the attempt on Abd al-Karim Qasim's life in 
1959. He was one of the ten young men selected to 
assassinate Qasim in accordance with a plan laid down by 
Ba'thist leaders. Though he was wounded and sentenced to 
death in absentia, he fled the country via his native town 
in disguise to Syria. A year later he made his way to Cairo 
44. Khadduri, Majid, 1978, op, cit, p. 72. 
45. Ibid, p. 72. See also Matar, Faud, op, cit, pp. 32-34. 
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where he completed high school in 1961. Meanwhile, he was 
drawn into nationalist activities during 1961-62 and became 
the leader in the Cairo unit o-f the Ba'th Party. After 
completing high school, he enrolled in the Cairo University 
law college in the -fall of the 1962 but before he could 
finish the first year he returned to Baghdad after the Ba'th 
Party seized power in February 1963. As an activist he 
became fully involved in the Ba'th Party and was arrested 
and thrown into prison in November 1964, after the fall of 
the Ba'th from power. He again consolidated his position 
when he and other Ba'th members supported Bakr in his drive 
to control the Regional command leadership. He worked 
closely with Bakr after the Ba'th seized power in 1963 . 
At the end of 1969, and indeed for some time 
afterwards, there were substantial pockets of opposition to 
al-Bakr and Saddam Husain within both the armed forces and 
the party leadership. One civilian member of the RCC, * Abd-
ullah Sail urn al-Samarrai the Minister of culture and 
information, was demoted to Minister of State in December 
1969, then dismissed from the RCC and put out to grass as 
Iraq's ambassador in India in 1970. 
In November 1969, it was announced that the 
Deputy Premiership had been abolished, a move directed 
46. Ibid, p. 73. See Batatu Hanna, op, cit, pp. 1084-87. 
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against the two holders of the post, Salih Mahdi Ammash and 
Hardan al-Takriti; as result neither could chair cabinet 
meetings in Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr's absence. Their power 
were -further reduced in April 1970, when both were relieved 
o-f their ministeries (and replaced by Sadum Ghaidan at 
Interior and Hammad al-^Shihab al-Takriti at De-fence), and 
appointed 'Deputy President'. A series of high level 
military transfers and promotions accompanied this 
47 
reshuffle . 
All in all, it proved rather harder to get 
rid of Ammash and Hardah al-Takriti than Saddam Husain had 
perhaps envisaged, but eventually the events in Jordan in 
September 1970 provided Husain and al-Bakr with the excuse 
they needed t-- remove Hardan al-Takriti and purge his 
leading supporters from the armed froces. The non-
intervention of the Iraqi Army on the side of the Palestine. 
Resistence could be laid fairly and squarely at the door of 
Haidan ,al-Takriti as Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Armed 
Forces, and it was also widely believed that Saddam Husain 
had favoured intervention but that Hardan had insisted on 
thwarting his wishes. Hardan was exiled to Algeria in 
October 1970, and later took refuge in Kuwait, where he was 
assassinated in 1971^°. 
47. Marion Farouk Sluglett, op, cit, p. 135. See also 
Kelidar, Abbas, The Wars of Saddam Husein, Middle 
Eastern Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4, Frank CASS, London, 
October 1992, pp. 778-798. 
48. Ibid. , p. 135. 
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Though Ammash as Vice-President almost a year 
a-fter Hardan's fall, began to -feel that there was 
curtailment on his powers comparing to his Predecessors. 
Dissatisfied with a position in which he had become 
virtually a -figure head, he o-ften made unwarranted critical 
remarks about other party members which aroused antagonism 
and tarnished his image. For these and other reasons, 
personal and otherwise, the Civilian leaders demanded his 
removal -from the Vice-Presidency. He was appointed 
Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. in 1971; three years later, he 
was trans-ferred in the Same capacity, -first to France and 
49 
then two years.later to Finland . 
There were some distinguished party members 
like Abd al-Khaliq al-Samarrai, Abd al-Karim al-Shaykhli and 
Salah Umar al-Ali who had distinguished themselves in public 
affairs. With this pace of time Samarrai as member of both 
the National and Regional Commands, won a reputation as a 
dedicated and hardworking leader and became very popular in 
party congresses and always stood high in the list of Party 
Candidates for elected positions. But he seems to have 
become very critical of party leaders in higher echelons. 
Very soon opposition grew against him; he was finally 
involved in Kazzar uprising and thrown into prison on the 
49. Khadduri, Majid, 1978, Op, cit, p. 61 
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instruction o^ Hassan al-Bakr. Similarly, Shaykhli and 
Salah ^Umar al-Ali, the -first holding the port-folio o-f 
Foreign Minister and the other information, were dropped 
•from membership o-f the RCC and appointed to diplomatic posts 
abroad. Shaykhli was sent to the United Nations as his 
country's head of mission in 1971 and Ali as Ambassador to 
Sweden in 1972^^. 
Saddam Husain, who quietly worked up his way 
in the party's echelons, proved capable of surrounding 
himself with a number of young men who gave him almost 
unlimited support to rise to the higher position in the 
State, next to President Bakr. Championing the cause of 
civil leadership, he was able to mobilize the growing 
civilian power against military ascendancy . 
In his drive for leadership, Saddam Husain 
encountered a number of opponents who were prepared to 
challenge him but none proved more determined, by force if 
necessary, to oppose him than Nazim Kazzar, Chief of the 
Security Police. He took an active part in the massacre of 
Communists following the first Ba'thist coup in 1963 and was 
appointed Chief of the Security Police at Saddam's 
insistence in 1969. 
50. Ibid, p. 62. See also Batatu Hanna, op, cit, p. 1097. 
51. Ibid, p. 63. 
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Though he agreed in principle on major 
issues, Kaz2ar came into con-flict with other Ba'th leaders 
on the method of dealing with the Kurdish question and 
communists. Because his harsh measures proved decisive in 
silencing opponents, Kazsar advocated stttlement of the 
Kurdish question by force and was responsible for the 
initial clashes between Kurds and security forces and for 
two unsuccessful 1 attempts on Mull a Mustafa's life a 
prominent Kurd leader in 1971 and 1972^ . 
Believing that his services to the party were 
not sufficiently recognized, Kazzar tried to realize his 
ambition by force. Thus Kazzar devised a plan that had the 
attraction of enabling him to dispose of almost all his 
rivals more or less simultaneously. Taking advantage of one 
of al-Bakr's relatively rare visits abroad, and realising 
that protocol would demand that most of the party leadership 
would be on hand at Baghdad Airport to greet the President 
on his return on 30 June, 1971, Kazzar invited the two key 
military members of the RCC, Lt. General Hammad Shihab, the 
Minister of Defence and Lt. General Sa'dun Ghaidan, the 
Minister of Interior (who were in charge of the armed forces 
and the police) to a * banquet', or, according to Ghaidan, to 
visit his head quarters to inspect some newly installed 
52. Ibid, p. 63. 
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surveillance equipment. On their arrival, the two ministers 
were bundled down to the cellars, while a special 
detatchment o-f Kassar's own men was despatched to the 
airport to assassinate both the President and his reception 
committee on the former's return from Poland. Fortunately 
for most of the RCC, the airoplane was delayed and the would 
be assassins left the airport, presumably under the 
impression that the President had somehow got wind of the 
plot. Meanwhile, Kassar, having watched al-Bakr's arrival 
on television and thus having seen for himself that the plot 
had misfired, left Baghdad by road, taking the two ministers 
with him as hostages, threatening (over the radio) to kill 
them if he was not given safe conduct out of the country. 
Unfortunately for Abd al~Khaliq al~Samarrai, Kazsar 
apparently offered to meet al-Bakr at the former's house to 
discuss his differences with the regime, thus implicating 
al-Samarrai in the plot. There is no other evidence linking 
Kassar with al-Samarrai, who, unlike Kaszar, had good 
standing in the Ba'th Party and was an important rival of 
the al-Bakr/Saddam Husain group. In the end Kazzar decided 
that his safest course of action was to try to reach Iran 
with his two hostages. When the Party was sighted by Iraqi 
forces near the Iranian border Kazzar killed Shihab and 
seriously wounded Ghaidan before being captured himself . 
53. Marion farouk Sluglett, Op, cit, p. 161. 
C106D 
The successful •foiling of the plot was 
immediately announced on Baghdad radio, and a special court 
under the Presidency of ' Izzat al-Duri was set up to "^ try' 
the conspirators. On 7 July, it was announced that the 
court had found Kazzar and twenty-one other guilty, and that 
they had been executed immediately afterwards. A further 
fourteen were e;<ecuted the ne;;t day, including Muhammad 
Fadhil, head of the Ba'th military bureau Abd al-Khaliq al-
Samarrai, apparently saved from the firing squad by the 
personal intervention of Michael Aflaq and was given 1' fe 
imprisonment 
After the dismissal of Hardan al-Takriti and 
Ammash and the foiling of Kazsar's plot in July 1973, there 
were no serious challenges to the leadership of al-Bakr and 
Saddam Husain; at least on the surface, apart from a few 
purges and dismissals, the two seemed fermly in control. In 
January 1976, Saddam Husain, who had no military background, 
had himself 'promoted' to the rank of general, 
retrospectively from 1 July 1973 . Later on it was 
announced that the complement of the people's Militia, the 
Ba'th Party's own military force under the command of Taha 
Yasin Ramadan would be doubled, over the next few year, its 
equipment was gradually built up sufficiently for it to be 
54. Ibid, p. 162. 
55. Ibid, p. 206. 
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able to act if necessary as a counterweight to the regular 
armed -forces 
Dn 4 September 1977, -for the second time 
since beginning o-f Ba'th rule in Iraq, all R.L. members 
joined the R.C.C. Between March and September 1977, the 
R.C.C. consisted o-f Bakr, Husain, Ghaydan, Izzat al-Duri , 
and Ramadan. When the R.L. members joined the R.C.C. it 
swelled -from 5 to 22 members. One reason -for this sweeping 
change may have been Saddam Husain's wish to strengthen his 
position - 2 of the 17 new R.C. members were his staunch 
supporters . At the same time Saddam Husain began his 
•first major -foray into enter-Arab politics with the Baghdad 
Summit and the ensuing Reconciliation' with Syria. It was 
only with al-Bakr's resignation in 1979 that the latent 
rebelliousness o-f Saddam Husain's colleagues broke out into 
the open 
On 16 July 1979, the eve of the eleventh 
anniversary of the Ba'th takeover, al-Bakr appeared on 
television to announce his resignation, and Saddam Husain 
56. In October 1977, al-Bakr handed over the Portfolio of 
Defence to his son-in-law. Colonel (Adnan Khairallah, 
who is also the brother of Saddam Husain's Wife. 
57. Baram, Amasia; The Ruling Political Elite in Ba'thi 
Iraq, 1968-1986: The changing features of a collective 
profile, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 
21, (1989) United States of America, p. 454. 
58. Marion Farouk Sluglett, op, cit, p. 208. 
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was ^sworn in' immediately as President, a transfer of power-
that had been as meticulously prepared as it had been long 
expected. Izsat al-Duri, a long-standing and loyal 
Lieutenant of Saddam Husain, was appointed Vice-President. 
However, a few days before al-Bakr's resignation, there were 
already indications that something else was afoot, with the 
announcement that the R.C.C. secretary, Muhi Abd al-Husain 
Mashhadi, was to be replaced by Tariq Hamad al-Abdullah. 
The full significance of this emerged a fortnight later, on 
28 July, when it was declared that a plot to overthrow the 
regime, masterminded by Syria, had been uncovered; a special 
party court of seven R.C.C. members was immediately set up 
under Naim Haddad, and within a few days twenty two people 
had been executed, including Mashhadi along with his four 
colleagues who were assigned membership of R.C.C. namely 
Muhammad 'Ayish, Muhammad Mahjub, and Shanim ^Abd al-Jalil 
respectively 
Saddam Husain since, then, has managed to 
crystallise the Ba'thist theory of action, through 
meticulous work; a precise and deep supervision of the 
development of the revolutionary process with all 
difficulties, complexes and ensuing new facts involved; a 
59. Ibid, p. 209. See also P.M.A. Card Arab World File, 
Coup Deta't, The Ba'th in Power (1968-81), Iraq, 1102/6, 
6 January, 1982. 
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live contact with the party members and the peoplei a 
creative ideological e-f-fort; and a high prepardness -for 
dialogue and interaction with views and -facts. This theory 
has guided the party in the political, economic, social and 
organisational -fields as well as its relation with the 
people and in its Arab and International relations in all 
past phases. It is today the prime scource o-f guidance -for 
the party's activity in all such fields. In this, Saddam 
Husain has made a valuable achievement in the history o-f the 
Party and Revolution, and even in the course o-f the 
movements of the Arab and Third World Revolutions . 
60. The Central Report of the Ninth Regional Congress, June 
19B2, Arab Ba'th Socialist Party Iraq Baghdad January 
1983, pp. 37-38. 
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BA^TH AND THE KURDISH QUESTION 
The Kurdish issue has constitutsed a central 
problem con-fronting Iraqi governments ever since the State 
o-f Iraq was established in 1920. This problem has comprised 
both internal and external aspects. In the domestic 
political context the Kurds, on the basis o-f their ethnic 
and linguistic di-f-ference from the Arab majority, have 
justi-fiably pressed for a special status within the Iraqi 
State. Yet on many occassions that genuine desire has been 
explpoited by external powers with an intrest in keeping the 
contemporary State of Iraq disunited and weak . 
Kurdistan, the land of the Kurds,is situated, 
in the Western part of Asia, in West Asia. It does not 
constitute a State, and the territory known as Kurdistan is 
shared by four countries namely Turkey, Iran, Iraq and 
Syria . The Kurds of Iraq hoped that in a country under 
British influence they might enjoy greater freedom and their 
national life would develop into maturity. The Iraqi 
Government agreed to recognise the Kurds as a people having 
their own cultural identity and granted them full status as 
Iraqi citisens. Upon the termination of British tutelage, 
it was hoped that in time the Kurds would be integrated with 
1. Niblock Tim (ed); Iraq The Contemporary State, Croom 
Helm, London, 1982, p. 47. 
2. Ghassemlou, Abdul Rahman; Kurdistan and the Kurds, 
Collet's Publisher Ltd., London, 1965, p. 13. 
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Arabs and other entho-cultural groups to -form the Iraqi 
nation . 
But after independence neither the Kurds nor 
the Arabs in true sense were prepare to -form a national 
identity and failure to create a new national identity -for 
Iraq was the root cause o-f Kurdish reluctance to give up 
their Kurdish identity. As the Arabs always asserted the 
Arab character o-f the country and the new generation 
identified itself with Pan-Arabism, the Kurds feared that 
their dependence on an Iraqi identity might be merely a step 
toward their ultimate assimilation by the advocates of Arab 
nationalism. The Kurdish nationalism that had been in the 
making before independence began to grow and was given 
impetus by the corresponding growth t^ Arab nationalism 
after World War-II. Without a serious attempt to discourage 
either trend or to impress on both Kurds and Arabs about the 
necessity of stressing the supremacy of the Iraqi national 
4 
1dentity . 
Since Kurdish nationalism took the form of 
tribal uprisings led by tribal chiefs - Nulla Mustafa and 
3. Khadduri, Majid, Socialist Iraq; Middle East Institute, 
Washington, D.C., 1978, p. 101. 
4. Ibid, for Kurdish nationalism see also - O'Ballance 
Edgar; The Kurdish Revolt, 1961-1970, Faber and Faber 
Limited, London, 1973, pp. 38-57. 
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others it was suppressed by -force on the ground that they 
were rebellions challenging the authority o-f the Central 
Government. Nothing constructive was done to win the 
con-fidence o-f the Kurds and the root cause of 
dissatisfaction, remained virtually untouched. Long be-fore 
it came to power, the Ba'th Party was perhaps the -first 
political party to tackle the Kurdish question with a 
5; 
positive and constructive approach . 
The Kurdish issue was one o-f the questions 
mentioned in the National Revolutionary Command Council's 
(NRCC) statement on the morning of February 8, 1963, when 
the Ba'th came to power in a coup. This statement declared 
that one of the goals new governments' was to achieve 
national unity by "manner that would guarantee the national 
intrest, strengthen the common struggle against Imperialism, 
and (express) respect for the rights of minorities by 
allowing them to participate in the national life" . 
However, negotiations between the Kurdish 
leaders and the new ^Iraqi Government did not lead to a 
satisfactory agreement. When Jalal Talibani, personal 
representative of Mulla Mustafa, arrived in Baghdad on 19 
February 1963 and met Tahir Yahya, Chief of Staff, he was 
5. Ibid, p. 102. 
6 . Ghareeb Edmund; The K u r d i s h Ques t i on i n I r a q , Sy racuse 
U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 8 1 , p . 58 . 
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told with reservations that Kurdish autonomy was to be 
declared soon. It was at that time that Bakr and ^Ammash, 
the Premier and the De-fence Minister, declared in broad term 
U'lurdish rights' rather than autonomy. They seem to have 
•feared that an immediate declaration o-f autonomy might 
arouse Pan-Arab criticism o-f the Ba'thi Government, although 
Ba'th leaders had agreed on Kurdish autonomy in principle. 
They told Kurdish leaders that the Kurdish problem should be 
discussed with the broader scheme of Arab unity . 
An announcement of the Mraqi Government that 
guranteed *the rights of the Kurds', on March 1, 1963 the 
two Kurdish members of the * Iraqi Government, viz Baba Ali 
and Fuad Arif, accompanied by Tahir Yahya and Ali Hayder 
Sulayman, to negotiate with Mulla Mustafa. The basic 
Kurdish demands were discussed and Mulla Mustafa insisted 
that as a first step the principle of autonomy should be 
recognised, but the details would be subjected to future 
negotiations. The principal Kurdish demands were: 
1. Equal rights for Arabs and Kurds within a unified 
State, 
2. The Post of Vice-President and Assistant Chief of 
Staff of the Iraqi Republic should go to Kurds; 
7. Khadduri, Maid; Republican Iraq' A Study in Iraqi 
Politics Since the Revolution of 1958, Oxford University 
Press, 1969, p. 269. 
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3. Kurdistan to comprise the provinces of Sulaymania, 
Kirkuk, Arabil, and the Kurdish districts of Mosul 
and Diyala provinces, with its own executive and 
legislative council, the authority of the Kurdish 
administration to include justice, internal affairs, 
education, health, agriculture. Appointments of 
Kurds to all Official posts, Kurdish language should 
be given the status of the second official language. 
4. Kurds to belong to the N.C.R.. C. in proportion to 
their percentage in Iraqi population. 
5. Oil revenues and customs due to be shared on the 
same proportion basis. 
6. Military movement in Kurdistan by the Iraqi army to 
be made only with the consent of the Kurdish 
admi ni strat i on. 
The Ba'th leaders, though accepting autonomy 
in principle, hesitated to make a formal declaration because 
they feared that if it might constitute a step towards an 
ultimate independence. They, therefore, formed a * popular 
delegation' (not officially to represent the government) to 
negotiate with Mull a Mustafa to substitute the word 
B 
^decentralization' for ^autonomy' . The Government issued a 
statement on March 9, 1963. 
8. Ibid, p. 270. 
C115D 
Since one of the main aims o-f the Revolution 
o-f Ramadhan 14 (Feb. 8) 1963 is to establish a modern system 
based on the best administrative and governmental methods, 
and since the methods o-f decentralisation has proved to be 
bene-ficial, therefore, the Revolution, acting on the basis 
of revolutionary principals announced in its first 
communique providing for strengthening of Arab-Kurdish 
brotherhood and for respect of the rights of Kurds and other 
minorities, approves the national rights of the Kurdish 
people on the basis of decentralisation. This should be 
entered in the provisional and the permanent constitutions 
when they are enacted. A committee will be formed to lay 
down the broad lines of decentralization . 
During the latter part of March, 1963, 
Kurdish leaders met to establish an atmosphere of solidarity 
to back up the Kurdish delegation that was going to try to 
negotiate for a special status for the Kurds with the 
Baghdad Government. After a month of much waiting and some 
meetings, including one with Deputy Prime Minister Sadi, the 
Kurdish delegation presented on April 24, 1963 a formal 
version of their familiar proposals for autonomy to the 
Baghdad Bovernment. In sum by these proposals pointed out 
asked that Iraq should make a unified state comprising two 
9. Pelletierce Stephen C; The Kurds: An unstable Element in 
the Gulf, West View Press/Boulder and London, 1989, p. 
134. 
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nationalities, Arabs and Kurds, with each enjoying equal 
rights; that the Kurds would be allowed to exercise 
legislation in a de-fined area including the northern 
provinces of Sulaymaniyah, Kirkuk and Arbil, and domain 
districts populated by Kurdish majority in o-f Mosul and 
Diyalah provinces, that this region have a share in all 
revenues and be represented on the twenty-man NCRC in 
proportion to its representation in the population at 
large'; and that the military -forces in Kurdistan be 
exclusively Kurdish, except in time o-f national emergency. 
The proposals were not -formally rejected, and the Government 
took pains to deny them in early May, 1963 when that the 
talks for negotiations came to an end . More alarming was 
the news that the Governmen*: began to reimpose restrictions 
in the north, especially the economic blockade, which was 
taken as sign that it was preparing for a resumption of the 
fighting. On 10 June, 1963 it arrested the Kurdish 
representatives, demanded the surrender of Mulla Mustafa and 
his forces within twenty four hours, and launched an 
offensive with a savagery for exceeding Qasim's. The 
fighting continued till February 1964 . 
After the fall of the Ba'th government, it 
was now Tahir Yahya, the new Premier, who had been in 
10. Devlin, John F; The Ba'th Party; A History, from its 
Origin to 1966, Stenford University California, 1976, p. 
276. 
11. Khadduri, Majid, op, cit, 1969, p. 271. 
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contact with Kurdish leaders to reopen negotiations. No 
agreement seems to have been reached, but two communiques 
were issued simultaneously by President Arif and Mull a 
Musta-fa on 10 February 1964, declaring a cease -fire. 
Negotiations were conducted between Kurdish and Iraqi 
leaders but no agreement was reached, despite exchange o-f 
letters to resolve specific issue between Abd al-Salam Arif 
and Mull a Mustafa. Hence fighting again broke out in March 
12 
with no marked success for either side . 
Settlement of Kurdish question devolved upon 
Bassaz, the civilian Premier, who realised that the internal 
social and economic conditions could not be improved untill 
the Kurdish question was brough to an end. On 15 June 1966 
al Bazsaz appeared on radio and television and declared 
himself ready to recognise Kurdish nationalism and the Kurds 
^national rights'. ^After twelve days of negotiations he 
announced the Declaration of 29 June, which recognized 
clearly and unequivocably the 'binational character of the 
Iraqi State. Before it had opportunity to implement this 
programme, the Baszaz government was replaced by an army 
officer who was not in favour of such a settlement . After 
Party's return to power in July 1968, the Ba'th Party 
leaders saw a fresh in the Kurdish problem a major threat to 
12. Ibid, p. 273. 
13. Sluglett Marion Farouk ?< Peter Sluglett; Iraq Since 
1958, From Revolution to Dictatorship, K.P.I., London, 
1987, p. 104. 
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the sKistence of the Iraqi State and a dangerous opportunity 
for foreign elements to interfere in the internal affairs of 
Iraq . The Party declared its intention to find a 
fundamental solution to the Kurdish problem. This 
intention, however, met with the same old obstacles. First 
there was the increasing confidence of the Kurdish 
leadership under the Mulla Mustafa. He was determined not 
to come to term with the central government before obtaining 
all his demands. Second, there was the problem of 
convincing the party members and the Iraqi and Arab public 
opinion that autonomy was not equivalent to separation. 
Finally, there was the continuing opposition by the military 
to a peaceful settlement 
Desperate to resolvfe the issue, the new 
Ba'thist regime launched the war in Kurdistan in April 1969. 
In the Kirkuk plain the Kurdish peasant were expelled from 
their lands or massacred. 
While these struggles were taking place, 
General Al-Bakr, anxious as ever to appear in the role of 
'father of the nation', made overtures to the left and sent 
an emissary, Aziz Sharif, to negotiate with General Barzani. 
14. Niblock, Tin, op, cit, p. 49. 
15. Kelidar, Abbas, (ed) - The Integration of Modern Iraq, 
Croom Helm, London, 1979, pp. 178-179. 
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These secret talks led eventually to an agreement on 11 
March 1970*^. 
Following the signing o-f an agreement between 
Saddam Husain and Mulla Musta-fa al-Barzani , President al-
Bakr in his message to the nation on March 11, 1970, 
announced that the Revolutionary Command Council had solved 
the Kurdish problem in accordance with the resolution o-f the 
Ba'th Party's Seventh Regional Congress. The programme 
included the -following measures: 
1. Recognition o-f Kurdish as the o-f-ficial language in 
those areas where Kurds constitute a majority. 
Kurdish and Arabic would be taught together in all 
schools. 
2. Participation o-f Kurds in government, including the 
appointment o-f Kurds to key posts in the state. 
3. Furtherance o-f Kurdish education and culture. 
4. Requirement that o-f-ficials in the Kurdish area speak 
Kur dish. 
5. Right to establish Kurdish student, youth, women's 
and teacher's organisations. 
16. Chaliand, Gerard; (ed) - People Without a Country, Zed 
Press, London, 1978, p. 167. 
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6. Economic development o-f the Kurdish area. 
7. Return o-f Kurds to their villages or -financial 
compensation. 
8. Agrarian re-form 
9. Amendment o-f the Constitution to read "the Iraq 
People consist o-f two main nationalities! the Arab 
and the Kurdish nationalities. 
10. Return o-f the Clandestine radio stations and heavy 
weapons to the government. 
11. Appointment of Kurdish Vice-President. 
12. Amendment o-f provincial laws in accordance with this 
declaration. 
13. Formation o-f a Kurdish area with sel-f-government . 
The implementation of the March Manifesto was 
expected to lead eventually to "self-rule" in the Kurdish 
area within the frame work of the new provincial law in 
which the principle of administrative decentralization was 
enshrined. It was a compromise between the Mulla's demand 
for autonomy and direct control of the Kurdish area by the 
central authority. In the new provincial law, self-rule for 
the Kurdish area was a form of decentralization which the 
17. Ghareeb Edmund, op, cit, p. 87. 
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law has provided -for the rest o-f the provinces in order to 
preserve the country's unity within the new decentralized 
system. The Ba'th leaders naturally took it -for granted 
that under the new administrative system the central 
authority was supreme while Mulla Musta-fa contended that 
certain residuary powers to be exercised by him through the 
18 
mechanism o-f self-rule 
However important di-f-ferences arose in the 
interpretation o-f the principle of "self-rule" as envisioned 
in the March Manifesto. First Mulla Mustafa demanded that 
four of the provinces specified in the new provincial law -
Bulaymaniya, Kirkuk, Arbil, Sinjar and Duhok - should be 
considered Kurdish even though some of the towns and 
localities within them may not be inhabited by a majority of 
Kurds, like the cities of Kirkuk and Khanaqin. Second, he 
demande--* the retention of certain powers to conduct Kurdish 
foreign relations which he had exercised during the defacto 
regime when he was at war with the central government. 
Third, he demanded the retention of control over the Pesh 
Merga - the Kurdish militia - though he agreed that this 
force should become part of the national army. The Ba'th 
19 
leaders rejected the Mulla's three demands . 
18. Khadduri, Majid, 1978, op, cit, p. 105. 
19. Ibid, p. 106. 
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Despite initial optimism that the March 
ManifeBto would provide the basis -for a permanent 
understanding, by September 1972, the agreement was showing 
signs o-f breakdown. The -factor leading towards breakdown 
Are clearly stated in the memorandum exchanged between the 
Ba'th Party and the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) at this 
time20. 
The Ba'th Party's memorandum, o-f September, 
1972, although admitted some mistakes committed by 
government o-f-ficials, placed the major share o-f balance -for 
the worsening situation on the leadership of Mulla Mustafa 
al--Barsani. KDP policy was criticised in three -fields. 
First, in its external relations the KDP was accused of 
maintaining and strengthening its relation with Iran. 
Second, in the -field of internal policy the memorandum 
accused the KDP of working to establishing its own 
undisputed authority in Iraqi Kurdistan through bypassing 
and some times de-fying the authority of the central 
government. Third, the KDP was accused of plotting directly 
21 
and indirectly against the Iraqi regime . 
In answer to the Ba'th Party the KDP sent a 
yet longer memorandum to the Ba'th leadership. The latter 
20. Niblock, Tim, op, cit, p. 50. 
21. Ibid, p. 51 
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memorandum failed to deny the accusation which had been 
made, but sought to exonerate the KDP -from blame by citing 
the KDP's own complaints and observations, that were the 
real reasons behind the deteriorating situation. The 
government was blamed -for ^its -failure to honour its 
obl;igations in the March Manifesto. Three major-
undertakings o-f the mani-festo had not been implemented, 
according to the memorandum, -first, the KDP had neither-
been given due representation in the legislature and 
executive, nor a Kurdish Vice-President -for the republic had 
been appointed. Second, the demarcation o-f the proposed 
autonomous Kurdish region had not been carried out, and 
•finally, the Kurdish area had not been allocated a special 
share in the economic plan . 
Besides its major complaints, the KDP had 
other reasons also for adopting an intrasigent stand. 
First, there was the role of Shah of Iran and the CIA who 
furnish Mulla Mustafa with a great deal of material and 
moral support thus enabling him to persist in his defiance 
of the Iraqi government. Second, the Kurdish leaders were 
alarmed by some abortive attempts on the lives of their 
leaders, especially on Mulla Mustafa . 
22. Ibid-52- See for detail Ghareeb, Edmund, pp. 115-123. 
23. Niblock Tim, op, cit, p. 53. 
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However, between March 1974 and March 1975 
the Kurdish Peshmarga took arms again, despite the -fact that 
the government had declared, in March 1974, the Kurdish area 
as an autonomous region. Dif-ferences over the interpretation 
of the Manifesto for autonomy were the main reasons behind 
the eruption of fighting. Other reasons were the Kurdish 
continuing claim for the oil-rich province of Kirkuk to be 
included in the autonomous region, over the extent of powers 
to be given to autonomous region, and over the Kurds 
24 
participation in the central government . 
Due to the sophistication of the weapons 
used, the new war was tough and intensive. Both sides were 
better equipped and organised, but the Iraqi army retained 
upper hand. After the initial success of the peshmarga, the 
Iraqi army staged its counter-offensive and in a few months 
managed to remove the peshmarga's threat to Zakho and Mosul, 
together with clearing the routes leading from and to the 
plain . In July and August the Peshmarga were forced into 
the mountains along the Turkish and Iranian borders after an 
entensive offense launched by the Iraqi Military Command. 
From this time the Peshmarga had to rely on Iranian 
reinforcements without which they could not resist the heavy 
Iraqi offensive, including the bombing of Kurdish town and 
24. Abbas, Kelidar, op, cit, p. 180. 
25. Niblock, Tim, op, cit, p. 55. 
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villages. But the agreement between Iraq and Iran on the 
frontier dispute in March, 1975, left the Peshmarga at the 
26 
mercy of the Iraqi army bombing 
With no support from outside within days of 
the Iraqi-Iranian understanding, the Kurdish revolt 
collapsed. The Iraqi government declared a general one-
month amnesty to all Kurds and asked the peshmarga to lay 
down their arms. Most Kurds feared reprisals and crossed 
the border into Iran rather than submit to the Iraqi 
government. Mulla Mustafa, his family and prominent members 
of the KDP were among the first to cross. At the end of the 
amnesty period the Iraqi army moved almost unharassed into 
the hearland of KDP, gaining control of all Iraqi Kurdistan. 
By May, 1975 armed activity in Iraqi Kurdistan had come to 
27 
an end . 
Telibani, however, remained active in the 
Kurdish national movement, and when Barsani's rebellion 
collapsed in 1975, Telebani set up its headquarters in 
Damascus, where the regime of Hafiz Assad, inimical to the 
Iraqi Ba'thists, provided him a base from which to continue 
the Kurdish resistance. Telebani's group, the Patriotic 
union of Kurdistan (PUK), conducted Fedayeen-type raids into 
26. Khadduri, Majid, 1968, op, cit, p. 109. 
27. Niblock, Tim, op, cit, p. 57. 
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Iraq when the war between Iran and Iraq broke out in 
September 1980. The Telebani's PUK established bases in 
Iraq as - Sul aymani yah ' s region of Southern Kurdistan -for 
28 
ex amp 1e . 
The I ran-Iraq war made allies out o-f 
erstwhile enemies; Iraq aided the Iranian Kurdish guerrilas, 
particularly the Ghassemlou -forces. An Teletaani, too -found 
himself cooperating with Baghdad, how beit indirectly. In 
the summer of 1983 Iran invaded Iraqi Kurdistan in a drive 
spearheaded by guerrilas of.the Iraqi Kurdish Democratic 
Party, Barsani's old party, now headed by his sons, Massoud 
and Idris. The Iranian thrust into northern Iraq presented 
Telebani with a crucial dilemma. Over the years the enemity 
between himself and Barsani's had ripened until there was 
little hope of reconci11iation. Telebani felt that he could 
not ally with Iranian because to do so he would have had to 
29-
join forces with his hated enemies, the Barsanis 
Saddam Husan at this stage took advantage of 
Telebani's predicament by offering to declare a truce with 
the PUK. Saddam asked Telebani to incorporate his guerrilas 
into the Iraqi army, where they would form a border guard 
and defend northern Iraq against the Iranian and the 
28. Op, cit, Pelletiere, Stephenc, op, cit, p. 195. 
29. Ibid. 
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Barzanis. Saddam in return was ready to make a signi-ficant 
grant of autonomy to the Kurds . 
The Ba'thist leadership from the very start 
realized that solution had to be -found to the Kurdish 
problem which weakened Iraq both internally and externally. 
The proposals to the Kurds, as expressed in the Manifesto of 
March 11, 1970, and in the Autonomy law of March 11, 1974, 
acknowledged the existence of the Kurdish people as a 
distinct national group within Iraq posessing their own 
language and culture. It further recognized the existence 
of a "Kurdish area", which by virtue of the majority of its 
population gave it the designation of Iraqi Kurdistan. The 
Autonomy Law also granted a number of national rights to the 
Kurds and offered them the opportunity to run their own 
31 
affairs locally through autonomous government organs . At 
the same time, however, this Autonomy Law limited Kurdish 
control over natural resources and placed the security 
appratus of the autonomous area under central government. 
The law made it clear that the Iraqi government considered 
the Kurdistan area and its people to be an indivisible part 
of Iraq. 
At the same time, aware that the solution to 
30. Ibid, p. 186. See also Saddam Husain, On Current 
Affairs Al-Thawra Publication, Iraq. pp. 31,64. 
31. Ghareeb Edmund, op, cit, p. 189. 
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the Kurdish problem lies beyond the achievement o-f military 
and political victory, the Ba'thist leadership has tried to 
win the support and loyalty of the Kurds through a peaceful 
process of social and economic reconstruction. The Ba'th 
government has implemented major economic development 
programs designed to appease the Kurds by transforming the 
economic structure of the Kurdish area and improving their 
32 
conditions . 
Saddam Husain has continued his efforts to 
rally Kurdish support for the autonomous process in Kurdish 
arsa. During several tours of the Kurdish area in March and 
August 1979 he said that the Ba'th Party was open to all 
Iraqis without discrimination. 
/• 
The fall of Mul1 a Mustafa has ended the 
costliest war in Iraq's modern history. The government now 
felt free to pursue its objective at hom and abroad. 
Externally the end of the war meant that Iraq is able to 
play a more effective role in regional affairs, especially 
in the Gulf region and in the nonaligned movement. Iraq has 
also embarked on major programs for industrial and 
agricultural development and for improving the standard of 
living of its people. Iraq's policy of cooperation with 
Arabs neighbors and the expansion of relations with the 
32. Ibid. 
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Third World and with European and Latin American countries 
has revealed its growing role as a regional power and active 
member o-f the nonaligned movement. This is demonstrated in 
Iraq's decision to host the Baghdad Summit Con-ference, using 
i t as a -forum to explain its Arab and regional pllicies and 
in the decision to hold the non-aligned summit conference in 
Baghdad in 1982^'^. 
The granting o-f autonomy to the Kurds and 
ambitious development schemes have strengthened Iraq's hand 
in its con-front action with the new regime in Iran. The 
conflict over the shatt~al Arab and the land border area was 
sharpened by ideological differences between the Arab 
nationalist and socialist regime in Baghdad and 
fundamentalist regime in Tehran. The Iranian leadership 
made no secret of its intention to export its Islamic 
revolution to Iraq and has supported some Kurdish and 
religious opponents to the Iraq regime. 
Broadly speaking, Iraq has proved in practice 
to recognise Kurdish national rights to a greater extent 
than either Turkey or Iran. However, the Iraqi resort to 
force to resolve the Kurdish question has aroused suspicion 
in Kurdish nationalist circles. 
33. Ibid, p. 191 
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REPUBLICAN IRAQ AT THE CROSS ROADS 
A-fter World War II, when almost all Arab 
countries achieved independence, Iraq appeared to lag behind 
them in- exerci sing -full freedom because o-f her pre-war 
commitments to Great Britain. When General Nuri moved to 
rid his counti^y o-F the objectionable treaty obligations to 
Britain in 1955 he entered into a new regional de-fence 
arrangement — the Baghdad Pact — in which Britain rejoined 
as a partner, keeping Iraq not only committed to her -former 
ally, but also to the Western block as a whole against 
alleged Soviet threats to the West Asia. This was done at a 
time when Arab public opinion had reached a high pitch of 
nationalist excitement and was calling for Arab solidarity 
against Western support for Israil's claims to Arab lands. 
Consequently Arab leaders urged their countrymen to remain 
uncommitted in the cold war and the ideological cry for 
neutralism was spreading fast in the Arab world — indeed 
the whole Arab-Asian block — in which Iraq remained the 
committed oasis in a vast neutralist desert. Thus Nuri's 
principal miscalculation was in overstressing Iraq's common 
interests with her non-Arab neighbours at the expense of 
Arab solidarity on the one hand, and in entering into an 
alliance with the West which, by its support for Israel 
presented in Arab eyes a greater danger in Arab interets 
than the Soviet threat on the other 
1. Khadduri, Majid, Socialist Iraq, A Study in Iraqi 
Politics since 1968, The Middle East Institute, 
Washington, D.C., 1978, pp. 141-42. 
C131D 
Iraq's -foreign policy after the Revolution o-f 
1958, though seemingly oriented by ideological influences, 
was governed essentially by the same forces that shaped the 
foreign policy of the Old Regime. The revolutionary leaders 
tried to change certain foreign policy objectives but could 
not effect a radical departure from Iraq's traditional 
foreign policy. Under the Old Regime, the opposition 
leaders demanded Arab solidarity and neutralism in the cold 
war, but after the fall of the monarchy the cause of Arab 
solidarity was not much better off-•'-deed, there were 
occassions, when the relations between Iraq and Egypt were 
almost reached to the breaking point. Even today, despite 
the fact that Iraq and Syria are governed by branches of the 
same party, the relations between the two countries are 
highly strained. As to neutralism which was the reason 
given for opposition to General Nuri's policy, it was but 
momentarily upheld, as the revolutionary leaders learned 
very soon that an alliance with a Breat Power has always 
been indispensable if Iraq's independence were to be 
adequately protected. They also realized that cooperation -
indeed even friendly relationship — with Iraq's non-Arab 
neighbours was necessary if the stability of the country and 
its internal unity be maintained. Some form of unity with 
one or more Arab countries, though a cherished aspiration of 
the revolutionary leaders, remained a mirage and often 
invited interference in Iraq's internal affairs whenever 
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attempts were made tcD bring the country into close 
relationship with one Arab country or another-'*-. 
Although Iraq's tentative attempts to 
disassociate itsel-f -from its le-ftist stance in the middle 
1970's were welcomed by most o-f its neighbours. Their 
continuing distrust and the regime's own unpredictable and 
erratic behaviour meant that the process o-f Iraq's 
reintegration into the 'higher counsels' o-f West Asian 
politics was some what uneven. However, the changing 
political circumstances in the region after- 1973 Arab-Israel 
war produced an atmosphere that put growing pressure upon 
Iraq to put an end to its Radicalism' and to its strident 
extremism. In this situation the gradual weakening o-f ties 
with the Soviet Union, the new oil Wealth, and the agreement 
concluded with Iran meant that Iraq was now in a better 
position to improve its relations with its neighbours and 
also to play a more vigorous part in the politics o-f the 
3 
region . 
Iraq's relation with other Arab Gul-f States 
have not always been smooth and -friendly, owing partly to 
dynastic rivalries but mainly to Iraq's territorial 
ambitions, particularly in Kuwait, which has alarmed other 
2. Ibid, pp. 142-43. 
3. Sluglett, Marion, Farouk, and Peter Sluglett; Iraq Since 
1958, from Revolution to Dictatorship, KPl, London and 
Newyork, 1987, p. 200. 
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*Gulf countries. Following the -fall of the monarchy in 1958, 
the establishment o-f the republican regime in Iraq and the 
recurring military coups did not in themselves pose a 
threat, taut the subsequent adoption o-f socialism and other 
radical doctrines by the Ba'th Party let alone its alliance 
with the Soviet Union, have aroused concern in high 6ul-f 
circles. The alarm deepend in recent years as the Ba'th 
regime, stressing Pan-Arab goals have shown greater intrest 
4 
in Gul-f a-f-fairs than ever be-fore . 
In an attempt to molli-fy their Arab Sul-f 
neighbours, the Ba'th leaders assured Gul-f rulers that they 
have no intention o-f inter-fering in their domestic a-f-fairs, 
least of all of undermining the ruling dynasties. They 
tried in vain to impress on them the need to follow an Arab 
Gulf policy aimed at forstering harmony and cooperation, to 
oppose foreign intervention and to limit immigration non-
Arabs to the Arabian coast of the Gulf, which had the effect 
of de-Arabising the character of the Gulf. While the Arab 
States shared Iraq's concern in principle, they were 
suspicious of Iraq's ambition to play the role of leader in 
Gulf security affairs. For this reason, it was suggested 
that an understanding between Iraq and Saudi Arabia was 
deemed necessary before embarking on an Arab Gulf policy. 
4. Khadduri Majid, The Gulf War, Origins and Implication o-f 
the Iraq-Iran Conflict, New York, Oxford University 
Press, 1988, p. 118. 
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The Iraqi leaders seem to have been con-fident that their 
policy would eventually meet with approval as it would 
promote general Arab intrests and not only Iraq's own 
special intrests. They must have also realised that such a 
policy could evolve only slowly and cautiously by means o-f 
direct negotiations, and it should not be imposed as a 
"grand design" embodying ideological goals . At the same 
time, F'rince Fahd's visit to Baghdad in June 1975 marked the 
beginning o-f improved relations between Iraq and Saudi 
Arc-jbia, and the two countries came to an agreement on the 
delimitation of the neutral zone on the borders between them 
later in the year. In the course o-f his speech on the 
seventh anniversary of the Ba.'th seizure of power, on 17 
July, 1975 al Bakr declared that 'in accordance with our 
clear Pan-Arab outlook we have sought to deepen 
understanding with the Arab countries of the Gulf, 
particularly Saudi Arabia, and to solve the issue pending 
with them . 
Although it was easy for the Iraqi regime to 
make the case that the claims of Arab brotherhood and 
solidarity made it imperative for it to pursue good 
relations with its Arab neighbours, it was both less 
inclined and less able to extend such cordiality to its 
5. Ibid. 
6. Sluglett, Marion Farouk, op., cit., p. 201. 
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Ba'th brothers in Syria. In order to maintain some degree 
of credibility it had to continue to phrase its policies in 
nationalist and unionist terms and appear to be more 
militant and more Arab than the Syrians, notably, o-f course, 
on Palestine. In this and other ways it tried to uphold its 
claim to the leadership of Arab radicalism throughout the 
latter part of the 1970's, while simultaneously maintaining 
thait the achievement of Arab unity was constantly being 
frustrated by ill-will or intransigence on the Syrian side, 
a charge that the Syrians were equally ready to level at 
Iraq. Apart from a brief explosion of ecstatic good 
neighbourliness, which lasted from the autumn of 1978 to 
July 1979. Iraq-Syrian relations between 1968 to 1980 were 
never particularly cordial and were in fact more- often 
downright hostile . 
However, the situation in the West Asia as a 
whole was greatly altered by Sadat's decision to go to 
Jerusalem in November 1977, since this marked such a major-
departure from the previous norms of intei—Arab politics as 
to require a fundamental change in the ground rules; even 
thos states that had never enjoyed particularly cordial 
relations with each other were obliged at least to make 
public profession of some form of solidarity against Sadat. 
These circumstances also combined to bring about a situation 
in which Saddam Hussain was increasingly tempted to assert 
7. Ibid, p. 202. 
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his own and Iraq's pretentioni; to fill the leadership 
vaccuum, -for which, given Saudi Arabia's more circumscribed 
political style, Syria was the only other serious contender. 
Thus readers of al-Thawra were informed in the run-up to the 
Baghdad Summit that ''The eyes of the Arabs everywhere have 
been turned towards your great revolution in this country 
and to your brave party which has shouldered the trust and 
responsibility of the Pan-Arab struggle for over thirty 
CSic3 years '. Iraq's role at the Baghdad Summit meeting 
and its announcement of the Arab National Declaration, 
aiming at achieving greater solidarity and cooperation among 
other countries, enhanced its position in inter-Arab 
9 
affairs . 
The boundary dispute between Iraq and Iran, a 
legacy which Iraq had inherited from the Ottoman Empire, has 
become more complicated by political conflicts ever since 
Iraq achieved independence. The Iraqi - Persian Treaty of 
1937 fixed the frontier between the two countries at the 
low-water mark on the eastern side of Shatt al-Arab. It 
gave Iraq control of the waterway except the area near the 
Abadan and Khurram shahr where the frontier was fixed at the 
median line in mid-channel or the thalweg. Iran's 
participation in the Baghdad Pact (1955), in which Iraq 
8. Ibid, p. 203. 
9. Khadduri, Majid, 1988, op, cit., p. 120. 
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played a leading role, induced both countries to subordinate 
the frontier dispute to large defence plans because these 
were then considered necessary to oppose an impending Soviet 
threats to the two Royal Houses of Iraq and Iran^ . 
After the fall of the Monarchy in 1958, Iraq 
withdrew from the Baghdad Pact and relations between Iran 
and Iraq began to deteriorate. These disputes were 
intensified after the Ba'th party came to power in 1968 as 
Iraq's new rulers have shown deeper difference with Iran 
both in regional and international affairs. The Ba'th 
leaders, stressing Arab ideological goals, were determined 
to assert Iraqi rights and referred to the Shatt as the 
eastern border of the Arab homeland. Iran's hostility to 
Iraq's new regime was reflected in her support to opposition 
leaders envoived in a power struggle with Ba'thist leaders. 
Complaints from one side to the other were not heeded, Iran 
demanded that the frontier issues should be considered as a 
whole and Iraq insisted that these should be settled in 
accordance with the judicial process specified in the treaty 
of 1937. Since a settlement in accordance with that treaty 
was considered unsatisfactory to Iran, the treaty was 
denounced on April 19, 1969, on the ground that its 
provision had been violated by Iraq for many years . 
10. Khadduri, Majid, 1978, op., cit., p. 148. 
11. Ibid, p. 149. 
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A series of border clashes between Iraqi and 
Iranian troops took place in 1972 and 1973, especially near 
the Mandali area (about 60 miles north east o-f Baghdad), 
causing casualties on both sides. While direct negotiations 
were taking place between Iraqi and Iranian representatives, 
who met in Istanbul -from August 13 to September 1, 1974, a 
new series o-f frontier incidents recurred which delayed the 
negotiations but did not interrupt them. It was, however, 
at a meeting of the organisation of petroleum Exporting 
countries (OPEC) in Algires (March 1975) that Iraq and Iran 
12 
finally reached to an agreement . 
In June 1975, the foreign Ministers of Iraq 
and Iran met in Baghdad to sign a ^reconci1iation' treaty 
designed to settle all outstanding differences between the 
two countries. The Baghdad Treaty did not merely settle 
border disputes, it is a landmark which ended longstanding 
issues between two neighbours whose cooperation was 
necessary for internal unity as well as for regional peace 
and security . 
Hardly four years had passed since Iran and 
Iraq had reached a peace sttlement in Algires (1975) when 
12. Ibid, p. 150. 
13. Ibid, p. 152. 
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signi-ficant changes accured in the political structure o-f 
both countries, which had an adverse e-ffect on their newly 
established friendly relations. In January 1979, the Shah's 
regime was overthrown by Islamic Revolution; six month 
later, the presidency o-f Iraq passed -from Ahmad Hasan al-
E(a\kr to Saddam Hussain. The two regimes — the Ba'th o-f 
Iraq and the Islamic Republic of Iran — were by their very 
nature prepared to engage in ideological warfare even before 
the hostilities commenced. Both aspired to establish new 
social orders, one embodying the fundamental principles and 
values of Islam and the other espousing modern doctrines 
14 
such as nationalism, socialism and democracy . 
On a more profound level , the causes of the 
war stemmed from the attitudes of the two states towards the 
use of the force. The Iranian leadership, at that time 
manifestly plural or decentralized, saw the world through 
the eyes of their success — full revolutionary experience. 
They rejected the need for standing and professional 
military forces armed with modern, or culturally 
contaminating, weapons in favour of reliance on the people -
their faith, their dedication and their unity. For 
revolutionary Iran, it was axiomatic that power came from 
the people against which brute military forces was useless. 
It was therefore, on the people of Iraq and Iran that they 
14. Khadduri, Majid, 1988, op.,cit., p. 64. 
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relied to remove Saddam Hussain and to spread the Islamic 
revolution -further afield ^. 
The leaders o-f the Islamic Republic in Iran, 
although often speaking in the name of Islam in general, 
have consciously sought to promote their own particular 
brand of Islam into a favoured position. Iran's stress of 
Shi'ism provided ample ammunition for the press and other 
media to engage in ideological warfare by inciting Shi'i 
followers in Iraq to denounce the Ba'th regime as biased 
against Shi'i of non-Arab descent. The extremist have gone 
so far as to deny the legitimacy of the Ba'th government on 
religious and historical grounds. The goal of Iran's 
ideological warfare was and still is to enable the Shi'i 
community in Iraq to play a meaningful role in the country's 
political system and, ultimately, to assume its leadership. 
To achieve this aim, the revival of Shi'i teachings and the 
preperation of a new generation that would undertake 
leadership were deemed necessary. Before the Iranian 
Revolution, the stress was on non political organizations, 
but after the Islamic republic was established, more active 
organisation began to work, sometimes resorting violence 
Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiya (the Islamic call 
15. Chubin Sharam and Charles Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War, 
I.B. Tauris ?< Co. Ltd.,'London, 1988, pp. 6-7. 
16. Khadduri, Majid, 1988, op., cit., pp. 105-8. 
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party) came into existence in 1965. At the outset, its 
goals were not political, as its activities were confined to 
the revival o-f Shi'i teachings and restricted to areas where 
Shi'i -followers outnumbered Bunnis, such as Naja-f , Karbala, 
S3.(n3.rrs., and Kasimayn. But its ultimate goal was 
unmistakably political, since the stress on Shi'i teachings 
tended to raise tensions, specially among the rank and 
f ile^ '''. 
Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr was the main spiritual 
leader oi the Da'wa Party in 1970s. He published several 
books and articles on Islam covering a wide range o-f 
subjects. Outwardly, the object o-f his works was to re-form 
society, irrespective o-f confessional differences, but the 
ultimate goal was obviously political and critical of the 
regime, by making clear that the alternative programs of 
reform offered by modern secular doctrines Pan-Arabism,, 
Socialism and others - which the Ba'th have advocated, would 
eventually lead to the re-vival of confessional tensions and 
other forms of discrimination and injustice. At the same 
time, the Shi'i cleric Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, had long been 
seen by the regime as a focus for ideas of an alternative 
political order. These implicitly challenged the principles 
exploited by the regime to justify its hold on power, and 
explicitly challenged that hold when civil disorder erupted 
17. Ibid. 
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in the Shi'i towns o-f the south during the 1970s. Al-Sadr 
had consequently been arrested numerous times by the regime. 
It incouraged the belief that the disturbances in Shi'i 
cities were the work o-f the new Iranian regime, acting 
18 
through their local agents . 
At the same time, Tehran escalated its anti-
Ba'th campaign by resuming its support for the Iraqi Kurds 
(which had ended in 1975), providing aid to underground 
Shi'i movement (in particular the Da'wa Party) in Iraq, and 
initiating attacks against prominent Iraqi officials, the 
most significant being the failed attempt on the life of 
Tariq Asis, the Iraqi deputy premier, on April 1, 1980. 
To check these pressures, Baghdad resorted to 
suppressing Shi'i underground organizations, expelling 
Iranian citizens (as well as Iraqi citizens of Persian 
Orgin) in mass, attempting to organize a united Arab Front, 
and supporting Iranian sepratist elements such as the 
Iranian Kurds and the Arabs in Khuzistan. These 
countermeasures failed to impress the revolutionary regime, 
and, responding Hussain's pledge to take revenge for the 
attempt on the life of Aziz, Ayatollah Khomeini called on 
the Iraqi Shia on June 9, 1980 to overthrow Saddam's 
government. Iran's foreign minister, Sadegh Ghobtzadeh, 
18. Ibid. 
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revealed on the same day that his government had made the 
decision to topple the Ba'th regime. The same theme was 
reiterated two days later by the Iranian President, Ataol 
Hassan Bani--Sadr, who also warned that Iran would go to war 
in the event o-f -further deterioration in the situation on 
the border. In April 1980, the Irani an-Iraqi con-f rontation 
entered a new phase with clashes among the common frontier, 
in August these escalated into heavy -fighting involving tank 
19 
and artillery duels and air strikes . 
The war has in -fact evolved in a way quite 
other than the hoped -for an desired by Saddam Hussain. 
Nevertheless it is remarkable that the political system 
upholding his leadership has been able to cope so readily, 
both conceptually and organizationally, with the e-f-fects o-f 
a prolonged and de-fensive war. However, this can largely be 
explained by the dual nature o-f that political system. On 
the one hand, there is a small core o-f ^insiders', 
relatively homogeneous even i-f that homogeneity has been 
some what ruthlessly created — and clustered around the 
-figure o-f Saddam Hussain. These men, and the particular-
constituencies they in turn cultivate, are the repositories 
o-f a traditional and exclusively dispensation o-f power, -from 
19. Karsh, E-frain, Geopolitical Determinism: The Origins o-f 
the Iran- Iraq war. The Middle East Journal, Spring 
1990, Volume 4, No.2. Middle East Institute, U.S.A. pp. 
266-67. 
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which they derive considerable benefit. On the other hand, 
there is the mass o-f ^outsider', who are expected to play a 
strictly subordinate role to the sel-f-designated rulers. 
However, they are addressed by them and regimented by them 
in the name of a national ideal and a national struggle. 
The purpose of this is to create out of the mass of Iraqi's 
a malleable resource for the rulers in their competition 
with each other or with other rulers. Though the techniques 
of physical elimination and role-playing on a public stage, 
Saddam Hussain has sought to turn the political loyalties of 
this very heterogeneous mass towards himself, or atleast 
20 
away from any more authentic local leasership 
This was achieved against the background of 
the 9th, Ba'th Party Regional Congress which witnessed 
Saddam Hussain's formal appropriation of the Ba'th and its 
ideology to serve his own ends. The process whereby his 
influence had become paramount within the party had, of 
course, been in train since 1969. There were, however, a 
number of longstanding members of the party who either 
objected to Saddam Hussain growing autocracy or who held 
fast to dogmatic interpretation of the proper mission of the 
Ba'th and its members. In neither case Saddam Hussain could 
tolerate these obstacles to his own absolute exercise of 
power. He had succeeded in disposing a number of personal 
20. Chubin Sharam and Charles Tripp, op., cit., p. 88. 
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opponents in the 1970s, at the 1982 Congress he succeeded in 
establishing that hence-forward ^on every matter big or small 
Che would bel cited as the authority'. As Ofra Bengis 
points out: 
r.The more precarious Hussain's standing in 
the party became the more he was inclined to enforce his 
line o-f thinking and to assert this authority. This was 
reflected in the 'formula which the report devised as his 
epithet, Viz. the 'imperative leaders' or the leader who 
represents historical and national 'necessity'. Farming a 
dialectical relation between Hussain and the party, the 
report warned members that 'disregarding this necessity or 
deviating from its strategic line' amounted to causing 
intentional and direct harm to the aspirations of the party 
21 
and the people and their basic interests] . 
In this respect, the myth of Iraqi nationhood 
and values, as well as identification of the person of 
Saddam Hussain himself with that 'nation, has undergone an 
intensification rather than a radical change under the 
pressure of War. At the same time, it had been noticeable 
that the Ba'th, especially while it came increasingly under 
the influence and direction of "^\ddam Hussain, had been 
encouraging Iraqis to think of therfiselves as the inheritors 
21. Ibid., p. 90. 
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o-f a distinctive national and cultural tradition, antedating 
the Arab-Islamic conquests. Many of the Pan-Arabists in the 
Ba'th looked askance at this apparent erosion of the idea of 
Arab nationalism. However, for those who sought to wield 
power within the given territorial limits of " the Iraqi 
State, it would be of considerable utility if the ethnically 
diverse inhabitants of that stae could be persuaded by that 
they shared a common identity. Even more useful would be 
the belief that this common identity imposed upon them an 
obligation to obey the individual who claimed to embody all 
the qualities of the national community . 
By transforming the institutions of the 
State, and incidentally the Ba'th as well, into the servants 
of an absolute ruler, it is hoped that the dangers and 
contradictions of institutional autonomy in such a setting 
will be avoided. Having established his primacy in this 
sphere, the autocrat can then, on his own terms, project his 
own person as the embodiment of the collective ideals that 
define the state. These two features, of private control 
and public myth have been evident in Saddam Hussain's 
seemingly inexorable rise to a position of primacy in 
Iraq^^. 
22. Ibid. , p. 94. 
23. Ibid,, p. 242. 
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Although it. was claimed as an historic 
victory, Saddam's war against Iran proved a ^^utile and 
wasteful endeavour. After eight years of armed conflict, 
the economy was in a shambles as the cost of the war 
mounted, estimated at around $300 billion. the people were 
dissi11usioned and disoriented and casualties have been 
estimated between 250,000 and 500,000. The reconstruction 
bill is put at *230 billion. Moreover, Iraq's annual oil 
revenue? had declined to * 13 billion, hardly sufficient to 
meet the nation's budgetary requirements. Iraq had also 
accumulated an *80 billion-worth of foreign debts. In 
short, the hollowness of proud claim made at the begining of 
the conflict that development and war would proceed hand in 
hand, began to haunt Baddam as he embarked on the 
construction of victory monuments in Baghdad and elsewhere 
in the country . 
Another dimension of the ruinous was featured 
prominently in Saddam's perception off his triumphant 
struggle against Iran. He expected the Arab World to hail 
him not simply as its hero but also its saviour since the 
war ended in the containment of Iran and the threat of its 
Islamic revolution. The War, so far as he was concerned, 
was fought on their behalf and in their defence. the moral 
24. Kelidar, Abbas; The wars of Saddam Hussain, Middle 
Eastern studies, Vol,28, No.4, Frankcass, London, 
October 1992, pp. 794-95. 
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and material support and assistance he received -from Europe 
and the United States during the was also convinced him that 
the West too owed him a debt. Arab financial aid, Soviet 
arms and Western technology liberally supplied to Saddam 
during the war allowed him to build a. -formidable war machine 
with ch6?mical, biological and potentially nuclear weapons. 
However, scorned by the Arabs, rebuted by the West, and 
feelinc} economically vulnerable to the pressures of the 
politics of the oil industry, its production quotas and 
pricing mechanism, Saddam embarked on a belligerent course 
to make the weight of Iraq in regional and international 
politics felt. Having cajoled the Arab oil producers, 
antagonir-ed the West over the execution of the hapless 
journalist, Farzad Bazoft, the super-gun episode and the 
nuclear triggors affair, and with his threat to scorch half 
of Israil wi-th binary chemical weapons, all in the course of 
few months, he ordered the Iraqi army into Kuwait on 2 
August 1990'^^. 
Evernsince 'Abd al-Karim Qasim put forth 
Iraq's claim to the sovereignty of Kuwayt after the 
decleration of Kuwayt's independence in June 1961, relations 
between Iraq and Kuwayt have often been strained over a 
variety of issue. In 1963, after Qasim's fall from power, 
friendly relations between Iraq and Kuwayt were restored 
25. Ibid. 
[:i49] 
-fol lowing a -formal visit to Iraq by Shaykh Sabah Salim al-
Sabah, then crown prince and Premier of Kuwayt. The Crown 
Prince and the Prime Minister o-f Iraq, Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, 
met to a-f-firm the existing borders between the two countries 
that were established in 1932 
Upon the coming o-f the Ba'th Party to power 
in 1968, which had repudiated Qasim's territorial claims and 
recognized Kuwayt's independence in 1963, there were high 
hopes in both countries that the border dispute might at 
last settled. Because o-f Iraq's con-flict with Iran over the 
shatt al~Arab and Kuwayt readiness to support Iraq, the 
circumstances were considered -favourable to resume 
27 
negotiations over the -frontiers far a. -final settlement . 
However, a year later a new -factor entered 
into the situation which rendered the dispute more dif-ficult 
to resolve. In 1969, it will be recalled, Iraq-Iranian 
relations had so deteriorated that war between the two 
countries was imminent. In April 1969, Iraq requested 
Kuwayt to permit Iraqi troops to be stationed on Kuwayti 
territory as part o-f a military -force on both sides of the 
Dorder to protect Umm Qasr from an impending Iranian attack. 
Though Kuwayt was hesitant to allow the entry o-f Iraqi 
26. Khadduri, Majid, 1978, op., cit., p. 153. 
27. Ibid., p. 155. 
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troops across the border, Iraq pressed her demand and both 
Hardan al-7'akriti and Sal eh Mahdi Ammash, the Iraqi 
I'iinisters of Defence and Interior, proceed to Kuwayt to 
rc?quest permission -for the Iraqi -force to be stationed on 
28 
her territory 
] raq rejected the validity o-f the agreements 
(in a note dated 17 May, 1973) on the ground that they have 
nejver been ratified in accordance with Iraqi constitutional 
procedure. Moreover, the Iraqi note stated, Kuwayt should 
bear in mind the radical changes of circumstances — Iraq's 
rise to full international status and the elimination of 
foreign influence - and the Arab national goals to which the 
29 
Ba'th and the Iraqi people have committed themselves 
Already before the Algiers Agreement and as 
early as 1973, the Ba'thist regime in Iraq had pressed 
Kuwayt to lease to it the uninhabited islands of warba and 
Bubiyan. The acceptence of the Thalweg in 1975, and the 
building of a naval port in the mean time at Umm al-Qasr at 
rhe entrance of the Western estuary opposite Warba, 
increased Iraqis intrest in this Island and in its neighbor 
Bubiyan. Iraqi planning envisaged the widening and 
extension of this western estuary to link up north wards 
28. Ibid. 
29. Ibid., p. 157. 
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with Basra and thu.3 provide Iraq with an alter:native access 
to the Gulf other than Shatt--al Arab . 
The other grievances that grtew during the 
Iran Iraq War. 
Although the grievances just mentioned 
remained in practical obeyance because of Iraq's 
preoccupation with Iran, they were, nevertheless, 
simultaneously being exacerbated below the surface. The 
issue? of access to the Gulf became mare acute because of the 
then still uncertain outcome of hostilities and the blocking 
of Shatt-al-Arab with the debris of war and accumulated 
silt. By the same token, Iraqi intrest grew in a post-war-
alternative to Shatt-al-Arab and therefore in warba and 
Eiubiyan. At the same time, all Kuwaiti activity along the 
border (for example, building of new frontier posts and oil 
installation) during Iraq's war with Iran was perceived by 
Iraq as a unilateral attempt by Kuwait to strengthen its 
case on the issue of the delineation of the frontier. In 
addition a new burgeoning grievances began to emerge based 
on the Iraqi perception or claim that during the hositlities 
with Iran, Kuwayt was drawing more than its share from the 
common noth-south Rumaila oil field, the Southern tip of 
30. Khalidi, Walid; The Gulf Crisis: Origins and 
Consequences, Journal of Palestine Studies, University 
of California Press, Volume ;<;; , Number 1, Autumn, 1990, 
p . i 0. 
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which straddled the border inland -from the Bul-f 
The grievances that were articulated in the 
period between the ceasefire with Iran in August 1988 and 
the Jeddah Conference just prior to the invasion on 2 
August• 
1. Overproduction of OPEC Quotas; In the closed session 
of the head of state already referred to on the last 
day of the Baghdad Summit on 30 May 1990, Saddam 
claimed th£it some Gulf countries had begun early in 
1990 to produce beyond their OPEC quotas to such an 
extent that the price in certain instances had 
plummeted to $ 7 per barrel. He claimed that every one 
dollar- drop in the price per barrel meant a loss of one 
billion dollars per annum for Iraq. He explicitly 
stated that in Iraq's present economic state this 
overproduction was an "act of War". War he said, could 
be waged by military means by "sending ar.mies across 
frontiers, by acts of sabotage, by killing people and 
by supporting coup detat but war can also be waged by 
economic means.... and what is happening is war against 
Iraq". He said he hoped the situation could be 
rectified, and hinted that the price of oil could be 
raised to % 25 per barrel. This was the only grievance 
that Saddam aired at this session before his peers 
31. Ibid. 
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including the Emir o-f Kuwait. He did not mention any 
Arab country by name. But he made it clear that he had 
reached the end o-f his tether. "I must -frankly tell you 
that we have reached a stage where we can no longer 
take any more pressure". 
The Iraqi Debt to Kuwait: Aziz did not give a 
figure -for this debt, but stated that this "assistance" 
-from Kuwait to Iraq during its War with Iran should not 
be considered a "debt" and should be cancelled. 
The Oil Allegedly Taken from the Rumaila Field; Aziz 
claimed that during 1980-1990 Kuwait pumped oil 
belonging to Iraq -from this -field, the worth of which 
was *2.4 billion and which Kuwait owed Iraq. 
Kuwait''s "Mar" on Iraq; Aziz claimed that kliwait's 
pumping of "Iraqi" oil from Rumaila was "tantamount to 
an act of War". While its attempt "to effect the 
economic collapse" of Iraq (through overproduction) was 
"not less than an act of War". This was a variation on 
the theme propounded by Saddam on 30 May 1990. 
Kuwait Alleged Complicity with Foreign Powers; Asiz 
claimed that the overproduction of Kuwait and UAE was 
synchronized with efforts of foreign powers to 
denigerate Iraq because of its increasing championship 
of the Palestinian cause and its role as a deterrent to 
Israi1. 
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6. fln Arab Marshall Plan -for Iraq: Iraq claimed it was 
entitled to expect the Gul-f countries to launch a 
Marshall Plan to support its recovery -from the war, 
just as the United States had done in Europe after 
World War II'''^ . 
There was deep shock in the Arab world when a 
number o-f Arab armies joined the U.S. led coalition against 
their "Iraqi Brothers" in the Gul-f War. The bitter 
realisation that Arabs could not solve their own problems 
without outside help kindled the discussion over a better 
Arab future. 
A year later disillusionment has set in 
Inter-Arab rivalry seems as strong as ever. 
It seems that the Arabs have learned nothing 
from the Gulf War, said one experts. 
Iraq and those countries that sympathised 
with President Saddam Hussein during the Kuwait conflict 
remain isolated. Yemen, Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria and the 
Palestinains 3.rB still being given the could shoulder by the 
ambittered Gulf States. 
32. Ibid., p. 11. 
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"Egypt and Syria are trying to perform a 
bridging -function but have not been successful so far", said 
Walid el Kassiha, political science professor at the 
American University here. 
Even the new Arab petrodollars for security 
system agreed by Egypt and Syria with the six Bulf States 
last March has flopped. 
Damascus and Cairo decided to withdraw from 
the Gulf their 50,000 soldiers who were entended to form the 
core of a peace keeping. 
Kuwait drew up a new security pact with 
United States. 
"The Gulf States have increasingly withdrawn 
from the Arab World". There Are some signs that they now 
wish to resuscitate the "Damascus Decleration". 
The Six heads of the rich oil producing 
states agreed last year to create an Arab Development Fund 
amounting to * 10 billion. 
Yet a new regional security system is not now 
in sight. There is disagreement among the "Damascus States" 
over which non-Arab regional powers such as Iran, should be 
CI 56] 
brought into the process. 
There are many in the Bulf who -feel the 
•feared Islamic state could be appeased by -financial support. 
But Egypt, -fearing the loss of its required leadership role, 
has rejected this . 
Given the record o-f the violent and 
unexpected ends ot" most Iraqi regimes since the overthrow a-f 
the monarchy, it would be unwise to make any predictions 
about the lejngth of time Saddam Hussein yet to rule. Such 
was the resilience of Hussein's inner circle of Kinsmen and 
associates that even in the aftermath of the defeat in 
Kuwait, he was able to keep hold of the main sinews of power 
in Iraq: the intelligence services, the internal security 
forces and key divisions of the armed forces. Consequently, 
by early April 1992, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) 
could boast of having crushed ^the acts of sedition, 
sabotage and rioting in all towns of Iraq of having defeated 
the plotting of the ^US-Atlantic Zionist aggression' or ^30-
state agression' that had 'sought to turn this unified, 
secure and lofty country into another Lebanon, to be 
enmeshed and crushed by Sectarian religious and racial 
34 
conflicts' 
33. The Economic Times, New Delhi, 15 Jan. 1992. 
34. Tripp Charles; The Gulf States and Iraq, Survival, Vol. 
Mo.3, Autumn 1992, pp. 55-61. 
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It is quite conceivable that many Iraqis, 
despite their misgivings about the competence, let alone the 
leqitimacy o-f Saddam Hussain's regime, are ready to believe 
their government's thesis that Iraq had been singled out for 
severe treatment. It was certainly a theme that the Iraqi 
authorities and media have returned to again and again in 
the year -following the defeat in Kuwait, harking back not 
only to the 'Mother o-f all Battles' taut also pointing to the 
continued disabilities under which Iraq suffered: the UN-
imposed economic blockade; the UN-supervised destruction of 
Iraq's nuclear, chemicals and biological weapons facilities, 
as well as its missiles; and the effective autonomy of much 
of Kurdistan under allied supervision. Regardless of 
Whether Iraq's cared much about the last. two aspects of 
Iraq's predicament, all were affected by its economic plight 
and were as likely to blame the international community as 
the force . that had provoked these measures in the first 
place . 
However, even in the cases in which the 
Iraqis identified the regime as the main culprit, there did 
not seem to be a great deal they could do about it. Saddam 
Hu.ssain had reestablished the security and intellegence 
network that has always constituted the final underpinning 
of his regime, ensuring that his kinsmen play a prominent 
35. Ibid. 
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and vital part therein. By the end o-f 1991, one half 
brother, wathban Ibrahim al-Hassan, had been appointed 
minister o-f the enterior, whilst another, Sabawj Ibrahim, 
was given over all responsibility for the domestic 
intelligence services- Reportedly one of the Saddam 
Husscxin's sons, Qusay, was placed in charge of a newly 
created-tritaally based special force, trained to counter the 
growing number of attacks on police £ind army posts in the 
towns of the southern provincevs 
It appears therefore, that Saddam Hussain's 
strategies of consolidating the centre?, reestablishing the 
networks of patronage and kinship control and challenging 
the international community but not risking open defiance, 
have largely succeeded. It is in the nature of such 
strategies, of course, that they do not guarantee long term-
survival, but Hussain has always acted upon the principle 
that if he can make the necessary dispositions to survive in 
the short term, the long term will look after itself. The 
issue that m.ust concern Iraq's neighbours, however is 
whether this preoccupation with the political survival of 
his regime will lead him, as in the past, to turn his 
attention to those in the region who appear to threaten that 
survival and, furthermore, if that should happen, whether he 
will have the where withal to do anything about it . 
37. Ibid. 
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The -fears -for the immediate future must 
revolve around the intentions o-f Saddam Hussain and the 
regime he has constructed in Iraq. However, in the medium 
to long term, Iraq's neighbours have reason to be -fear-ful o-f 
the developments that might occur in Iraqi politics after 
the demise of Hussain himself. When contemplating the shape 
of Iraqi politics after the fall of the present regime, two 
possibilities seem to emerge in the deb^ite. 
The first might be called the sceptical or 
pessimistic views. It suggests that, whatever the 
circumstances of Saddam Hussain's fall, there will 
eventually emerge a regeime not dissimilar to that of 
Hussain. That is, it will be a neo-patrimonial system, 
relying on kinship ties and patronage networks, led either 
by a military strongman or by a group of powerful figures 
who can command loyalty within the armed forces and within 
those sections of Iraqi society that have hitherto supported 
the Saddam Husain regime. It may not be as brutal as the 
regime of Saddam Hussain, it may even initially adopt a 
facade of openness but the principle of authoritarian, 
personalised and unrepresentative government will lie at its 
heart. This view is founded on the belief that the regime 
of Saddam Hussain and his Kinsmen is no more than the 
product of the forces that characterise Iraqi society, and 
Hussain himself has ensured that the same forces will 
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continue to be the sole -foundation -for the success-ful 
exercise o-f power in Iraq. Whatever principles may be 
adhered to in public, to ne3gl6?ct the powerful clannishners 
and the patron - client networks of Iraqi society is to 
commit political suicide. 
This leads to the second, more hopeful and 
optimiEitic vision of Iraq's political future. Basing itself 
largely on the public de-?cl arat i ons of the many Iraqi 
apposition parties, this view assert that all opposition 
members, of whatever ideological have now committed 
themselves to the establishment of a liberal democratic 
government in Iraq. The argument is founded on two central 
beliefs. First, that the Iraqis, as a whole, are sick of 
dictatorship and long for a more open and representative 
government; second, that the opposition parties themselves 
have realized that a representative system is not only the 
most desirable, but also the most pratical means of 
governing Iraq. Encouraged by recent experiences in 
Kurdistan, the suggestion is that there exists a capacity 
among Iraqi to set aside ethnic, sectarian and tribal 
cJivision of society and to escape from the effects of 
devisive sitrategies pursued by all previous Iraqi regime . 
There are many ways of trying to assess the 
global impact of Iraq's defeat at the hands of the U.S. in 
38. Ibid. 
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the recent Bul-f conflict. One can attempt the most 
comprehensive o-f surveys -focussing in turn, on the 
implication o-f the war for- each of the major actors, whether 
regional or e;;tr-a-regi onal , whether state or non state and 
then seeking to leave together these entersecting 
rt^ l ati onshi p into an overall tapestry of the world political 
scene. 
In respect of the U.S. objective, the outcome 
of the war carries much more mixed consequences challenges 
to pro-U.S. intermediaries come from Arab nationalism in 
both its secular and non-secular forms and from the rise of 
any potential regional rival to Israil. It is necessary to 
clarify the issue and to dispose of some of the arguments 
atgainst attaching due weight to Arab nationalism. It is 
indubitably the case that Arab nationalism is itself 
vitiated by the specific nationalisms of different nations. 
Thus, despite widespread popular sympathy for Mr. Saddam 
Hussain in his confrontation with the U.S. even those Arab 
countries most opposed to the behaviour of the U.S. led 
coalition did little beyond verbal protest. Time and again 
efforts at forging a large Arab nation have fallen through 
it also can not be denitid that Anwar Sadat's peace 
initie^tive with Israel, although it represented an enormous 
setback to Palestinian aspirations, was widely welcomed by 
the Egyptian public for the territories it restored to the 
nation. There has not been one Arab Government including 
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Mr. Saddam Hu.ssain's which has not been cynical in its 
39 
man i pulat i on of the Pal est i ne i ssue 
Nevertheless, Arab nationalism exists and 
Palestine continues to represent its cutting edge. The 
importance o-f Arab nationalism and its discomfort for the 
U.S. and Israel lies not so much in its potential for 
generating wider Arab unity as in its capacity to disturb 
the existing patterns of Western, especially U.S. Control in 
the region, it is changing manifestation and its periodic 
e;a.itaera.nces threaten to alter the existing, established an 
therefore, stable arrangements or regional patterns through 
which the West/U.S. must operate in order to secure its 
control on influence 
It is not an argument to say that ultimately 
these periodic expressions — Iraqi posture as champion of 
Arab nationalism or Iran as the vanguard of an Islamic 
nationalism are ultimately amenable to cooperation with the 
UrS. or incorporation in an eventual Western dominated 
arrangement. The point is precisely the instability created 
in the period (often prolonged) from initial challenge to 
the U.S. and ultimate institutionalisation of accommodation 
to it. This i nsti tuti onal i ::; at ion is adversely effected by 
39. Achin Vanaik, Global Impact of Iraqi defeat, The Hindu, 
30 April 1991. 
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periodic outbursts o-f anti-Israel i and 'temporary' anti-
Western -fervour o-f the? kind associated -for example, with the 
r i se o-f I si ami c f undame?ntal i sm. 
American success in the war has achieved 
littls. the internal arrangements o-f its client Arab 
nations have been hacJly shaken and they will not re-
establish themselves easily. The Palestine question 
continues to -fester- and an increasingly enubittered 
Palestinian diaspora and West Bank populace "wi11 continue to 
make its presence -felt in uncom-f ortabl e way -for the West, 
Israel and the U.S.'*^. 
41. Ibid. 
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CONCLUSION 
Th« present study tries to outline the aims 
of the revolutionary changes in Iraq since its inception and 
when the Ba'th Party came to power for a few months and the 
emerging trends that might ultimately lead to the 
establishment of a progressive and enduring political system 
which would command the greatest public appeal. That 
political system, it was suggested, should be based on a set 
of principles that have become ovrriding political thinking, 
such as ? nationalism and socialism — presumably along 
secular lines — and a measure of individual freedom. A new 
form of representation by virtue of which the public can 
participate in political processes is deemed necessary to 
provide legitimacy and inspire public confidence. These were 
the trends of thought in Iraq when the Ba'th Party fully 
achieved power in 1968 and its leaders promised to give them 
practical edKpression and provide the country with a stable 
regime capable of achieving cherished national goal. 
Ha» the Ba'th Party accomplished any of these 
goals during the decade since it achieved power? To begin 
with, Iraq has experienced a series of military revolutions 
since 1958 which introduced vi'olence as a method of 
political change and it had become exceedingly difficult to 
maintain public order and establish an enduring regime. 
Upon achieving power, the Ba'th leaders were determined to 
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put an end to violent changes and erect a regime immune to 
military intervention. In the past despite several, attempts 
to overthrow the regime (i.e. the abortive coups of 1970 and 
1973) the Ba'th leaders have not only been able to 
discourage military intervention but have also succeeded in 
relieving, the political process -from military pressures. 
The Ba'th Party endeavors to bring if it has not already 
brought — the Army under its control and hopes that its 
tenure of office will depend on civil rather than military 
support. The army seemed to have accommodated to party 
discipline by the recruitment of an increasing number of 
young Ba'th members into its ranks. Moreover, a number of 
Army officers have been induced to join the Ba'th Party and 
a growing fraternization between military institutions and 
top Ba'th leaders has become noticeable. Today even strikes 
and popular demonstrations that often recurred and disturbed 
public order are no longer feasible. For this reason even 
political opponents, though they often voice certain 
grievances against restrictions of political opinion, have 
paid a high tribute to the Ba'th Party's ability to thwart 
military interventions and maintain stability and public 
order. 
The first step In the right direction toward 
political participation was the establishment of the 
progressive National Front, composed first of two parties — 
the Ba'th and the Communist Parties — and then of other 
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"Progressive" parties and groups. Though in theory the 
prograssive National Front o-f 1972 claimed to had a much 
wider popular base than the constituency o-f the Ba'th Party 
— indeed, it could only marginally claim the loyalty of all 
elements represented in the Front, in rality, however, the 
Ba'th Party alone was held responsible -for political 
decisions. 
Today Perhaps a more important instrument to 
enlist papular participation would be a functional National 
Assembly in which various shades of opinion be allowed to 
represent. The temporary constitution indeed has provided 
for such an Assembly but the relevant articles of the 
constitution (Articles 46-55) have not yet been implemented. 
Leaders of various groups and national organizations 
prepared to cooperate within the framework of the regime 
seem to be awaiting the opportunity to express their views 
through an elected organ but plans for holding of elections 
have not yet been laid down. 
The Ba'th leaders have shown a greater 
enthusiasm in emphasising "reconstruction" by planning and 
economic development than in the granting of freedom and 
political participation on the ground that no real progress 
and stability in the country can be achieved before poverty 
and other forms of deprivation were wiped out. Ba'th 
socialism, it is held, is designed to improve social and 
C167D 
economic conditions as a prerequisite to other ultimate 
objectives — democracy, -freedom and Arab Unity." 
The 1991 war and its aftermath brought to the 
sur-face an emotional unity Wihdathal (Unity o-f situation) 
among the Arabs. The sympathy expressed by many Arabs -for 
Saddam and -for his invasion and occupation of Kuwait, 
indicates that many Arabs do not take for granted the 
boundaries between Arab states because they do not consider 
the divisions of the Arab world to be permanent. In the 
Arab public eye, some borders are less popular than others, 
the borders that insulate the Gulf royal families and their 
fortunes are very unpopular and the elimination of the Gulf 
politial orders and elites is desirable in the eyes of many 
Arabs. 
Arab nationalism now consists of two major 
ideas; first, the notion that the Arabs share common 
sentiments and cultural and linguistic heritage and for 
some, a religious heritage, second the idea that some of the 
borders between Arabs state are not only artificial but also 
undesirable. There are various arguments that Arabs promote 
regarding the efficacy of Arab nationalism. For Faysal 
Darraj the well known Palestenian writer, the crises in Arab 
contemporary history do not underscore the divisions between 
the Arab people, rather they underline the schism between 
"the people" and "the regimes". The repurcussion of the 
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Bulf war, according to Darraj, sharpened the divisions 
between the people and the regimes but not among the Arab 
people themselves. 
For Darraj and many Arab nationalist writers, 
the division o-f the Arab world into separate states has only 
served the interests o-f those Western powers who feared Arab 
unification and power. Furthermore, some modern Arab nation 
— states ar-B seen as being closely associated with the 
interests of both Western powers and Arab ruling families 
and groups and are regarded as subservient to those 
interests. The response of many Arab officials to the 
attempt by the Iraqi regime to eliminate the Kuwaiti 
political entity was strikingly different from the 
enthusiams expressed among the Arab masses to the disaster 
that befell Kuwait. Arab public dissatisfaction with 
oppressive system in most if not all — Arab countries lead 
many Arabs to link, oppressiveness with the regional (iqlimi) 
fragmentation of the Arab world. 
The current intellectual debate about Arab 
nationalism entails no illusions and obstacles in the path 
of Arab-Partial or full-unification. The opposition by 
Western powers and Israel to the goal of Arab unity appears 
to increase, not decrease, the popularity of the idea. In 
an unusual communique circulated in Syria in January 1991, 
noted Arab intellectuals expressed their opposition to the 
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Gulf war and af-firmed their faith in collective Arab action 
and in the necessity of "Arab Power". To many Arabs, the 
United States fixation with Iraqi military capabilities is 
indicative of Western fears of Arab military and political 
power. In other words the sympathy that many Arabs 
expressed for Saddam was not so much directed toward his 
person but toward his military appratus, of which many Arabs 
in the epoch of defeat and despair were proud. 
Unlike the nostalgic Arab nationalism harking 
back to the Baghdad of Harun al-Rashid, Arab nationalism 
today does not aspire to achieve glory and greatness, two 
words that appeared frequently in the Arab nationalist 
literature of the first part of this century. Many Arabs 
simply took for greater ease of population movement within 
the Arab world without worrying about the watchful cruel 
eyes of the mukhabarats (intelligence networks). 
In the present phase invariably Arabs are 
united by the concept of wihdat al-masa'ib (Unity of 
disasters). Unity is expressed in various ways and in 
different degrees because of the varied oppressive 
conditions in the Arab world. The Gulf Governments for 
example, were and still are intolerant of expression of 
dissent, as are Egyptian, Syrian and Iraqi Governments. 
Iraqis who strongly expressed their staunch opposition to 
the tyranny of Saddam Hussain were later oppressed by Iraqi 
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troops, to the Indi-f-f erence o-f the world community. 
In a society where kinship, communal, tribal 
and other primordial loyalties prevail, the Ba'th has 
attached considerable value to the mystique o-f being an 
Arab. The sel-f-assertion of his Arab identity would awaken 
the nationalist consciousness that lay dormant and trigger 
o-f-f automatic processes for self realization as an Arab 
nationalist. It is clear that Ba'thists are not prepared to 
distinguish between the individual being a national of the 
state and a nationalist. 
However, the over-emphasis on people rather 
than territory, and nationality rather than citizenship, 
makes Ba'thist doctrine repressive as its strives for the 
assimilation of heterogeneous communities so that everyone 
conforms to its militant nationalist requirements. It is a 
recipe for the establishment of authoritarian rule under the 
control of a totalitarian party. 
The present Ba'thist regime is more intensely 
ideological and Arab nationalist, and has an over projected 
ambition of transforming Iraq into a modern and secular 
state as a part of the Arab world. The reality is in fact, 
far from it. In the final analysis it can be said that devis 
the process of nation - building in Iraq already in 
precarious and uncertain condition. The task for Arab 
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intellectuals and many among the masses is to link the goal 
o-f Arab unity with the crucial issues of democratization and 
Islam. This affirms the point that the political and social 
process in Iraq are not autonomous but are effected by the 
movements and ambitions of the countries both inside and 
outside the region. 
Recent developments in the Arab world have 
caused many people to switch their focus from secular 
ideologies such as Arab nationalism, Ba'thism and socialism 
to Islamic oriented thinking. Arab nationalism has been 
associated with political failure and defeat. The climax of 
this failure occured in the war against Israel and the 
recent Iraqi invasion of Kuwait further more. Islamic 
revivalist movements have de-emphasised Arab nationalism in 
favour of Islamic nationalism in their socio-political 
activities. Islam has prvided Arabs with a sense of 
distinctive identity. Due to the failure of other 
ideologies, most Arabs considers Islam to be the only viable 
ideology that can strengthen the Arab world. 
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APPENDIX-A 
THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION 
PART ONE 
THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ 
ARTICLE-1 
Iraq is a Sovereign People's Democratic Republic: its 
principal aim is to achieve the United Arab State and 
establish the Socialist system. 
ARTICLE-2 
The Peop le i s t h e s o u r c e of a u t h o r i t y and i t s 
l e g i t i m a c y . 
ARTICLE-3 
( a ) . S o v e r e i g n t y o-f I r a q i s an i n d i v i s i b l e u n i t , 
( b ) . The l a n d oi I r a q i s an i n d i v i s i b l e u n i t and no 
p a r t o-f i t s h a l l be r e l i n q u i s h e d . 
ARTICLE-4 
I s l a m i s t h e r e l i g i o n o f t h e S t a t e . 
ARTICLE-5 
(a) Iraq is part of the Arab Nation. 
(b) The People of Iraq is formed of two principal 
nationalities, the Arab nationality and the Kurdish 
nationality. This Constitution shall recognize the 
national rights of the Kurdish People and the 
legitimate rights of all minorities within the 
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unity of Iraq. 
ARTICLE-6 
The Iraqi nationality and its rulings shall be 
determined by the law. 
ARTICLE-7 
(a) Arabic is the of-ficial language. 
(b) The Kurdish language, in addition to the Arabic 
language, shall be the o-f-ficial language in the 
Kurdish Region. 
ARTICLE-8 
(a). Baghdad is the Capital of the Republic of Iraq, 
and it may be shifted by a law. 
(b). The Republic of Iraq shall be divided into 
administrative units which shall be organised on 
the basis of decentralisation. 
(c). The area whose majority of population is from 
Kurds shall enjoy autonomy in accordance with what 
is defined by the law. 
ARTICLE-9 
The Flag and the Emblem of the Republic of Iraq and the 
rules pertaining to them shall be specified by a law. 
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PART TWO 
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BASES OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRftQ 
ARTICLE-10 
Social solidarity is the -foremost -foundation -for 
society. Its implication is that every citizen shall 
perform -fully his duty towards society and that society 
shall ensure to the citizen his full rights and freedoms. 
ARTICLE-11 
The family is the nucleus of society. The State shall 
guarantee its protection and support, and shall foster 
maternity and childhood. 
ARTICLE-12 
The State shall undertake planning, directing and 
guiding the national economy in accordance with the 
following aims: 
(a). Establishing the socialist system on scientific 
and revolutionary principles. 
(b). Achieving Arab economic unit. 
ARTICLE-13 
National resources and fundamental instruments of 
production are the property of the People, and the central 
authority of the Republic of Iraq shall employ them directly 
in accordance with the requirements of the general planning 
of the national economy. 
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ARTICLE-14 
The State shall ensure, promote and support all kinds 
o-f cooperation in production, distribution and consumption. 
ARTICLE-15 
Public properties and the properties o-f the public 
sector shall have special inviolability, which the State and 
all citizens have to maintain and guarantee their security 
and protection. Any subversion or attack on it shall be 
regarded as an attack on the structure o+ society and a 
violence to it. 
ARTICLE-16 
(a). Ownership is a social -function which shall be 
exercised within the limits of society's aims and 
the State's programmes in accordance with the 
provisions of the law. 
(b). Private ownership and individual economic -freedom 
shall be guaranteed within the limits o-f the law 
provided that individual ownership will not 
contradict or be determental to general economic 
planning. 
(c). Private property shall not be expropriated except 
for the public interest and in accordance with 
just compensation in accordance with the 
provisions of the law. 
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(d). The maximum agricultural ownership shall be 
de-fined by the law and the excess shall be 
regarded as the property o-f the People. 
ARTICLE-17 
Inheritance ie a recognized right regulated by a law. 
ARTICLE-IB 
Real estate ownership is -forbidden to non-Iraqis except 
in cases speci-fied by a law. 
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PART THREE 
BftSIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES 
ARTICLE-19 
<a) . All citizens are equal be-fore the law, without 
distinction on the basis of race, origin, 
language, class or religion. 
(b). Equal opportunities for all citizens shall be 
guaranteed within the limits of the law. 
ARTICLE-20 
(a). The accused is innocent until he is declared 
guilty by judicial procedure. 
(b). The right to defense is sacred in all processes of 
investigation and trial in accordance with the 
provisions of the law. 
(c). All trials shall be open to the public unless 
declared in Camera. 
ARTICLE-21 
(a). Penalty is personal. 
(b). There shall be no offence or penalty except as 
defined by a law. No penalty shall be imposed 
except on an act deemed by the law as an offence 
at the time of its commission. No more severe 
penalty than the penalty enforced at the time of 
committing the offence shall be applied. 
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ARTICLE-22 
(a). The dignity o-f Man is guaranteed. Any kind of 
physical or psychological torture shall be 
prohibited. 
(b). No one may be arrested, detained, imprisoned or 
searched except in accordance with the provisions 
of the law. 
(c). Homes are inviolable. The may not be entered or 
searched except as specified by the law. 
ARTICLE-23 
Privacy of mail, telegraphic and telephone 
correspondence shall be guaranteed, and it shall not be 
violated except for reasons of public security in accordance 
with the limits and the rules provided by the law. 
ARTICLE-24 
No citizen shall be prevented from travel outside the 
country or from returning thereto and no restriction shall 
be imposed on his moving and residence inside the country 
except in the cases defined by the law. 
ARTICLE-25 
Freedom of religion, beliefs and exercise of religious 
ceremonies shall be guaranteed, provided that this freedom 
shall neither contradict the provisions of the Constitution 
and the law nor violate morality and public order. 
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ARTICLE-26 
The Constitution shall guarantee -freedom of opinion, 
publication, meeting, demonstration, -forming of political 
parties, unions and societies in accordance with the aims of 
the Constitution and within the limits of the law. The 
State shall endeavour to provide the means required for 
exercising these freedoms, which run in line with the 
nationalist and progressive line of the Revolution. 
ARTICLE-27 
(a). The State shall undertake to eliminate illiteracy 
and ensure the right of free-of-charge education 
in various elementary, secondary and university 
levels to all citizens. 
(b). The State shall endeavour to make elementary 
education compulsory, expand vocational and 
technical education in all towns and villages and 
particularly promote evening education which 
enables the popular masses to correlate knowledge 
between science and labour. 
(c). The State shall guarantee freedom of scientific 
research, promote and reward distinction and 
creativity in all intellectual, scientific and 
technical activities and all kinds of popular 
genius. 
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ARTICLE-28 
Education shall aim at raising and developing the 
general cultural level, developing the scienti-fic thinking, 
encouraging the spirit o-f research, -fulfilling the 
requirements of economic and social development programmes, 
creating a free nationalist and progressive generation solid 
in structure and character, which takes pride in its people, 
its homeland and its legacy, sympathises with the rights of 
all its nationalities and opposes the doctrines of 
capitalism, exploitation, reaction, Zionism and colonialism 
in order to achieve Arab unit, freedom and socialism. 
ARTICLE-29 
The State shall endeavour to provide the means of 
enjoying the achievements of modern civilization for the 
masses of the people and generalize the progressive outputs 
of modern civilization to all citizens. 
ARTICLE-30 
(a). Public office is a sacred trust and a social 
service, whose principal attribute is a loyal 
obligation to protect the interests of the masses, 
their rights and freedoms in accordance with the 
provisions of the Constitution and the law. 
(b). Equality of employment in public office shall be 
guaranteed by the law. 
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ARTICLE-31 
(a). De-fence of the homeland is a sacred duty and an 
honour bestowed to the citizen. Service to the 
Flag is compulsory and the law shall organize the 
manner of its performance. 
(b). The Armed Forces ar-B the property of the people, 
and they are the People's tool for preserving its 
security, defending its independence, protecting 
the people's and the homeland's safety and unity 
and achieving its national and patriotic aims and 
aspirations. 
(c). The State alone shall undertake to establish Armed 
Forces, and no body or group shall be entitled to 
establish military or para-military formations. 
ARTICLE-32 
(a). Work is a right which the State shall undertake to 
provide to every citizen capable of it. 
<b). Work is an honour and a sacred duty imposed on 
every capable citizen. It is required by the 
necessity of participation in building society and 
its protection, development and prosperity. 
(c). The State shall undertake to improve conditions of 
work and promote standards of living, expertise 
and culture for all working citizens. 
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(d). The State shall undertake to provide wider social 
ensurances for all citizens in case o-f sickness, 
disability, unemployment and old age. 
(e). The State shall edeavour to organize the programme 
and ensure the necessary means which enable 
working citizens to spend their leaves in an 
atmosphere that helps them to improve their health 
standards and develop their cultural and 
technicaql gifts. 
ARTICLE-33 
The State shall undertake to protect public health 
through continuous expansion of free-of-charge medical 
services, whether by prevention, treatment or medicine, in 
all cities, towns and villages. 
ARTICLE-34 
(a). The Republic of Iraq shall grant political asylum 
to all persons persecuted in their countries 
because of their struggle in the defense of human 
liberation principles, which the Iraqi People has 
accepted under this Constitution. 
(b). Political refugees shall not be delivered. 
ARTICLE-35 
Payment of taxes is a duty imposed on all citizens. 
Taxes may not be imposed, amended or levied except by a law. 
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ARTICLE-36 
An activity which contradicts the aims of the people 
de-fined in this Constitution and any act of conduct aiming 
at undermining the national unity of the masses of the 
people, proviking racial or sectarian or regional bigotry 
among their ranks, or violating their progressive gains and 
achievements, shall be prohibited. 
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PART FOUR 
THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL 
ARTICLE-37 
The Revolutionary Command Council is the supreme body 
in the State, which has undertaken since the 17th. of July, 
1968, the responsibility o-f achieving the people's public 
will by stripping power from the reactionary, distatorial, 
corrupt system and restoring it to the people. 
ARTICLE-38 
The Revolutionary Command Council shall exercise, by a 
majority of two thirds of its members, the following powers: 
(a). Elect the Chairman from among its members who 
shall be designated as the Chairman of the 
Revolutionary Command Council and President of the 
Republic. 
(b). Elect the Vice-Chairman from among its members who 
shall be designated as Vice-Chairman of the 
Revolutionary Command Council and take the place 
of the Chairman in case of his official absence or 
his exercise of his constitutional powers becomes 
difficult or impossible for any legal reason. 
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(c). Select new members to the Council -from among the 
Regional Command o-f the Arab Ba'th Socialist 
Party, provided that its members shall not exceed 
twelve. 
(d). Accept the resignation of the Chairman or the 
Vice-chairman or any o-f the Council's members. 
<e) . Release any o-f its members from membership of the 
Counci1. 
(f). Charge and send to trial any members of the 
Revolutionary Command Council, or any deputy of 
the President of the Republic or any Ministers. 
ARTICLE-39 
The Chairman, the Vice-Chairman and the Members of the 
Revolutionary Command Council shall take the following oath 
before the Council: 
"I swear by Almighty Bod, by my honour and belief 
to preserve the Republican Regime and abide by its 
Constitution and laws, protect the people's interests, 
safeguard the homeland's independence and safety and 
integrity of its lands and endeavor with full sacrifice and 
loyalty to fulfil the Arab Nation's aims of unity, freedom 
and socialism". 
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ARCILE-40 
The Chairman, the Vice-Chairman and the Members of the 
Revolutionary Command Council shall enjoy -full immunity and 
no measure may be taken against anyone of them except by 
prior permission from the Council. 
ARTICLE-41 
(a). The Revolutionary Command Council shall convene at 
the invitation of its Chairman or Vice-Chairman or 
one third of its members. Its sessions shall be 
convened under the presidency of the Chairman or 
the Vice-chairman and the presence of the majority 
of its members. 
(b). Meetings and discussions of the Revolutionary 
Commands Council Sire in camera; their disclosure 
shall be subject to constitutional inquiry before 
the Council. Announcement, publication and 
notification of the decisions of the Council shall 
be performed by the manners provided in this 
Constitution. 
(c). Laws and resolutions shall be approved in the 
Council by the majority of its members, except in 
the cases otherwise provided in this Constitution. 
ARTICLE-42 
The Revolutionary Command Council shall exercise the 
following powers: 
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(a). Promulgate laws and decrees whichhave the power 
o-f the law. 
(b). Issue decrees required by the necessities o-f 
applying the provisions of the enforced laws. 
ARTICLE-43 
The Revolutionary Command Council shall exercise, by 
the majority of its members, the following powers: 
(a). Approve recommendations of the Ministry of Defence 
and public security, initiate laws and adopt 
resolutions concerning them in respect to 
organization and jurisdictions. 
(b). Declare general mobilization partially or fully, 
declare war accept armistice and conclude peace. 
(c). Approve the draft of general budget of the State 
and the independent and investment budgets annexed 
thereto and the credit of the final accounts. 
(d). Ratify international treaties and agreement. 
<e). Provide the internal regulations of the Council, 
define its cadre, approve its budget, appoint its 
officials and specify remunerations and allowances 
of the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman, the members 
and the officials. 
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(•f). Lay down the rules -for the trial of its members 
and setting up the court and the procedures which 
must be followed. 
(g). Authorize its Chairman or the Vice-Chairman to 
exercise some of its powers provided in this 
Constitution except legislative powers. 
ARTICLE-44 
The Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council shall 
undertake the following: 
(a). Preside over the meetings of the Council, 
represent it, conduct its sessions and order 
expenditure therein. 
(b). Sign all laws and resolutions promulgated by the 
Council and their publication in the Official 
Gazette. 
<c). Supervise the works of the Ministers and 
Institutions of the State, call the Ministers for 
conferring on the affairs of their Ministries, 
interrogate them wheh necessary and inform the 
Revolutionary Command Council thereof. 
ftRTICLE-45 
Each of the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman and Members of 
the Revolutionary Command Council shall be responsible 
before the Council for violating the Constitution, for 
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violating the obligations of the Constitutional oath or for 
any act or conduct which the Council deems as determintal to 
the honour o-f responsibility which he exercises. 
ARTICLE-46 
A Higher Financial Comptrolling Authority shall be 
established and attached to the Revolutionary Command 
Council. Its head and the rules o-f its -functions shall be 
regulated by a law. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 
The National Assembly shall consist of the 
representatives o-f the people in all its pol itical , economic 
and social sectors. Its -formation, manner of membership, 
process o-f work in it and its powers shall be de-fined by a 
special law, namely, the National Assembly Law. 
ARTICLE-48 
The National Assembly must meet in two ordinary 
sessions each year. The Chairman o-f the Revolutionary 
Command Council is entitled to call the Assembly -for an 
extra-ordinary meeting whenever required, and the meeting 
shall be con-fined to the subjects for which it is called. 
Sessions of the National Assembly shall be convened and 
concluded by a resolution issued by the Revolutionary 
Command Council. 
ARTICLE-49 
S e s s i o n s of t h e Assembly s h a l l be conduc ted p u b l i c l y 
u n l e s s i t i s dec ided t o convene some of them i n camera i n 
a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s of i t s l aw . 
ARTICLE-50 
(a). Members of the National Assembly may not be 
questioned over the opinions and suggestions they 
introduce during their exercise of the tasks of 
their posts. 
E205J 
(b). None of the members of the Assembly may be pursued 
or arrested for an offence committed during the 
meetings without obtaining the Assembly's 
permission, except in case of being held in the 
act of crime. 
ARTICLE-51 
The National Assembly shall undertake tos 
(a). Lay down its internal regulations, specify its 
cadre, approve its budget and appoint its 
personnel. Remunerations and allowances of its 
President and Members shall be defined by a law. 
(b). Provide the rules for charging and trying its 
members in case of their committing one of the 
acts provided in Article 56 of this Constitution. 
ftRTICLE-52 
The National Assembly shall consider the draft laws 
proposed by the Revolutionary Command Council within a 
period of fifteen days from the date of their arrival to the 
bureau of the National Assembly's Presidency. If the 
Assembly approves the draft, it shall be submitted to the 
President of the Republic, to promulgate it. But if the 
National Assembly rejected or amended it, it shall be 
returned to the Revolutionary Command Council. If the 
amendment were approved by the Revolutionary Command 
Council, it shall be submitted to the President to 
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promulgate it. But i-f the Revolutionary Command Council 
insists on its opinion in the second reading, the dra-ft 
shall be returned to the National Assembly to be presented 
in a joint sitting o-f the Council and the Assembly. The 
decision issued by the majority of two thirds shall be 
considered as -final. 
ARTICLE-53 
The National Assembly shall consider, within a period 
o-f -fi-fteen days, the dra-ft Laws -forwarded to it by the 
President of the Republic. If the Assembly rejects the 
draft, it shall be returned to the President of the Republic 
with the statement of the reasons of rejection. But if the 
Revolutionary Command Council and if it approves the draft, 
then it shall be liable for promulgation. But if the 
National Assembly amends the draft, then it shall be 
submitted to the Revolutionary Command Council, and if it 
approves the draft, it shall be liable for promulgation. 
But if the Revolutionary Command Council rejects the 
amendment or makes another amendment, it shall be returned 
again to the National Assembly within one week. If the 
National Assembly adopts the opinion of the Revolutionary 
Command Council, the draft shall be submitted to the 
President of the Republic for promulgation. But if the 
National Assembly insists, in the second reading, on its 
opnion, then a joint sitting of the Council and the Assembly 
shall be held, and the draft adopted by the majority of two 
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thirds shall be considered as -final, and it shall be 
submitted to the President o-f the Republic -for promulgation. 
ftRTICLE-54 
The National Assembly shall consider draft laws 
presented by one quarter o-f its members in a-f-fairs other 
than military matters and public security a-f-fairs. 
I-f the Assembly approves the draft law, it 
shall be submitted to the Revolutionary Command Council to 
consider it within fifteen days from the date of its arrival 
to the Council's Bureau. 
If it is approved by the Revolutionary 
Command Council, it shall be submitted to the President of 
the Republic for promulgation. 
But if the Revolutionary Command Cojncil 
rejects or amends it, the draft shall be returned to the 
National Assembly. If the latter insists on its opinion, in 
the second reading, a joint session of the Council and the 
Assembly shall be convened under the presidency of the 
Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council or his Deputy. 
The draft issued by the majority of two thirds shall be 
considered as final and shall be submitted to the President 
of the Republic for promulgation. 
ftRTICLE-55 
(a). Deputies of the President of the Republic and the 
Ministers and those who ars in ranks similar to 
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them shall be entitled to attend the meetings of 
the National Assembly and participate in 
discussions. 
(b). the National Assembly may, a-fter the approval o-f 
the President o-f the Republic, call the Ministers 
in order to make an enquiry or explanation. 
ARTICLE-56 
The President o-f the National Assembly and 
every member in it are held responsible before the Assembly 
•for violating the Constitution, perjuring the obligations o-f 
the Constitutional oath or -for any act or conduct the 
National Assembly deems as detrimental to the honour of 
responsibility he exercises. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC 
ARTICLE-57 
(a). The President of the Republic is the President o-f 
the State and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed 
Forces. He shall undertake the executive power-
directly or through the Council of Ministers. 
<b). The President of the Republic shall promulgate the 
necessary ordinances for exercising his powers as 
prescribed in this Constitution. 
ARTICLE-SB 
The President of the Republic shall directly exercise 
the following powers: 
(a). Preserve the independence of the country and 
integrity of its lands, protect its interior and 
exterior security and protect the rights and 
freedom of citizens. 
(b). Supervise the application of the Constitution, 
laws, resolutions, judicial decisions and 
development projects in all parts of the Republic 
of Iraq. 
(c). Appoint Deputies for the President of the Republic 
and release them from their posts. 
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(d). Appoint the Ministers and release them -from their 
posts. 
(e). Appoint civil and religious judges and civil and 
military o-f-ficials of the State, and terminate 
their services in accordance with the law. 
(f>. Appoint and accredit Iraqi diplomatic 
representatives in the Arab and -foreign countries, 
and in international conferences and 
organizations. 
(g). Grant military ranks and medals in accordance with 
the law. 
(h). Hold negotiations and conclude international 
agreements and treaties. 
(i). Accept diplomatic and international 
representatives and demand their withdrawal. 
(j). Approve capital punishments and issue special 
amnesty. 
(k). Direct the control of the work of the Ministries 
and general institutions and coordinate them. 
ARTICLE-59 
Deputies of the President of the Republic and the 
Ministers shall be held responsible before the President of 
the Republic for their works, and he is entitled to refer 
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any one oi them to trial, in accordance with th» provlvions 
of the Constitution, -for -functional errors committed, for 
taking advantage of, or abusive use of, his powers. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 
ARTICLE-60 
(a). The Council o-f Ministers shall consist of the 
Ministers and be presided over by the President of 
the Republic. 
(b). The President of the Republic shall call the 
Council of Ministers to meet and conduct its 
meetings. 
ARTICLE-61 
The Council of Ministers shall exercise the folowing 
powers: 
(a). Initiate draft laws and refer them to the proper 
legislative authority. 
(b). Issue administrative regulations and decisions in 
accordance with the law. 
(c). Appoint civil officials of the State and promote 
them, in accordance with the law. 
(d). Submit the general plan of the State. 
(e). Submit the general budget of the State and the 
budgets annexed to it. 
(f). Conclude and grant loans, and supervise organising 
and administering currency. 
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(g). Declare a -full or partial emergency and terminate 
it in accordance with the law. 
(h). Supervise general utilities and of-ficial and semi-
official institutions. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE JUDICIARY 
ARTICLE-62 
(a). The Judiciary is independent and no power shall be 
exercised over it except the law. 
(b). The right to litigation shall be guaranteed to all 
citizens. 
(c). The law shall de-fine the manner of courts 
•formation, their grades, jurisdictions, 
stipulations -for appointing civil and religious 
judges, transferring and promoting them, 
litigating and retiring them. 
ARTICLE-63 
The law shall de-fine the posts o-f the Public 
Prosecution, its stipulations -for appointing Public 
Prosecutors and their deputies and the rules -for 
transferring and promoting them, litigating and retiring 
them. 
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PART FIVE 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
ARTICLE-64 
(a). No one shall be member o-f the Revolutionary 
Command Council and no one shall be deputy to the 
President o-f the Republic or Minister except 
whoever is Iraqi by birth and from Iraqi parents 
by birth also. 
(b>. Members o-f the Revolutionary Command Council, 
deputies to the President of the Republic and the 
Ministers shall not exercise a free profession or 
a commercial business, or purchase from the state 
properties, sell to the State some of their 
properties, or barter for them while holding their 
posts. 
ARTICLE-65 
(a). The provisions of this Constitution shall remain 
in force until the Permanent Constitution is 
promulgated. 
(b). This Constitution shall not be amended except by 
the Revolutionary Command Council by a majority of 
two thirds of its members. 
ARTICLE-66 
(a). Laws shall be published in the Official Gazette 
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and shall come into -force -from the date o-f their 
publication except otherwise provided therein. 
(b). Laws shall have no retroactive ef-fect except if 
otherwise provided therein and this exclusion 
shall not include Criminal Laws and laws of taxes 
and financial dues. 
ARTICLE-67 
This interim Constitution, the laws and judicial 
decisions shall be promulgated and executed in the name of 
the people. 
ARTICLE-68 
All laws and resolutions of the Revolutionary Command 
Council enforced prior to the promulgation of this 
Constitution shall remain in force and they may not be 
amended or abrogated except through the manner provided in 
this Constitution. 
ARTICLE-69 
The Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council shall 
undertake the promulgation of this constitution and its 
publication in the Official Gazette. 
I ^ < ^ ^^^ ^ '^ 
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APPENDIX-B 
DECISIONS OF THE SIXTH NATIONAL CONVENTION OF 
THE ARAB BA'TH SOCIALIST PARTY. 1963 
INTRODUCTION; 
Following are the general decisions of the 
Sixth National Convention of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party: 
The struggle of the Arab Ba'th Socialist 
Party has been continuous for approximately twenty years. 
During this period the people, led by the party, have 
offered many martyrs at the altar of the struggle for Arab 
national unity, liberty, and socialism. The Arab Ba'th 
Socialist party was able to outline the course of the Arab 
struggle with precision and understanding. It was able to 
crystallize the desires and goals of the Arab peoples in two 
spheres: the national sphere and the Socialist sphere. 
Furthermore, the party was able, during the negative aspects 
of the struggle, to incarnate the Arab people's ambitions 
and their revulsion toward the underdeveloped, exploited, 
and dismembered Arab present. 
During twenty years of struggle the party has 
been able to incorporate itself truthfully in the struggle 
of the Arab peoples. It was able to lead successfully such 
struggles in Syria and Iraq; to deprive aristocracy, 
reactionaries, and the bourgeoisie of the leadership of Arab 
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nationalism, to convert the nationalist movement into the 
mementum o-f the struggle oi the millions. This party 
promises the Arab masses to walk side by side with them 
unhesitatingly and untiringly in their nationalist struggle 
•for Arab unity. 
The party has been able to bring into the 
Arab nationalist movement the spirit o-f the modern age. It 
has accomplished this by tying its interests to those o-f the 
struggling masses and by linking together the nationalist 
and socialist revolutions. Today, the party promises the 
masses that it will continue to march with fortitude with 
the struggling masses to achieve the Socialist revolution 
and to renew the slogans which it has carried and -fought -for 
since its inception. 
The party contributed toward creation o-f the 
•first national revolutionary cadre for the Arabs in their 
modern history when it helped bring about the union o-f 1958 
and sacrificed itself at the altar of that union. After the 
destruction of that union, the party was able to reorganize 
itself, lead the masses, and face courageously the 
separatist regime that was an enemy of Arab nationalism and 
unity. This facilitated the downfall of the separatist 
reactionary regime in Damascus which had been exhausted by 
the attacks made by the Ba'th. On the morning of March 8, 
the vanguard of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party were leading 
forces to bury the black separatist regime. 
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New circumstances have arisen that will 
^=acilitate great victories in the spheres o-f nationalism and 
socialism. The Cairo Convenant o-f April 17, 1963 was the 
product of the new circumstances brought about by the 
people's struggle led by the party. The Cairo authorities 
were not able to understand the new atmosphere o-f the Arab 
struggle, thus they re-fused to cooperate with the party and 
declared their withdrawal -from the Convenant. 
Under these new circumstances the Sixth 
National Convention o-f the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party was 
convened. On the threshold to positive struggle, the 
constructive struggle, the Sixth National Convention meets. 
It meets -full of hope and determination to lead the new 
battle. It meets with the same faith in the Arab people and 
with cognisance of the historical responsibility placed upon 
it. 
The Convention commenced its meeting on 
October 5, 1963, and terminated on October 23, 1963. The 
Convention discussed the party organisation and direction of 
the authorities in the two Regions and studied some 
theoretical problems facing the Arab struggle; appropriate 
decisions were made. 
The Convention also discussed the political 
union of the two Regions - the Syrian and Iraqi - and the 
application of Socialist measures. It made appropriate 
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decisions. 
The Convention discussed Arab international 
political problems and made appropriate decisions. 
What -follows are the principal decisions o-f 
the Convention. Full explanations o-f these decisions will 
be issued later. 
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ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE PARTY AND THE 
PARTY^s RELATION TO THE MASSES AND 
TO THE AUTHORITIES 
1. The Convention studied, in a general way, the 
organizational problems o-f the party and 
rea-f-firmed its principle o-f collective leadership 
in party activity; this, to re-flect the democracy 
of the party at the top. 
The Convention concluded that the 
party's experience has con-firmed the principle of 
democratic centralism in which it believes. The 
establishment of a. balance between centralism on 
the one hand and democracy on the other permits 
the free and responsible exercise of the party's 
struggle, and also preserves party unity while on 
the other hand realising democracy. 
2. In a serious study of the party's situation in 
Syria and Iraq, the Convention paid particular 
attention to the forthcoming Socialist revolution. 
The Convention agreed that the social composition 
of the party would influence the Socialist 
revolution. Therefore, the Convention decided 
that the party's Socialist goals mut be a 
reflection of its social composition since the 
Socialist revolution would rfest on workers and 
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peasants who must be at the base of the revolution 
and the party at the same time. 
3. In these circumastances where the party is in 
authority in both the Syrian and Iraqi Regions, 
the Convention warns against the infiltration of 
the party by opportunists, or the succumbing of 
some party elements to the temptations of power 
that will cause them to look down on the non-party 
masses. 
The Convention affirmed that membership 
in the party could only mean a tremendous 
responsibility to be borne by the member. Members 
should confine themselves to carrying out their 
responsibilities. Their rights are the same as 
those accorded to any citizen without the addition 
of any privileges. 
The convention agreed that the nonparty 
masses have the right to criticize and oversee 
party members. The Convention considers this 
supervision by the nonparty masses a natural right 
of the people that guarantees that process of 
rapport between the people and the party and 
between the party and the authorities. 
This popular supervision was considered 
a means to check against the temptations of power 
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and a means to check against the rise of bourgeois 
tendencies within the party. 
The Convention emphasized that careful, 
attention be? paid to the behaviour of prospective 
party members, that requirements for membership be 
made more stringent, and that the period of party 
training be lengthened to make certain of the 
prospective member's characteristics and readiness 
to struggle. 
4. Regarding the relation between the party and the 
state, the Convention decided upon the necessity 
of complete separation between the state and the 
party. It cautioned against the possibility of 
party involvement in the routine of day-to-day 
government. The Convention considers the party as 
leader and director of the basic political 
problems of the state. 
The Convention recognised the necessity 
of having a larger proportion of party leadership 
devoted to the direction of party activity. 
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DECISIONS CONCERNING SOME THEORETICAL 
PROBLEMS DEALING WITH THE PARTY IDEOLOGY AND 
THE ARAB NATIONAL STRUGGLE 
The Convention discussed a number o-f problems o-f 
the Arab struggle. It discussed some of the 
theoretical problems dealing with Arab unity, 
socialism, popular democracy, and the party's 
stand vis-a-vis international Socialist thought. 
The Convention recognized the two basic 
characteristics o-f the party's ideology, 
pragmatism and revolutionism, within the national 
framework. 
The Convention then criticized some of 
the outdated opinions and thoughts left behind as 
the party ideology advanced. Such criticism 
allows the ideological evolution of the party to 
meet future needs while maintaining continuity 
with the party's heritage, in a manner that 
guarantees the ideological and organizational 
unity of the party and provides for revolutionary 
and scientific solutions to the problems of the 
Arab national struggle. 
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PROBLEMS OF THE SOCIALIST PROGRAM IN THE 
TWO RESIONS OF SYRIA AND IRAQ 
The Convantion discussed the problems o-f 
conversion to a Socialist regime in the Regions o-f 
Syria and Iraq and decided to proceed with it on a 
democratic basis and with popular participation. 
FolloMing a scientific discussion o-f the 
sociopolitical and class composition in the two 
Regions of Syria and Iraq, the Convention 
reiterated that the party should be based in the 
masses in preparation for the establishment o-f a 
revolutionary and democratic experiment in the two 
Regions that will influence the course of events 
in the entire Arab fatherland and provide the 
objective circumstances for interaction with other 
movements in the Arab fatherland. 
On the basis of a scientific analysis of economic 
and political conditions in the two Regions, the 
Convention concluded that the bourgeoisie is 
unable to carry out any positive task in the 
economic sphere. Furthermore, the opportunism of 
the bourgeoisie qualifies it for the role of ally 
to the new colonialism. The workers, peasants, 
revolutionary civil and military intelligentsia, 
and the petit bourgeoisie were considered the 
proper forces for achievement of the Socialist 
revolution in its initial stage. 
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8. In an attempt to visualise the extent of Socialist 
evolution in the two Regions, and guided by 
Socialist experiments elsewhere in the world, the 
Convention asserted the necessity o-f democratic 
worker's participation in administration in the 
two Regions during the stage o-f state capitalism. 
The Convention cautioned against 
bureaucratic tendencies and stressed the necessity 
•for a continual curbing and eventual liquidation 
o-f such tendencies. 
9. The Convention paid particular attention to the 
growth of governmental agencies and the relation 
o-f these to the party and the masses. 
The Convention approved a detailed 
policy of a revolutionary and democratic 
development of these agencies in a manner that 
would permit them to participate fully in the 
process of conversion to socialism. The 
Convention asserted that the principal task would 
be proper evolution rather than mutation. 
Evolution should be the basis, mutation the 
exception. Such a plan is necessitated by humane 
considerations and by a faith in the citizen's 
consciousness. 
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As -for the land problem, the Convention 
concluded with revolutionary and Socialist 
decisions. The Convention agreed on the necessity 
o-f take-o-f-f from a revolutionary basis, and 
considered the agricultural revolution as a 
necessary step toward a quick economic development 
in the industrial sector. Thus the goal o-f 
establishing collective farms, administered by the 
peasants themselves, in those lands covered by 
agricultural reform, was considered the proper 
Socialist take-off point for the oncoming change 
in social relationships. Such a revolutionary 
goal, coupled with peasant participation in the 
agricultural sphere, is a necessary element in the 
success of the Socialist revolution. 
10. The Convention also asserted the importance of 
Socialist planning in the regional and Arab 
spheres. Planning was considered the practical 
method by which all the national material, human, 
and natural resources could be scientifically and 
practically utilised. The Convention also 
emphasized industrialization and industrial 
development. Investments should be centered in 
those more important spheres that guarantee real 
national economic development, rather than in 
those ostentatious accomplishments that do not 
increase real production. 
C228] 
11. The Convention laid out a Socialist policy in the 
field o-f social services. It drew attention to 
the apparent paradox between ostentatious and 
unnecessary spending in government and the Iw 
standard of living of the masses. Austerity 
should be practiced by the well-to-do and the 
government agencies as well. 
The Convention considered the problems 
o,f education and the establishment of compulsory 
education. It stressed the need to eradicate 
illiteracy and to give the education of youth a 
scientific and national coloring that would go 
hand in hand with human knowledge. The education 
plan should correspond with the requirements of 
development and should stress higher 
specialization. It should look to an expansion of 
the scientific fields in the universities and to 
raising their standards. 
The Convention agreed on the necessity 
of expanding services in the rural areas and the 
poor and distant districts. Free and socialised 
medicine was considered the most basic aspect of 
Socialist thought. The Convention put forth the 
policy to execute this program beginning with 
expansion of medical school facilities and 
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eKpansion o-f present government medical services 
until the eventual liquidation O'f private 
medicine. 
12. The Convention studied the National Guard program. 
Despite some o-f the shortcomings and mistakes o-f 
this program it was considered a sa-feguard o-f the 
revolution. The Guard should be expanded and 
developed to become capable o-f ful-filling 
revolutionary tasks and educating the masses. Any 
mistakes committed by members o-f the National 
Guard should be dealth with -firmly. 
The Convention a-f-firmed the right o-f 
papular organizations for workers, students, 
pro-f essionals, and women that are within the 
national Socialist line. It a-f-firmed the 
association's re;atove autonomy with regard to the 
state as long as the latter is in the process of 
achieving its Socialist program. The existence of 
such associations was considered a necessity 
dictated by the interests of groups and classes. 
The Convention affirmed the right of the working 
class to have political parties. 
13. The Convention paid particular attention to 
ideological education in the Armed Forces and 
affirmed the right of its members to practice 
their full political rights. the Convention 
C2303 
considered the carganic incorporation of the 
revolutionary civilian and military vanguard as 
the only way to create an ideological interaction 
between the two groups. This would mean a 
practical unity o-f action and thought and would 
incorporate the popular and armed •forces in a 
combined Socialist effort. Ideological education 
for the armed forces would create a new and 
revolutionary understanding between the officers 
and the men. 
The Convention affirmed the necessity of 
compulsory military service in an underdeveloped 
country where such service could become a school 
for peasant soldiers, thus sharing in the 
eradication of illiteracy in the rural areas. 
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CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF THE ARAB STRUGGLE 
14. Following Cairo's withdrawal -from the Triparite 
Unity Agreement, the party finds itself compelled 
to establish unity between Syria and Iraq. Thus 
the Convention agreed on the principle of 
establishing a federal union between the Syrian 
and Iraqi Regions. The Convention regarded the 
new union as a step toward complete Arab unity and 
as capable of fusing the revolutionary energies in 
the two Regions. The new state was considered as 
a stage in the struggle for complete unity, and 
open for others to join. 
The Convention affirmed that the biggest 
unionist stride is that which brings Egypt to the 
new nation on the basis of democracy, regional 
equality, and collective leadership. 
15. The Convention considered the reactionary 
aggression by the maghrib on the Algerian 
revolution. The essence of the problem was not a 
mere border dispute; rather, the Convention 
considered the aggression only as another aspect 
of the struggle between progressivism and reaction 
in the African part of the Arab fatherland. The 
Convention insisted that the support of the 
Algerian revolution, with all its national, 
Socialist, revolutionary, and Arab 
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characteristics, is a guarantee of the success o-f 
the unionist Socialist revolution in the entire 
Arab -fatherland. 
There-fore, the party stands 
unhesitatingly with the Algerian revolution 
against the Maghrib reactionary aggression 
supported by the new and old colonialism. It 
calls on the governments o-f Syria and Iraq to 
o-f-fer the Algerian revolution any assistance it 
may require. 
16. The -first aspect o-f the resistance o-f Arab 
reaction is portrayed in its aggression on the 
Algerian revolution. the second aspect is its 
conspicuous and frank subservience to colonialism 
- a subservience that compel Is it to betray the 
Arab national cause daily. Thus the repressive 
measure utilised by the reactionary Maghrib 
authorities against Al-Ittihadal-Watani Li al-
Quwah al-Sha'biyyah CThe' National Union of Popular 
Forces] are an aspect of subservience to 
imperialism and a defense of the imperialist 
spheres of influence in the Maghrib. The 
Convention decided to condemn the repressive 
measures taken against Al-Ittihad al-Watani Li al-
Quwah al-Sha'biyyah and declare its support of the 
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latter against the -forces o-f reaction and 
imperial ism. 
17. The Convention care-fully considered the problem o-f 
diversion or pumping of the waters o-f the River 
Jordan and considered such a scheme a supreme 
military danger to the Arab -fatherland. Thus the 
party calls on all the Arab peoples and their 
governments to resist this danger by -force. The 
governments o-f Syria and Iraq in particular must 
resist this danger. It also calls on the United 
Arab government to resist this scheme even by the 
use of force and to cooperate in this endeavor 
with Syria and Iraq. 
IS. The Convention considered the Yemenite revolution 
and saw in it another aspect of the struggle 
between the Arab reactionary forces and the Arab 
peoples. The Convention saw in the Yemenite 
revolution a revolutionary take-off point to save 
the Arab south and the Arabian peninsula from the 
reactionaries and imperialist stooges. The 
Convention calls on all the progressive Arab 
forces to rally around the Yemenite revolution and 
support it against the reactionaries. In 
particular, the Convention calls on the 
revolutionary authorities in Syria and Iraq to aid 
and support the Yemenite revolution. Such support 
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should be viewed as a duty imposed by Arab destiny 
and an element in the de-feat of reaction. 
19. The Convention discussed the positive and negative 
aspects of Abdel Nasser's regime and reiterated 
the importance of the presence of the United Arab 
Republic, quantitatively and qualitatively, in any 
union. 
The positive aspects of Abdel Nasser's 
regime prompt the party to accept a union with it. 
The negative aspects, however, compel the party to 
accept Abdel Nasser's regime only as a partner but 
not as the basis of the union. The party 
considers this a condition that permits the 
process of correction and interaction of the 
revolutionary Arab movements. The Convention 
affirmed that Abdel Nasser's autocratic regime had 
imposed on the party an unnecessary struggle with 
it. 
The Convention agreed on the necessity 
of halting this struggle and finding mutual points 
of understanding among the libertarian Arab 
movements. 
20. The Convention studied carefully the development 
of the contemporary Arab problem in Palestine and 
concluded the necessity of recruiting the 
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Palestinian Arabs as the -first tool in the 
liberation o-f Palestine. 
The Convention recommends the 
establishment of a Palestine Liberation Front and 
calls on all Arab governments, and on Syria and 
Iraq in particular, to o-ffer all available 
resources to the establishment of this Front. All 
the necessary tools and revolutionary leadership 
should be provided. The Front must be kept out of 
disputes among Arab states. 
21. From its deep faith in the unity of the entire 
Arab world, the Convention stresses the necessity 
of establishing a Progressive Arab Front to 
include the entire Arab fatherland. 
?'? The Convention reaffirmed the basic revolutionary 
policy that has been pursued by the party since 
its establishment and that endeavours to support 
all national liberation movements against 
imperialism. The Convention exposed the recent 
methods of cooperation between the bourgeoisie and 
neoimperialism in defining the party's stand vis-
a-vis imperialism by explaining its role as a 
Socialist party belonging to a persecuted and 
colonized people. Therefore, the Convention 
cautioned against the belief that the construction 
of a Socialist society that places the people's 
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interest first cannot be completed without 
entailing a struggle against imperialism, and 
against every aspect o-f the exploitation o-f man. 
23. The Convention a-f-firmed the policy of nonalignment 
with international power blocs, and neutrality in 
the daily disputes o-f the blocs. 
24. But nonalignment should not be construed as a bar 
against closer and -friendlier relations with the 
people o-f the Socialist camp. 
25. The Convention a-f-firmed the necessity of 
strengthening the ties with the nations of the 
Third World, to which we belong and which pursues 
the policy of positive neutrality. Closer ties 
will mean strengthening the Front against 
imperial ism. 
26. The Convention decided to fight all types of 
racial discrimination in the world and to consider 
such a phenomenon as another characteristic of 
colonial capitalism. The Convention views South 
Africa as a new kind of Israel in Africa. The 
party stands against racial discrimination in this 
nation and extends its helping hand to all peoples 
struggling against the new and old imperialism. 
I K . < ^ 
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APPENDIX-C 
CONSTITUTION OF THE 
ARAB Bft'TH SOCIALIST PARTY 
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 
First Principle; Unity and Freedom o-f the Arab Nation 
The Arabs •form one nation. This nation has 
the natural right to live in a single state and to be -free 
to direct its own destiny. 
The Party o-f the Arab Ba'th there-fore 
believes that: 
1). The Arab -fatherland constitutes an indivisible 
political and economic unity. No Arab country can 
live apart -from the others. 
2). The Arab nation constitutes a cultural unity. Any 
di-f-ferences existing among its sons &re accidental 
and unimportant. They will all disappear with the 
awakening o-f the Arab consciousness. 
3). The Arab -fatherland belongs to the Arabs. They 
alone have the right to administer its a-f-fairs, to 
dispose o-f its wealth, and to direct its 
destinies. 
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Second Principle! Peraonality of the Arab Nation 
The Arab nation is characterized by virtues 
which are the result of its successive rebirths. These 
virtues are characterized by vitality and creativeness and 
by an ability for transformation and renewal. Its renewal 
is always linked to growth in personal freedom, and harmony 
between its evolution and the national interest. 
The Party of the Arab Ba'th therefore 
believes that: 
1). Freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of 
belief, as well as artistic freedom, are sacred. 
No authority can diminish them. 
2). The value of citizens is measured - once all 
opportunities have been given them - by the action 
they take to further the progress and prosperity 
of the Arab nation, without regard to any other 
cri terion. 
Third Principle; The Mission of the Arab Nation 
The Arab nation has an eternal mission. This 
mission reveals itself in ever new and related forms through 
the different stages of history. It aims at the renewal of 
human values, at the quickening of human progress, at 
increasing harmony and mutual help among the nations. 
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The Party o-f the Arab Ba'th there-fore 
believes that: 
1). Colonialism and all that goes with it is a 
criminal enterprise. The Arabs must -fight it with 
all possible means, just as they must take it on 
themselves to help, according to their physical 
and moral abilities, all peoples -fighting for 
their freedom. 
2). Humanity constitutes a whole, the interests of 
which are solidarity and the values and 
civilisation of which are common to all. The 
Arabs are enriched by world civilisation and 
enrich it in their turn. They stretch a fraternal 
hand to other nations and collaborate with them 
for the establishment of just institutions which 
will ensure for all the peoples prosperity and 
peace, as well as moral and spiritual advance. 
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GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
ARTICLE-1. 
The Party o-f the Arab Ba'th is a universal Arab party. 
It has branches in all the Arab countries. It does not 
concern itself with regional politics except in relation to 
the higher interests of the Arab cause. 
ARTICLE-2. 
The headquarters o-f the party is -for the time being 
located in Damascus. It can be transferred to any other 
Arab city if the national interest should require it. 
ARTICLE-3. 
The Party of the Arab Ba'th is a national party. It 
believes that nationalism is a living and eternal reality. 
It believes that the feeling of national awakening which 
intimately unites the individual to his nation is a sacred 
feeling. This feeling has within itself a potential of 
creative power; it binds itself to sacrifice, it seeks the 
exercise of responsibilities, and it directs the individual 
personality in a concrete and active manner. 
The national idea to which the party appeals 
is the will of the Arab people to free themselves and to 
unite. It demands that the opportunity be given to it to 
realize in history its Arab personality, and to collaborate 
with all the nations in all the fields which will ensure the 
march of humanity toward welfare and progress. 
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ARTICLE-4. 
The Party ai the Arab Ba'th is a Socialist party. It 
believes that socialism is a necessity which emanates from 
the depth o-f Arab nationalism itself. Socialism 
constitutes, in fact, the ideal social order which will 
allow the Arab people to realise its possibilities and to 
enable its genius to flourish, and which will ensure for the 
nation constant progress in its material and moral output. 
It makes possible a trustful brotherhood among its members. 
ARTICLE-5. 
The Party of the Arab Ba'th is a popular party. It 
believes that sovereignty is the property of the people, who 
alone is the source of all authority. It believes that the 
value of the state is the outcome of the will of the masses 
from which it issues and that this value is sacred only to 
the extent that the masses have exercised their choice 
freely. That is why, in the accomplishment of its mission, 
the party relies on the people with whom it seeks to 
establish intricate contact, the spiritual, moral, material, 
and physical level of whom it is trying to raise, in order 
that the people may become conscious of its personality and 
that it may become able to exercise its right in private and 
public life. 
ftRTICLE-6. 
The Party of the Arab Ba'th is revolutionary. It 
believes that its main objectives for the realization of the 
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renaissance o-f Arab nationalism or -for the establishment of 
socialism cannot be achieved e;;cept by means oi revolution 
and struggle. To rely on slow evolution and to be satisfied 
with a partial and superficial reform is to threaten these 
aims and to conduce to their failure and their loss. 
This is why the party decides in favour of: 
1). The struggle against foreign colonialism, in order 
to liberate the Arab fatherland completely and 
f inally. 
2). The struggle to gather all the Arabs in a single 
independent state. 
3). The overthrow of the present faulty structure - an 
overthrow which will include all the sectors of 
intellectual, economic, social, and political 
life. 
ARTICLE-7. 
The Arab fatherland is that part of the globe inhabited 
by the Arab nation which stretches from the Tauru Mountain, 
The Pocht-i-Kouh Mountains, the Gulf of Basra, the Arab 
Ocean, the Ethiopian Mountains, the Sahara, the Atlantic 
Ocean, and the Mediterranean. 
ARTICLE-8. 
The official language of the state, as well as that of 
all the citizens, is Arabic. It alone is recognised in 
correspondence and in teaching. 
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ARTICLE-9. 
The emblem oi the Arab state is that of the Arab 
revolution begun in 1916 to liberate and unify the Arab 
nation. 
ARTICLE-10. 
An Arab is he whose language is Arabic, who has lived 
on Arab soil, or who, after having been assimilated to Arab 
life, has faith in his belonging to the Arab nation. 
ARTICLE-11. 
To be excluded from the Arab fatherland: whoever has 
fought for or has belonged to a factious anti-Arab 
association, whoever has lent himself inside the Arab 
fatherland to colonial ends. 
ARTICLE-12. 
The Arab woman enjoys all the rights of citizenship. 
The party struggles to raise up woman's level in order to 
make her fit to exercise these rights. 
ARTICLE-13. 
The party strives to give all the citizens the same 
opportunities in the field of schooling and livelihood in 
order that, in the various aspects of human activityj 
everyone should be equally able to show his real abilities 
and to develop them to the maximum. 
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THE WAYi INTERNAL POLICY OF THE PARTY 
ARTICLE-14. 
The regime o-f the Arab state will be a constitutional 
parliamentary regime. Executive power is responsible before 
the legislative, which is directly elected by the people. 
ARTICLE-15. 
The national tie is the only tie that may exist in the 
Arab state. It ensures harmony among all the citizens by 
melting them in the crucible of a single nation and 
counteracts all religious, communal, tribal, racial or 
regional factions. 
ARTICLE-16. 
The administrative system of the Arab state is a system 
of decentralization. 
ARTICLE-17. 
The party strives to make popular feeling universal and 
to make the power of the people a living reality in the life 
of the individual. It undertakes to give the state a 
constitution guaranteeing to all Arab citizens absolute 
equality before the law, the right to express their opinions 
in absolute freedom, and a true choice of their 
representatives, thus ensuring for them a free life within 
the framework of the law. 
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ARTICLE-18. 
A single code of laws is to be established freely for 
the whole of the Arab nation. This code will be in 
conformity with the spirit of the times and will take into 
account the past experiences of the Arab nation. 
ARTICLE-19. 
The judicial power will be independent. It will be 
free from interference by other powers and enjoy total 
i mmuni ty. 
ARTICLE-20. 
The rights of citizenship are granted in their totality 
to every citizen living on Arab soil who is devoted to the 
Arab fatherland and who has no connection with any factious 
association. 
ARTICLE-21. 
Military service is compulsory in the Arab fatherland. 
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FOREIGN POLICY OF THE PARTY 
ARTICLE-22. 
The -foreign policy o-f the Arab state will be guided by 
the interests of Arab nationalism and o-f the eternal mission 
o-f the Arabs which seeks to establish in cooperation with 
other nations a -free, harmonious, and secure world, 
continuously advancing in progress. 
ARTICLE-23. 
The Arabs will struggle with all their power to destroy 
the foundations o-f colonialism and of foreign occupation and 
to suppress all foreign political or economic influence in 
their country. 
ARTICLE-24. 
Since the Arab people is the sole source of power, all 
treaties, pacts, and documents concluded by governments 
which detract from the total sovereignty of the Arabs will 
be abrogated. 
ARTICLE-25. 
Arab foreign policy seeks to give a true picture of the 
will of the Arabs to live in freedom, and of their sincere 
desire to see all other nations enjoy the same liberty. 
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ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE PARTY 
ARTICLE-26. 
The party o-f the Arab Ba'th is a Socialist party. It 
believes that the economic wealth of the fatherland belongs 
to the nation. 
ARTICLE-27. 
The present distribution of wealth in the Arab 
fatherland is unjust. Therefore a review and a just 
redistribution will become necessary. 
ARTICLE-28. 
The equality of all the citizens is founded on human 
values. This is why the party forbids the exploitation of 
the work of others. 
ARTICLE-29. 
Public utilities, extensive natural resources, big 
industry, and the means of transport are the property of the 
nation. The state will manage them directly and will 
abolish private companies and foreign concessions. 
ARTICLE-30. 
Ownership of agricultural land will be so limited as to 
be in proportion to the means of the proprietor to exploit 
all his lands without exploitation of the efforts of others. 
This will be under the control of the state and in 
conformity with its over-all economic plan. 
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ARTICLE-31. 
Small industrial ownership will be so limited as to be 
related to the standard o-f living o-f the citizens of the 
state as a whole. 
ARTICLE-32. 
Workers will participate in the management of their 
factory. In addition to their wages - fixed by the state -
they will receive a proportion of the profits, also fixed by 
the state. 
ARTICLE-33. 
Ownership of immovable property is allowed to all the 
citizens so long as they do not exploit it to harm of 
others, and so long as the state ensures for all citizens a 
minimum of immovable property. 
ARTICLE-34. 
Property and inheritance are two natural rights. They 
are protected within the limits of the national interest. 
ARTICLE-35. 
Usurious loans are prohibited between citizens. One 
state bank is to be founded to issue currency, which the 
national output will back. This bank will finance the vital 
agricultural and industrial plans of the nation. 
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ARTICLE-3&. 
The state will control directly internal and external 
trade in order to abolish the exploitation o-f the consumer 
by the producer. The state will protect them both, as it 
will protect the national output against the competition o-f 
•foreign -foods and will ensure equilibirum between exports 
and imports. 
ftRTICLE-37. 
Beneral planning, inspired by the most modern economic 
ideas, will be organized so that the Arab -fatherland will be 
industrialized, national production developed, new outlets 
opened for it, and the industrial economy of each region 
directed according to its potential and to the raw material 
it contains. 
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SOCIAL POLICY OF THE PARTY 
ARTICLE-38. 
Family, Procreation, Marriage. 
1). The -family is the basic cell o-f the nation. It is 
•for the state to protect, to develop, and to help 
it. 
2). Procreation is a trust given in the first place to 
the -family and then to the state. Both must 
ensure its increase, ctnd look to the health and 
education of the descendants. 
3). Marriage is a national duty. The state must 
encourage it, facilitate it, and control it. 
ARTICLE-39. 
Public Health. The state will build, at its expense, 
institutions of preventive medicine, dispensaries, and 
hospitals which will meet the needs of all citizens, for 
whom the state ensures free medical treatment. 
ARTICLE-40 LABOUR: 
1). Labour is an obligation for all those who are 
capable of it. It is for the state to ensure that 
work is available to every citizen, whether 
intellectual or manual. 
2). The employer must ensure at the least a decent 
standard of living for his employee. 
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3). The state sees to the maintenance o-f all persons 
incapable o-f work. 
4). Just laws will be promulgated to limit the 
workman's daily hours o-f work, to give him the 
right to paid weekly and annual holidays, to 
protect his rights, to ensure social security -for-
him in old age, and to indemnify him -for any 
cessation of work, whether partial or total. 
5). Free workmen's and peasant's unions will be 
established and encouraged, so that they may 
constitute an instrument efficient in the defense 
of their rights, in raising their standard of 
living, in developing their abilities, in 
increasing the opportunities offered to them, in 
creating among them a spirit of solidarity, and in 
representing them in joint works councils. 
6). Joint works councils will be created in which the 
state and the unions of workmen and peasants will 
be represented. These councils will have power to 
decide the issues arising among the unions, the 
works managers, and the representatives of the 
state. 
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ARTICLE-41. CULTURE AND SOCIETY. 
1). The party seeks to develop a general national 
culture -for the whole Arab -fatherland which shall 
be Arab, liberal, progressive, extensive, 
pro-found, and humanist; it attempts to disseminate 
it in all sections of the population. 
2). The state is responsible -for the protection o-f the 
liberty o-f speech, o-f publication, o-f assembly, o-f 
protest, and o-f the press, within the limits o-f 
the higher Arab national interest. It is, for the 
state to facilitate all the means and the 
modalities which tend to realize this liberty. 
3). Intellectual work is one of the most sacred kinds. 
It is the state's concern to protect and encourage 
intellectuals and scientists. 
4). Within the limits of the Arab national idea, every 
freedom will be given for the foundation of clubs, 
associations, parties, youth groupings, and 
tourist organisations, as well as for obtaining 
profit from the cinema, radio, television, and all 
the other facilities of modern civilization in 
order to spread generally the national culture, 
and to contribute to the entertainment of the 
people. 
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ARTICLE-42. 
Separation o-f the classes and di-f-ferentiation among 
them are abolished. The separation of the classes is the 
consequence of a faulty social order. Therefore, the party 
carries on its struggle among the laboring and oppressed 
classes of society so that such separation and 
differentiation will come to an end and the citizens will 
recover the whole of their human dignity and will be enabled 
to live in the shadow of a just social order in which 
nothing will distinguish one citizen from another except 
intellectual capacity and manual skill. 
ftRTILE-43 NOMADISM 
Nomadism is a primitive social state. It decreases the 
national output and makes an important part of the nation a 
paralysed member and an obstacle to. its development and 
progress. The party struggles for the sedentarisation of 
nomads by grant of lands to them, for the abolition of 
tribal customs, and for the application to the nomads of the 
laws of the state. 
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POLICY OF THE PARTY IN EDUCATION AND TEACHING 
The educational policy o-f the party aims at 
the creation oi a new Arab generation which believes in the 
unity o-f the nation, and in the eternity of its mission. 
This policy, based on scientific reasoning, will be -freed 
•from the shackles of superstitions and reactionary 
traditions; it will be imbued with the spirit of optimism, 
of struggle, and of solidarity among all citizens in the 
carrying out of a total Arab revolution, and in the cause of 
human progress. 
Therefore the party decides as follows: 
ARTICLE-44. 
A national Arab stamp will mark all the aspects of 
intellectual, economic, political, architectural, and 
artistic life. The party establishes once again the links 
of the Arab nation with its glorious history and urges it 
toward a future even more glorious and more exemplary. 
ARTICLE-45. 
Teaching is one of the exclusive functions of the 
state. Therefore, all foreign and private educational 
institutions 3.re abolished. 
ARTICLE-46. 
Education at all stages shall be free for all citizens. 
Primary and secondary education shall be compulsory. 
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flRTICLE-47 
Pr o-f e s s i o n a l s c h o o l s w i t h t h e most modern equ ipment 
s h a l l be e s t a b l i s h e d , where e^ducation s h a l l be - f r ee . 
ARTICLE-48. 
Teaching cs.reerB and all that relates to education are 
set aside -for Arab citizens. An exception to this rule is 
made in the instance of higher education. 
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AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION 
SINGLE ARTICLE. 
The -fundamental and general principles o-f the 
Constitution cannot be amended. Other articles may, 
however, be amended, provided that two-thirds of the General 
Council o-f the party agree thereto, on a motion put by the 
Executive Council, or by a quarter o-f the members of the 
Generaql Council, or by ten members of the Party 
Organi sation. 
